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GH-49760: Document differences between bugs and security vulnerabilities#49761

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alamb wants to merge 3 commits intoapache:mainfrom
alamb:alamb/improve_security_dics
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GH-49760: Document differences between bugs and security vulnerabilities#49761
alamb wants to merge 3 commits intoapache:mainfrom
alamb:alamb/improve_security_dics

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@alamb alamb commented Apr 15, 2026

Rationale for this change

The current security model documented https://arrow.apache.org/docs/dev/format/Security.html

Does not explicitly address what constitutes a bug vs a security vulnerability. We should make this clear

This is a follow on to the security documentation added by @pitrou in

What changes are included in this PR?

Add a section to the format security document that defines bugs vs security vulnerabilitty

Are these changes tested?

Not sure

Are there any user-facing changes?

Yes as it defines our security posture more generally

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Thanks for opening a pull request!

If this is not a minor PR. Could you open an issue for this pull request on GitHub? https://github.com/apache/arrow/issues/new/choose

Opening GitHub issues ahead of time contributes to the Openness of the Apache Arrow project.

Then could you also rename the pull request title in the following format?

GH-${GITHUB_ISSUE_ID}: [${COMPONENT}] ${SUMMARY}

or

MINOR: [${COMPONENT}] ${SUMMARY}

See also:

@github-actions github-actions bot added the awaiting committer review Awaiting committer review label Apr 15, 2026
@alamb alamb marked this pull request as draft April 15, 2026 11:21
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alamb commented Apr 15, 2026

@github-actions crossbow submit preview-docs

@alamb alamb changed the title [GH 49760]: Document differences between bugs and security vulnerabilities GH-49760: Document differences between bugs and security vulnerabilities Apr 15, 2026
@alamb alamb marked this pull request as ready for review April 15, 2026 11:23
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Revision: 705ce5c

Submitted crossbow builds: ursacomputing/crossbow @ actions-a1e6cabe5e

Task Status
preview-docs GitHub Actions

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pitrou commented Apr 15, 2026

I think such guidelines should really be implementation-specific. Some implementations may want to have different opinions on what deserves a CVE and the associated ceremonial.

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alamb commented Apr 15, 2026

I think such guidelines should really be implementation-specific. Some implementations may want to have different opinions on what deserves a CVE and the associated ceremonial.

I am happy to close this PR if others agree (or want this to be targeted just at the C/C++ implementation)

I made a PR for arrow-rs here and I can incorporate the guidance there too


* Execute arbitrary code (RCE);
* Exfiltrate sensitive information from process memory (Information Disclosure);
* Cause a sustained Denial of Service (DoS) affecting the broader system.
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Here we define DoS as an exploitable issue, but then say that process crashes are not exploitable?

I think what gets tricky is technically any arrow API could be exposed by a client application, and therefore in theory could be exploitable in that applications context.

I wonder if we need to distinguish between network APIs, e.g. arrow flight, and internal APIs?

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yeah, I was hedging with "sustained" and "affecting the broader system" . I guess in my mind I don't think we should treat panics or OOMs as security issues (they are bugs certainly)

I want it to be clear to downstream users that they need to take other precautions (like process sandboxing, and cgroups for example) to make their systems resilent rather than assume we will treat every bug as a security issue

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Maybe we should just remove "denial of service" from the list 🤔

@github-actions github-actions bot added awaiting changes Awaiting changes and removed awaiting committer review Awaiting committer review labels Apr 15, 2026
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3 participants