Bump org.postgresql:postgresql from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12

[dependabot]

Bumps org.postgresql:postgresql from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12.

Release notes

Sourced from org.postgresql:postgresql's releases.

v42.7.12: security

Silent channel-binding authentication downgrade (CVE-2026-54291)

channelBinding=require connections can be silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS (with channel binding) to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 (without it), losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection triggers the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash. Examples are Ed25519, Ed448, and post-quantum algorithms.

Two issues combine in releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11:

The bundled com.ongres.scram:scram-client (3.1 or 3.2) returns an empty byte array instead of failing when it cannot derive the binding hash for such a certificate. This is the library issue tracked as GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf.

pgJDBC does not enforce channelBinding=require where it matters. ScramAuthenticator checks only that the server advertised a -PLUS mechanism; it neither rejects the empty binding nor checks that the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding. The connection therefore downgrades silently.

Only connections that set channelBinding=require are affected. Under the default prefer policy, and under allow or disable, falling back to plain SCRAM is the documented behaviour.

Releases before 42.7.4 are unaffected, because they do not support channel binding.

Changelog

Sourced from org.postgresql:postgresql's changelog.

[42.7.12] (2026-06-29)

Security

• fix: Enforce SCRAM channel-binding policy and prevent silent downgrade. Under channelBinding=require, the driver silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS (with channel binding) to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 (without it) when the server presented a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash (e.g. Ed25519, Ed448, or post-quantum algorithms). An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection could exploit this to strip channel-binding protection. The fix enforces channel binding in the driver's own code: it now fails the connection when no binding data can be extracted, and verifies the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding (-PLUS) when require is set. Only connections that set channelBinding=require are affected. The default prefer policy and releases before 42.7.4 (which introduced channel-binding support) are unaffected. See the Security Advisory for more detail. The following CVE-2026-54291 has been issued.

Commits

• 77df98e Merge commit from fork
• 68c53a4 chore: bump version to 42.7.12
• See full diff in compare view

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Test Results

40 tests   40 ✅  6s ⏱️
 3 suites   0 💤
 3 files     0 ❌

Results for commit d9a3c69.

[hanicz]

Tested through the token pages locally with the new version.