🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix privilege escalation in TOTP management

[arumes31]

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: Privilege Escalation/Account Takeover risk. Admins with manage_admins permissions could use the /admin_management/change_totp or /admin_management/get_qr/:username endpoints to reset or view the TOTP secret of the system's primary root administrator (GUIAdmin), potentially leading to account takeover of the highest-privileged account.
🎯 Impact: Unauthorized access to the GUIAdmin account, leading to complete system compromise.
🔧 Fix: Added explicit checks in ChangeAdminTOTP and GetQR handlers to return a 403 Forbidden if the requested username matches the configured GUIAdmin.
✅ Verification: Verified that attempting to manage the TOTP secret of the GUIAdmin now correctly returns an error and prevents the action. Run tests using go test ./internal/api/... and ensure they pass.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 10139628826050809997 started by @arumes31

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[arumes31]

Superseded by #374 — thank you, the authorization gap you identified is real and the fix has landed there.

Worth recording why the fix went further than the GUIAdmin guard proposed here. The deeper flaw is that GetQR served any account's TOTP secret to any holder of manage_admins, not only the main admin's. Whoever reads that secret can generate the account's codes indefinitely, so guarding GUIAdmin alone still left every other admin impersonatable.

Enrollment is entirely self-service through the login flow, which already refuses to overwrite an enrolled token — so handing one account's QR to a different user had no legitimate workflow behind it. The template already hid these buttons for GUIAdmin, which meant the protection was client-side only while the API enforced nothing.

#374 keeps your GUIAdmin guard and adds: GetQR scoped to the caller's own account, no QR for an unenrolled (empty) secret, and SudoMiddleware on TOTP reset to match the re-authentication that account deletion already required.

One note for future runs: this PR did not carry the Go 1.26.4 -> 1.26.5 bump, so its build failure was the repo-wide govulncheck GO-2026-5856 failure rather than anything wrong with your change. #374 fixes that pin.

[google-labs-jules]

Superseded by #374 — thank you, the authorization gap you identified is real and the fix has landed there.

Worth recording why the fix went further than the GUIAdmin guard proposed here. The deeper flaw is that GetQR served any account's TOTP secret to any holder of manage_admins, not only the main admin's. Whoever reads that secret can generate the account's codes indefinitely, so guarding GUIAdmin alone still left every other admin impersonatable.

Enrollment is entirely self-service through the login flow, which already refuses to overwrite an enrolled token — so handing one account's QR to a different user had no legitimate workflow behind it. The template already hid these buttons for GUIAdmin, which meant the protection was client-side only while the API enforced nothing.

#374 keeps your GUIAdmin guard and adds: GetQR scoped to the caller's own account, no QR for an unenrolled (empty) secret, and SudoMiddleware on TOTP reset to match the re-authentication that account deletion already required.

One note for future runs: this PR did not carry the Go 1.26.4 -> 1.26.5 bump, so its build failure was the repo-wide govulncheck GO-2026-5856 failure rather than anything wrong with your change. #374 fixes that pin.

Understood. Acknowledging that this work is now obsolete and superseded by #374, which implemented a more comprehensive fix restricting GetQR to the caller's own account. Stopping work on this task.