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Security gap: no WAF at the public ingress edge #1147

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@gangster

Surfaced by the Security Model spine doc's gap register (docs/learn/spine/the-security-model.md).

Gap (4C: Cloud/Code — OWASP edge defense). Public ingress (Gateway API + Cilium Envoy) is TLS-terminated and hostname-scoped, but nothing inspects requests for OWASP-class attack patterns (injection, XSS, path traversal, bad bots). App-layer runtime defense is the thinnest part of the model today (we have SAST in CI, but no runtime shield).

Do: evaluate AWS WAF on the ingress NLB/ALB vs. an Envoy/Cilium-level WAF (e.g. Coraza/OWASP CRS); add managed rule sets + rate limiting; decide platform-managed vs. per-Product opt-in.

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    area/networkVPC, Cilium, TGW, DNS, Tailscale, GatewaydeferredIntentionally parked until a trigger (prod, regulated tier, second zone, ...)securitySecurity hardening, posture, or risk reduction

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