v0.8.0

Security

• Added cryptographic verification for AP2 v0.2.0 dSD-JWT mandate chains, including every
  delegation signature and binding, terminal audience and nonce, validity windows, typed payloads,
  and open-to-closed constraints.
• Required an explicit local public P-256 trust root. Key paths are confined to the contract
  directory, private JWK material is rejected, reads are bounded, and remote key discovery is never
  attempted.
• Redacted mandate tokens selected by AP2 assertions before JSON, JUnit, terminal, or evidence
  output while preserving unrelated response data. Verification failures do not echo untrusted
  token payloads.

Features

• Added expect.ap2 assertions for signed payment and checkout mandate chains. Official AP2 data
  keys are inferred from the mandate type, with optional response-part filters and custom JSON
  Pointer paths.
• Added payment checks for expected transaction IDs and open-checkout references, plus checkout
  checks for expected hashes and automatic binding of checkout_hash to the signed
  checkout_jwt.

Documentation

• Added a focused AP2 guide covering the pinned official SDK install, trust-root setup, payment and
  checkout examples, verification semantics, redaction, and current protocol boundary.

Maintenance

• Added a pinned CI integration test against the official AP2 v0.2.0 source commit. It creates
  valid payment and checkout chains, verifies both, and rejects a tampered signature.
• Confirmed real interoperability between the current A2A client and an AP2-style A2A 0.3.24
  JSON-RPC server, including legacy extension-header translation and signed mandate transport.
• Extended the generated configuration schema and deterministic mutation target for AP2 while
  retaining complete statement and branch coverage.