Termul runs shells, reads/writes files, and talks to AI providers — so security bugs matter. If you find one, please tell us before posting it publicly.

Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories. Include:

• What the issue is and what it lets an attacker do
• Steps to reproduce (a small PoC is great)
• Version, OS, arch

We'll get back to you within a few days. Once it's fixed, we'll credit you in the release notes — unless you'd rather stay anonymous.

Please don't open a public GitHub issue for security reports.

Until 1.0.0, only the latest minor gets security fixes. Right now that's 0.1.x.

• The Rust backend in src-tauri/ (PTY, FS, IPC, plugins)
• The frontend in src/ — anywhere untrusted input lands (terminal output, file content, AI tool results, credentials)
• Release artifacts on GitHub

• Bugs in upstream deps (Tauri, xterm.js, CodeMirror, AI SDKs…) — report those upstream. We'll ship the fix once it's released.
• Anything that needs an already-compromised machine or a local attacker with shell access
• Older versions (< 0.1)

• API keys live in the OS keychain via keyring — not on disk, not in localStorage, not in logs.
• No telemetry. Termul only talks to the network when you ask it to (AI requests, update checks).
• AI tool approval. File writes and shell commands from the agent need your OK before they run.
• No Node in the renderer. The frontend only reaches the host through the allow-listed Tauri commands.

• Termul runs whatever you (or the agent) tell it to run, with your permissions. That's kind of the point of a terminal.
• AI providers see whatever you send them. Read their retention policies.
• Local LLM endpoints (LM Studio, OpenAI-compatible) are trusted at the network level — only point Termul at servers you control.