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Update module google.golang.org/protobuf to v1.33.0 [SECURITY]#100

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Update module google.golang.org/protobuf to v1.33.0 [SECURITY]#100
bootjp merged 1 commit intomainfrom
renovate/go-google.golang.org/protobuf-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate Bot commented Mar 13, 2024

Mend Renovate

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.32.0 -> v1.33.0 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-24786

The protojson.Unmarshal function can enter an infinite loop when unmarshaling certain forms of invalid JSON. This condition can occur when unmarshaling into a message which contains a google.protobuf.Any value, or when the UnmarshalOptions.DiscardUnknown option is set.


Release Notes

protocolbuffers/protobuf-go (google.golang.org/protobuf)

v1.33.0

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@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update module google.golang.org/protobuf to v1.33.0 [SECURITY] Update module google.golang.org/protobuf to v1.33.0 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Mar 16, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Mar 16, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot deleted the renovate/go-google.golang.org/protobuf-vulnerability branch March 16, 2024 10:23
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update module google.golang.org/protobuf to v1.33.0 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Update module google.golang.org/protobuf to v1.33.0 [SECURITY] Mar 16, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Mar 16, 2024
@renovate renovate Bot restored the renovate/go-google.golang.org/protobuf-vulnerability branch March 16, 2024 10:31
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/go-google.golang.org/protobuf-vulnerability branch from 69b3ceb to 62479f6 Compare March 16, 2024 10:32
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/go-google.golang.org/protobuf-vulnerability branch from 62479f6 to caac0b1 Compare March 16, 2024 10:41
@bootjp bootjp merged commit aff49da into main Mar 16, 2024
@bootjp bootjp deleted the renovate/go-google.golang.org/protobuf-vulnerability branch March 16, 2024 11:06
bootjp added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 30, 2026
Two P1 follow-ups from Codex.

#100 Codex P1 -- overbroad fast path.
The previous len(raw)*3 > 240 fast path tripped for any input
longer than 80 bytes, including pure-ASCII keys whose 1:1 encoded
form would have fit fine. That converted reversible keys into
ErrShaFallbackNeedsKeymap unnecessarily. Replaced with:
  1. len(raw) > maxSegmentBytes -> SHA fallback (1:1 lower bound;
     no encoding can fit).
  2. percentEncodeBounded: stream-encodes with an in-loop overflow
     check so the partial allocation is bounded to maxSegmentBytes
     even on adversarial inputs that DO need escaping. Returns
     ("", false) on overflow so the caller takes the SHA path
     without seeing the partial output.
TestEncodeSegment_LongUnreservedASCIIEncodesAsIs locks the
correct 200-byte-ASCII round-trip.

#146 Codex P1 -- b64. prefix collision.
A user STRING key like "b64.foo" was returned as-is by
EncodeSegment (all unreserved) and then misclassified by
DecodeSegment as a binary segment, decoding the base64 to "foo"
instead of round-tripping. EncodeSegment now promotes any input
whose percent-encoded form starts with the binary prefix to a
real SHA fallback, parallel to the existing SHA-shape collision
check, so KEYMAP.jsonl carries the original bytes.
TestEncodeSegment_KeyStartingWithBinaryPrefixIsPromotedToFallback
covers it.

The previous huge-input OOM-guard property (no all-at-once
3*len(raw) allocation) is preserved by percentEncodeBounded; the
existing TestEncodeSegment_HugeInputDoesNotMaterialiseFullExpansion
still passes.
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