fix(wab): bind verified identities to account operations - #333
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ty-everett
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July 25, 2026 21:55
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Summary
Why
The extended CodeQL review identified several validation guards for manual inspection. That review uncovered real authorization gaps: a valid OTP for one phone could be presented alongside another user's Shamir hash, deletion accepted any string with the expected prefix, a hard-coded historical phone/OTP pair bypassed Twilio, and an existing authentication identity could be reassigned to another live account.
This change makes the externally verified identity, stored user, and requested target agree before any sensitive operation. Deletion intents are now durable across service instances and resistant to forgery, replay, cross-flow reuse, and database growth.
Public-service compatibility
WAB remains a public protocol service. This PR does not narrow its public-by-default, credential-free wildcard CORS behavior. Operators retain the existing exact-origin allowlist and disabled modes. CSP remains an application/document policy rather than API authorization.
Validation
npm test -- --runInBand— 10 suites, 86 tests passednpm run test:coverage -- --runInBand— 67.47% statements overall; request validation 98.44%, deletion sessions 88.37%npm run buildnpm run lintnpm audit --audit-level=moderate— 0 vulnerabilitiespnpm audit --audit-level=high— no known vulnerabilitiespnpm health:check— 37 projects, 0 control errorspnpm check-versionsnode scripts/check-sdk-peer.mjsTracks #324.