Make the scanner say WHAT it found - #2
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The first version reported a count and nothing else. It now prints rule, file, line, commit and entropy (values still redacted), uploads the JSON report, and says what to do in both directions -- rotate a real credential, or allowlist a false positive by the narrowest mechanism the tool actually honours. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Follow-up to the scanner added earlier today. The first version reported
leaks found: 1and nothing else — no file, no line, no commit. That is a real defect: it sends you hunting through the whole history to find what it means.It now reports what it found — rule, file, line, commit, date, entropy, values still redacted — and uploads the JSON report as an artifact.
It also tells you what to do next, in both directions: rotate a real credential (rewriting history does not make a leaked key safe — the object stays retrievable by hash), or allowlist a false positive by the narrowest mechanism the tool honours, never a path, extension or whole rule.
One trap learned the hard way and written into the guidance: gitleaks 8.18 accepts a
fingerprintskey in the global allowlist, loads the config without complaint, and then ignores it. Anyone assuming fingerprints work would believe something was suppressed when it was not.🤖 Generated with Claude Code