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fix(deps): Update module google.golang.org/grpc to v1.79.3 [SECURITY]#2442

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Mar 19, 2026
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fix(deps): Update module google.golang.org/grpc to v1.79.3 [SECURITY]#2442
kodiakhq[bot] merged 2 commits intomainfrom
renovate/simple_plugin-go-google.golang.org-grpc-vulnerability

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@cq-bot cq-bot commented Mar 19, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
google.golang.org/grpc v1.79.2v1.79.3 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-33186

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

It is an Authorization Bypass resulting from Improper Input Validation of the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header.

The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the :path omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., Service/Method instead of /Service/Method). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official grpc/authz package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with /) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present.

Who is impacted?
This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:

  1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in google.golang.org/grpc/authz or custom interceptors relying on info.FullMethod or grpc.Method(ctx).
  2. Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).

The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed :path headers directly to the gRPC server.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a :path that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a codes.Unimplemented error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.

Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):

  • v1.79.3
  • The latest master branch.

It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially grpc/authz) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:

1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)

Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:

func pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
    if info.FullMethod == "" || info.FullMethod[0] != '/' {
        return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
    }   
    return handler(ctx, req)
}

// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain
s := grpc.NewServer(
    grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)

2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization

If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the :path header does not start with a leading slash.

3. Policy Hardening

Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.


Release Notes

grpc/grpc-go (google.golang.org/grpc)

v1.79.3: Release 1.79.3

Compare Source

Security

  • server: fix an authorization bypass where malformed :path headers (missing the leading slash) could bypass path-based restricted "deny" rules in interceptors like grpc/authz. Any request with a non-canonical path is now immediately rejected with an Unimplemented error. (#​8981)

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - At any time (no schedule defined), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

@kodiakhq kodiakhq bot merged commit bb4ccdc into main Mar 19, 2026
9 checks passed
@kodiakhq kodiakhq bot deleted the renovate/simple_plugin-go-google.golang.org-grpc-vulnerability branch March 19, 2026 04:10
kodiakhq bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 19, 2026
🤖 I have created a release *beep* *boop*
---


## [4.94.6](v4.94.5...v4.94.6) (2026-03-19)


### Bug Fixes

* **deps:** Update aws-sdk-go-v2 monorepo ([#2438](#2438)) ([15eb7ab](15eb7ab))
* **deps:** Update module github.com/cloudquery/plugin-pb-go to v1.27.10 ([#2445](#2445)) ([4222ea8](4222ea8))
* **deps:** Update module github.com/cloudquery/plugin-pb-go to v1.27.9 ([#2444](#2444)) ([2fa661d](2fa661d))
* **deps:** Update module google.golang.org/grpc to v1.79.2 ([#2439](#2439)) ([3389f5c](3389f5c))
* **deps:** Update module google.golang.org/grpc to v1.79.3 [SECURITY] ([#2442](#2442)) ([bb4ccdc](bb4ccdc))
* **deps:** Update module google.golang.org/grpc to v1.79.3 [SECURITY] ([#2443](#2443)) ([c3d6d7c](c3d6d7c))

---
This PR was generated with [Release Please](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please). See [documentation](https://github.com/googleapis/release-please#release-please).
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