v1.1.0 — Security hardening & operational maturity

A security-hardening and operational-maturity release, from a full audit of the shipped v1.0. One breaking change (below) that closes an open-relay footgun; everything else is additive or a fix.

Breaking

• auth_required = "none" on a public bind is now refused at config-parse time (#41). An SMTP listener with auth_required = "none" whose listen address is not verifiably loopback/private (e.g. :2525, 0.0.0.0:2525, a public IP, or an unresolvable hostname) is a startup error. Set trusted_network = true to assert the listener is reachable only from a trusted network — a Docker bridge with no ports: exposure, a VPN, or a firewall. Migration: deployments built from the pre-existing Ghost / Gitea / internal-relay recipes used auth_required = "none" with listen = ":2525" and must add trusted_network = true (the updated recipes include it). This closes the open-relay footgun where the sender allowlist was the only gate on an unauthenticated public listener.

Added

• SMTP listener brute-force and resource hardening (#50). Per-remote-IP AUTH-failure budget (10 failures/minute; further attempts get 421 and the connection closes; successful auths never consume budget). Global (max_connections, default 100) and per-IP (max_connections_per_ip, default 16) concurrent-connection caps; over-cap connections get a 421 before any protocol work.
• CSRF rejections now increment posthorn_spam_blocked_total{kind="csrf"} — previously they were log-only and invisible on /metrics.
• spam_blocked (honeypot and origin) and csrf_rejected log lines now carry client_ip for operator forensics, matching rate_limited; omitted when strip_client_ip = true (FR59).

Fixed

• An [smtp_listener]-only config (no [[endpoints]]) is now accepted — the config validator required at least one HTTP endpoint, breaking the documented Ghost and Gitea recipes and every SMTP-listener-only deployment. posthorn validate output now names the listener so a listener-only config doesn't report a bare "0 endpoint(s)". (#37)
• SMTP-listener sends now honor the FR19-22 retry policy — a transient provider error is retried once (as the HTTP ingress already did) instead of returning an immediate 451. Previously a provider blip could drop a transactional email on the SMTP path that the HTTP path would have retried. The retry policy is now shared between both ingresses. (#59)
• The HTTP server now sets ReadTimeout (15s) and WriteTimeout (30s, chosen to exceed ReadTimeout + the handler's 10s request bound so a legitimate slow upload followed by a provider retry isn't truncated after the mail was sent) plus an explicit 64 KB MaxHeaderBytes, so slow-body senders and slow-reading clients can't hold connections indefinitely. (#42)
• Raw stdlib parse errors are no longer echoed to clients on malformed bodies; both parse paths return a generic 400 and log the detail server-side as body_parse_failed. Deliberate API-shape messages (e.g. "nested objects are not supported") remain client-visible. (#42)

Security & supply chain

• CI now runs a gofmt gate, govulncheck, and golangci-lint on every push and pull request. (#38)
• Docker base images are pinned by digest, and Dependabot keeps the base images, Go modules, and GitHub Actions current. (#39)
• Release images now ship SLSA provenance and SBOM attestations, are signed with cosign (keyless via GitHub OIDC), and are gated on a Trivy vulnerability scan. (#56)

Development

• New hermetic provider-testing harness (core/providertest): ingress→egress end-to-end tests for all five transports and the SMTP listener, run on every PR with no credentials. A make test-live runner and a scheduled, protected workflow validate against real provider APIs (against non-delivering targets; SES via OIDC, no stored key). See #76. Posthorn deliberately does not test deliverability/DKIM — the provider owns signing and reputation.

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Image: ghcr.io/craigmccaskill/posthorn:1.1.0 (multi-arch, cosign-signed, SBOM + provenance attested). Validated via v1.1.0-rc.1 before GA.