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chore: pin GitHub Actions uses: references to commit SHA instead of tag #728

Description

@credfeto

Background

Part of an org-wide audit of .github/workflows/*.yml and .github/actions/*/action.yml files for GitHub Actions referenced by a mutable tag instead of a full commit SHA. A tag (even a released version tag) can be repointed by the upstream maintainer, or an attacker who compromises their account, without warning; a commit SHA is immutable. This is GitHub's own recommended hardening practice for Actions.

Findings

Switch each uses: line below from tag pinning to SHA pinning, keeping the released version as a trailing comment so the version stays human-readable:

  • .github/workflows/geoipupdate.yml: uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -> uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
  • .github/workflows/geoipupdate.yml: uses: actions/setup-dotnet@v6 -> uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6
  • .github/workflows/geoipupdate.yml: uses: credfeto/action-dotnet-version-detect@v1.3.0 -> uses: credfeto/action-dotnet-version-detect@d572bbd7285038bda731c8a4f237b9b8e64a9954 # v1.3.0
  • .github/workflows/geoipupdate.yml: uses: stefanzweifel/git-auto-commit-action@v7 -> uses: stefanzweifel/git-auto-commit-action@4a55954c782fc1ea30b9056cd3e7a2b40ca8887d # v7

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AI-WorkWork for an AI AgentSecuritySecurity issue, e.g. use of insecure packages, or security fix

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