v2.2.2

Security

• ha_blueprint get/substitute now reject absolute or ..-laden paths, the
  same guard delete already applied. HA joins the caller's path straight onto
  blueprints/<domain>/ with pathlib, so an unsanitized read op could point at a
  file outside the blueprint folder.
• ha_registry kind=entity list/get now honor the token owner's per-entity
  read policy: list drops entities the user can't read and get masks them as
  "not found". A restricted non-admin token could previously enumerate the full
  entity registry (and confirm existence of hidden entities via get), bypassing
  the per-entity read policy enforced by the other read tools.
• ha_history kind=logbook now requires a restricted non-admin token to scope
  by entity_ids; an unscoped call previously returned the whole logbook,
  bypassing the per-entity read policy.
• ha_yaml_config list/get are now admin-only — they return full
  automation/script/scene logic (and any inlined secrets), matching ha_trace.
• Internal failures no longer leak raw exception detail to the client. Beyond
  the central JSON-RPC/tool-call handlers, per-tool except Exception paths
  (config flow, blueprint, diagnostics, energy, trace, camera, system, yaml
  reload) and the ws_call bridge now log the cause server-side and return only
  a generic, actionable message. Validation feedback and HA's own user-facing
  errors are unaffected.