alternatives

Alternatives

Three other projects solve adjacent problems. Pick the one that matches your threat model and workflow. This table used to live at the bottom of the README.

	harnessed	NVIDIA OpenShell	Anthropic devcontainer	Trail of Bits
Primary use case	Power-user daily driver across multiple AI harnesses	Enterprise sandboxing with policy enforcement	VS Code team dev environments	Security auditing of untrusted code
Auth model	Seamless — host credentials shared into container	Credential providers inject keys; never exposed in sandbox	Per-container setup	Fully isolated
Threat model	Contain the AI, not the repo	Full defense-in-depth (filesystem, network, process, inference)	Consistent team environments	Malicious repos / adversarial input
Runtime	Podman (rootless); Docker pending	K3s (Kubernetes) inside Docker	Docker / Dev Containers spec	Docker
AI harnesses	Claude, omp (via bridge); more planned	Claude, OpenCode, Codex, Copilot	Claude	Claude

Use harnessed if you want composable experimentation across skill, MCP, and memory combinations, without re-authenticating or switching tools every session.

Use NVIDIA OpenShell if you need enterprise-grade sandboxing with declarative security policies, a privacy-aware LLM proxy, and Kubernetes orchestration for multi-agent environments.

Use Trail of Bits' devcontainer if you are doing security audits or reviewing untrusted repos. Their threat model explicitly accounts for malicious code trying to escape the container.

Use Anthropic's official devcontainer if you are on a team that wants a standardised, VS Code-integrated development environment with Claude Code.