Release v0.3.0 — recipient allowlist + encrypted-seed hardening · echennells/sparkbtcbot

0.3.0 — 2026-05-29

Opt-in outbound recipient allowlist (lib/recipients-allowlist.js). When ~/.spark/recipients.allow exists with at least one entry, transfers and cooperative withdrawals to any address not on the list fail; a missing or empty/all-comments file leaves the gate unenforced. Spark (sp1…) and L1 addresses share one file (one per line, # comments allowed), matched as plain strings. New exports loadRecipientsAllowlist, assertRecipientAllowed, DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST_PATH; enforced in spark-agent.js on transfer/withdraw (Lightning BOLT11 sends are not gated, since they target node pubkeys). This is an operator-surprise guardrail, not a defense against a compromised agent (which can rewrite the file) — sparkbtcbot-proxy remains the path for hard-enforced, server-side limits.

Atomic, crash-safe seed writes. saveEncryptedMnemonic() and the mnemonic-backup writer now write via temp file + fsync + atomic rename instead of a plain exclusive-create, so a crash mid-write can no longer leave a partial or corrupt seed.enc. Exclusive-create semantics (refuses to overwrite) and 0o600 permissions are unchanged.
Passphrase env hygiene. loadMnemonicFromEnv() now clears SPARK_PASSPHRASE from process.env immediately after reading it, on all paths, shrinking the window it lives in process memory (debugger snapshots, child-process inheritance, crash dumps). Opt out with loadMnemonicFromEnv({ clearEnv: false }) if a later path must re-read it. Crypto primitives unchanged (scrypt N=2¹⁷, AES-256-GCM).