fix: prevent PRIVATE_LINK token leak in landing page lookup - #44
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The lookupUser action retrieved or generated the secret share token and redirected unauthenticated visitors directly to the token URL. This defeated PRIVATE_LINK mode by exposing the token to anyone who knew a username. Access control is now fully delegated to the wrapped page's checkWrappedAccess, which correctly denies access when no token is present in the URL.
🤖 Augment PR SummarySummary: Fixes a share-token leak in the landing-page username lookup by removing PRIVATE_LINK token-based redirects for unauthenticated visitors. Changes: The lookup action now always redirects to the userId-based wrapped URL, relying on 🤖 Was this summary useful? React with 👍 or 👎 |
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Summary
lookupUseraction where PRIVATE_LINK share tokens were exposed to unauthenticated visitors who submitted a username on the landing pagecheckWrappedAccesson the wrapped page, which correctly returns 404 when no valid token is presentTest plan
bun run checkpasses with no errorsbun testpasses (1206 tests)/wrapped/{year}/u/{userId}, which returns 404/wrapped/{year}/u/{token}) still works for PRIVATE_LINK users