Revoker is a security tool that holds an API key capable of moving funds. Treat issues here accordingly.

Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.

Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting, or email the maintainer at edy.cu@live.com.

Please include what you can: affected file or endpoint, reproduction steps, and the impact you believe it has. A proof-of-concept against a testnet is welcome; please do not test against anyone else's mainnet funds.

Expect an acknowledgement within 72 hours.

What this project assumes, so you know what counts as a vulnerability:

• The agent never holds a private key. Signing happens inside a Turnkey enclave via KeeperHub. Anything that would cause this process to obtain, log, or transmit raw key material is a vulnerability.
• The API key is the sensitive credential. It can authorise transactions from the org wallet. It is read from process.env, then ~/.config/keeperhub/env, then a gitignored .env — never from the repo. Anything that logs, serialises, or transmits it is a vulnerability.
• Threat rules are advisory, not authoritative. A missed detection is a known limitation of a deliberately narrow rule set (see README), not a vulnerability. A false revoke fired against a benign spender is.
• The audit trail must be truthful. Any path where a revoke is reported as confirmed while the allowance is still non-zero is a vulnerability — the agent's honesty about its own actions is a security property.

These are documented in the README and are deliberate scope boundaries:

• Token discovery is watchlist-scoped; no public RPC serves address-less eth_getLogs over a useful block range.
• The young-spender rule requires an archive RPC and abstains — loudly, as INDETERMINATE — when historical state is unavailable.
• A spender that is verified, aged, and absent from the deny-list trips no rule.
• Demo contracts (MockUSDC, RoachMotelSpender) are unaudited testnet fixtures. They are not intended for any other use.