ci: add explicit permissions to ci-package-manager#67
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Prerequisites checklist
AI acknowledgment
What is the purpose of this pull request?
Security hardening: this PR declares a workflow-level
permissions: contents: readinci-package-manager.yml, which currently inherits the defaultGITHUB_TOKENpermissions from the calling repository.The main motivation is that the install jobs run lifecycle scripts from many third-party dependencies, so limiting the token to read-only reduces the blast radius if any of them is ever compromised.
What changes did you make? (Give an overview)
Added a workflow-level
permissionsblock withcontents: readonly.Is there anything you'd like reviewers to focus on?
I went through each job in the workflow to confirm this doesn't change any behavior:
actions/checkoutonly needscontents: read.upload-artifact/download-artifactuse the Actions runtime token, notGITHUB_TOKENscopes.Also, since this is a reusable workflow, a called workflow can only downgrade (never elevate) the caller's token — so this effectively caps the
GITHUB_TOKENfor every repository that calls it.