v0.9.0-b.3
Pre-release
v0.9.0-b.3 (2026-08-31)
This release is published under the MIT License.
Features
- authenticity: Name who a trusted key belongs to (
365104a)
The paper makes this connection load-bearing -- Section 5 says a signature is what turns a declared actor into an authenticated identity, and Section 8.3 rests the Ed25519 strictness on it -- and no mechanism existed. A trust-root entry carried five members and none was an identity, the SSH comment is deliberately stripped, and Brain.sign never reads the actor. So provenance named a person, the signature named a fingerprint, and nothing asserted they were the same.
TrustedKey gains an optional subject: an actor identifier, inside the signed bytes, changed only by a revision and therefore only by a quorum. The claim is narrow on purpose and stays narrow: it is what this brain's governance asserts, not a certificate, and the grounds for believing a key is someone's remain outside the protocol. What it adds is that once those grounds exist the conclusion is written where a verifier reads it.
An absent subject is omitted rather than serialized as null, so a trust root that names none keeps exactly the digest it had and every pin still holds.
SignatureVerdict and Authorship report it, so a quorum's holders are all readable rather than just the first. An attributable key reports none, which is the whole state: nobody here has said whose it is.
AgentSigner stops discarding the agent comment and offers it as a suggested subject when it already is an identifier. Offered, never adopted -- the comment is a label the key's own holder typed.
Detailed Changes: v0.9.0-b.2...v0.9.0-b.3