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JavaScript: Fix DomMethodCallExpr.interpretsArgumentsAsHTML. #1835

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Merged
semmle-qlci merged 2 commits into from
Aug 30, 2019
Merged

JavaScript: Fix DomMethodCallExpr.interpretsArgumentsAsHTML. #1835

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JavaScript: Fix `DomMethodCallExpr.interpretsArgumentsAsHTML`.
Aug 27, 2019
b622099
JavaScript: Restrict `setAttribute` sink to potentially dangerous att…
Aug 30, 2019
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17 changes: 17 additions & 0 deletions change-notes/1.23/analysis-javascript.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Improvements to JavaScript analysis

## General improvements

## New queries

| **Query** | **Tags** | **Purpose** |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|


## Changes to existing queries

| **Query** | **Expected impact** | **Change** |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Client-side cross-site scripting (`js/xss`) | More results | More potential vulnerabilities involving functions that manipulate DOM attributes are now recognized. |

## Changes to QL libraries
15 changes: 12 additions & 3 deletions javascript/ql/src/semmle/javascript/security/dataflow/DOM.qll
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -71,17 +71,26 @@ class DomMethodCallExpr extends MethodCallExpr {
or
name = "writeln"
or
name = "insertAdjacentHTML" and argPos = 0
name = "insertAdjacentHTML" and argPos = 1
or
name = "insertAdjacentElement" and argPos = 0
name = "insertAdjacentElement" and argPos = 1
or
name = "insertBefore" and argPos = 0
or
name = "createElement" and argPos = 0
or
name = "appendChild" and argPos = 0
or
name = "setAttribute" and argPos = 0
(
name = "setAttribute" and argPos = 1
or
name = "setAttributeNS" and argPos = 2
) and
// restrict to potentially dangerous attributes
exists(string attr |
attr = "action" or attr = "formaction" or attr = "href" or attr = "src" |
getArgument(argPos-1).getStringValue().toLowerCase() = attr
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@asger-semmle asger-semmle Aug 30, 2019

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We already have isUrlValuedAttribute which seems to do this more generally, although it currently only works if the element type is known. Maybe we could reuse that?

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@xiemaisi xiemaisi Aug 30, 2019

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Hm, interesting thought. That predicate does rely on knowing what the element type is, though, which in this case we don't. (I'll definitely add action and formaction here, though.)

)
)
}
}
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19 changes: 19 additions & 0 deletions javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-079/Xss.expected
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -49,6 +49,15 @@ nodes
| translate.js:7:42:7:47 | target |
| translate.js:7:42:7:60 | target.substring(1) |
| translate.js:9:27:9:50 | searchP ... 'term') |
| tst3.js:2:12:2:75 | JSON.pa ... tr(1))) |
| tst3.js:2:23:2:74 | decodeU ... str(1)) |
| tst3.js:2:42:2:56 | window.location |
| tst3.js:2:42:2:63 | window. ... .search |
| tst3.js:2:42:2:73 | window. ... bstr(1) |
| tst3.js:4:25:4:28 | data |
| tst3.js:4:25:4:32 | data.src |
| tst3.js:5:26:5:29 | data |
| tst3.js:5:26:5:31 | data.p |
| tst.js:2:7:2:39 | target |
| tst.js:2:16:2:32 | document.location |
| tst.js:2:16:2:39 | documen ... .search |
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -215,6 +224,14 @@ edges
| translate.js:6:16:6:39 | documen ... .search | translate.js:6:7:6:39 | target |
| translate.js:7:42:7:47 | target | translate.js:7:42:7:60 | target.substring(1) |
| translate.js:7:42:7:60 | target.substring(1) | translate.js:9:27:9:50 | searchP ... 'term') |
| tst3.js:2:12:2:75 | JSON.pa ... tr(1))) | tst3.js:4:25:4:28 | data |
| tst3.js:2:12:2:75 | JSON.pa ... tr(1))) | tst3.js:5:26:5:29 | data |
| tst3.js:2:23:2:74 | decodeU ... str(1)) | tst3.js:2:12:2:75 | JSON.pa ... tr(1))) |
| tst3.js:2:42:2:56 | window.location | tst3.js:2:42:2:63 | window. ... .search |
| tst3.js:2:42:2:63 | window. ... .search | tst3.js:2:42:2:73 | window. ... bstr(1) |
| tst3.js:2:42:2:73 | window. ... bstr(1) | tst3.js:2:23:2:74 | decodeU ... str(1)) |
| tst3.js:4:25:4:28 | data | tst3.js:4:25:4:32 | data.src |
| tst3.js:5:26:5:29 | data | tst3.js:5:26:5:31 | data.p |
| tst.js:2:7:2:39 | target | tst.js:5:18:5:23 | target |
| tst.js:2:7:2:39 | target | tst.js:12:28:12:33 | target |
| tst.js:2:7:2:39 | target | tst.js:23:42:23:47 | target |
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -342,6 +359,8 @@ edges
| string-manipulations.js:9:16:9:58 | String. ... n.href) | string-manipulations.js:9:36:9:52 | document.location | string-manipulations.js:9:16:9:58 | String. ... n.href) | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | string-manipulations.js:9:36:9:52 | document.location | user-provided value |
| string-manipulations.js:10:16:10:45 | String( ... n.href) | string-manipulations.js:10:23:10:39 | document.location | string-manipulations.js:10:16:10:45 | String( ... n.href) | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | string-manipulations.js:10:23:10:39 | document.location | user-provided value |
| translate.js:9:27:9:50 | searchP ... 'term') | translate.js:6:16:6:32 | document.location | translate.js:9:27:9:50 | searchP ... 'term') | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | translate.js:6:16:6:32 | document.location | user-provided value |
| tst3.js:4:25:4:32 | data.src | tst3.js:2:42:2:56 | window.location | tst3.js:4:25:4:32 | data.src | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | tst3.js:2:42:2:56 | window.location | user-provided value |
| tst3.js:5:26:5:31 | data.p | tst3.js:2:42:2:56 | window.location | tst3.js:5:26:5:31 | data.p | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | tst3.js:2:42:2:56 | window.location | user-provided value |
| tst.js:5:18:5:23 | target | tst.js:2:16:2:32 | document.location | tst.js:5:18:5:23 | target | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | tst.js:2:16:2:32 | document.location | user-provided value |
| tst.js:8:18:8:126 | "<OPTIO ... PTION>" | tst.js:8:37:8:53 | document.location | tst.js:8:18:8:126 | "<OPTIO ... PTION>" | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | tst.js:8:37:8:53 | document.location | user-provided value |
| tst.js:12:5:12:42 | '<div s ... 'px">' | tst.js:2:16:2:32 | document.location | tst.js:12:5:12:42 | '<div s ... 'px">' | Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to $@. | tst.js:2:16:2:32 | document.location | user-provided value |
Expand Down
9 changes: 9 additions & 0 deletions javascript/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-079/tst3.js
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var foo = document.getElementById("foo");
var data = JSON.parse(decodeURIComponent(window.location.search.substr(1)));

foo.setAttribute("src", data.src); // NOT OK
foo.setAttribute("HREF", data.p); // NOT OK
foo.setAttribute("width", data.w); // OK

for (var p in data)
foo.setAttribute(p, data[p]); // not flagged since attribute name is unknown