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Fix the tool-permission scoping regression first — it independently crashed Daily Testify Uber Super Expert and Linter Miner today via the same read($GITHUB_WORKSPACE) denial, burning ~25 minutes and ~14 minutes of compute respectively before giving up. Everything else this cycle is either already tracked or too low-severity to act on.
5 failures analyzed (of 8 failed runs in the last 6h — 3 lacked detailed logs in the pre-fetch payload and were not deep-dived). 1 new P0 sub-issue filed.0 issues closed — no fresh evidence that any of the 12 currently-open agentic-workflows issues are fixed or stale.
safe_outputs job "Process Safe Outputs" step failure, isolated single occurrence
Not filed — too low-severity
3 additional failed run IDs from the lookback window without detailed log payloads
30753821917, 30751969165, 30751208732 — present in failed_run_ids but not in the detailed failures array; not deep-dived this cycle per the pre-fetch-first policy. Flag for next cycle if they recur.
Evidence
Cluster 1 (P0) — audit-diff and cross-workflow correlation
audit-diff comparing Daily Testify's failed run against its own successful baseline (§30570103985): posture regressed write_capable → read_only, turns dropped 1 → 0, GitHub Core API points consumed dropped 77% (252 → 59) — the agent barely started before being denied. Zero firewall/domain anomalies, which rules out a network/egress explanation.
audit on Linter Miner's failed run shows the identical degradation class against its own baseline: posturewrite_capable → read_only, turns3 → 0. Two unrelated scheduled workflows, same signature, ~30 minutes apart — this is a systemic regression, not a workflow-specific config error. Full detail is in the filed sub-issue.
Cluster 2 — Design Decision Gate, inconclusive
Unlike cluster 1, this run completed 21 agent turns (reading PR metadata, ADR pre-fetch summary, etc.) before failing with a bare Process completed with exit code 1. The only anomaly in the log tail is [entrypoint][WARN] Failed to transfer /host/.../safeoutputs ownership to chroot user, emitted at container entrypoint — but the 50-line tail captured doesn't reach the actual failing step, so this is a lead, not a confirmed cause. Does not match either existing Design Decision Gate issue (#49144: pre-fetch step fails before agent starts; #49096: LLM invocation cap from shell-expanded paths) — this run got well past both of those failure points.
No open issue is contradicted by fresh evidence, so none closed this cycle.
Fix roadmap
P0 — Fix the read-tool permission scoping regression. It's cross-workflow, wastes real compute (up to 25 min/run before failing), and has zero existing tracking. See the linked sub-issue for root cause and remediation steps.
P1 — Get full raw logs for Design Decision Gate run §30754639273. The pre-fetched 50-line tail doesn't reach the actual failure; pull the complete agent job log before filing a fix, since the current evidence (a WARN, not an ERROR) isn't strong enough to act on.
P2 — No action on PR Sous Chef's safe_outputs failure. Single occurrence, isolated to one run; revisit only if it recurs in a future cycle.
Sub-issues created
Read-tool permission scoping regression crashes read-only workflows on their own checkout root (P0) — linked below.
Executive summary
Fix the tool-permission scoping regression first — it independently crashed Daily Testify Uber Super Expert and Linter Miner today via the same
read($GITHUB_WORKSPACE)denial, burning ~25 minutes and ~14 minutes of compute respectively before giving up. Everything else this cycle is either already tracked or too low-severity to act on.5 failures analyzed (of 8 failed runs in the last 6h — 3 lacked detailed logs in the pre-fetch payload and were not deep-dived). 1 new P0 sub-issue filed. 0 issues closed — no fresh evidence that any of the 12 currently-open
agentic-workflowsissues are fixed or stale.Failure cluster table
exit 1; chroot ownership-transfer WARN on the safeoutputs temp dir precedes it but causality unconfirmedsafe_outputsjob "Process Safe Outputs" step failure, isolated single occurrence3 additional failed run IDs from the lookback window without detailed log payloads
30753821917,30751969165,30751208732— present infailed_run_idsbut not in the detailedfailuresarray; not deep-dived this cycle per the pre-fetch-first policy. Flag for next cycle if they recur.Evidence
Cluster 1 (P0) — audit-diff and cross-workflow correlation
audit-diffcomparing Daily Testify's failed run against its own successful baseline (§30570103985):postureregressedwrite_capable → read_only,turnsdropped1 → 0, GitHub Core API points consumed dropped 77% (252 → 59) — the agent barely started before being denied. Zero firewall/domain anomalies, which rules out a network/egress explanation.auditon Linter Miner's failed run shows the identical degradation class against its own baseline:posturewrite_capable → read_only,turns3 → 0. Two unrelated scheduled workflows, same signature, ~30 minutes apart — this is a systemic regression, not a workflow-specific config error. Full detail is in the filed sub-issue.Cluster 2 — Design Decision Gate, inconclusive
Unlike cluster 1, this run completed 21 agent turns (reading PR metadata, ADR pre-fetch summary, etc.) before failing with a bare
Process completed with exit code 1. The only anomaly in the log tail is[entrypoint][WARN] Failed to transfer /host/.../safeoutputs ownership to chroot user, emitted at container entrypoint — but the 50-line tail captured doesn't reach the actual failing step, so this is a lead, not a confirmed cause. Does not match either existing Design Decision Gate issue (#49144: pre-fetch step fails before agent starts; #49096: LLM invocation cap from shell-expanded paths) — this run got well past both of those failure points.Existing issue correlation
Fix roadmap
agentjob log before filing a fix, since the current evidence (a WARN, not an ERROR) isn't strong enough to act on.safe_outputsfailure. Single occurrence, isolated to one run; revisit only if it recurs in a future cycle.Sub-issues created