If you discover a security vulnerability in RedMess itself (not in the tools/exploits it helps create), we want to know about it.
✅ Report These:
- Command injection in RedMess code
- Path traversal allowing unauthorized file access
- Privilege escalation in installation scripts
- Code execution via malicious skill files
- Authentication bypass in Telegram gateway
- Memory leaks causing crashes
- Backdoors in the codebase
❌ Don't Report These:
- Vulnerabilities in tools RedMess helps create (that's the point)
- "RedMess can generate malware" (intended feature)
- "AI says bad things" (no content filtering by design)
- Exploits discovered using RedMess (disclose to affected vendor)
Email: security@redmess.dev
Include:
- Description - What's the vulnerability?
- Impact - What can an attacker do?
- Reproduction - Step-by-step POC
- Affected versions - Which releases are vulnerable?
- Suggested fix - Optional but appreciated
- 24-hour response - We'll acknowledge your report
- 7-day initial assessment - Severity classification
- 30-day fix timeline - For critical issues
- 90-day disclosure - Coordinated disclosure after patch
We don't have a formal bug bounty program yet, but:
- Critical vulnerabilities - We'll credit you prominently
- High-severity issues - Named in security advisory
- Pull request preferred - Submit a fix for faster resolution
Critical (Patch within 7 days)
- Remote code execution
- Authentication bypass
- Arbitrary file write with privilege escalation
High (Patch within 30 days)
- Local privilege escalation
- Information disclosure of credentials
- Denial of service
Medium (Patch within 90 days)
- XSS in web interface
- Path traversal without privilege escalation
- Memory exhaustion
Low (Patch when convenient)
- Information disclosure (non-sensitive)
- Minor bugs with no security impact
We follow coordinated disclosure:
- Day 0 - You report vulnerability privately
- Day 1 - We acknowledge and start investigation
- Day 7 - Initial assessment and timeline
- Day 30-90 - Patch developed and tested
- Day of patch - Security advisory published, credit given
- Day 90 - If no patch, we allow public disclosure
If you want to publish before 90 days, let us know. We prefer coordination but respect researcher choice.
-
Isolated Environment
- Run in Docker or VM
- Don't run on your main machine
- Use separate network for testing
-
API Key Security
- Use separate API keys for RedMess
- Rotate keys regularly
- Don't commit keys to version control
-
Telegram Bot Security
- Use strong bot tokens
- Enable 2FA on Telegram account
- Restrict bot to authorized users only
- Set
OWNER_IDSin config
-
File System Isolation
- RedMess has full file system access
- Don't run as root unless necessary
- Use AppArmor/SELinux profiles
-
Network Isolation
- Assume RedMess can exfiltrate data
- Use network segmentation
- Monitor outbound traffic
What RedMess protects against:
- ✅ Unauthorized users accessing your instance
- ✅ API key leakage (not stored in plaintext)
- ✅ Command injection (sanitized inputs)
What RedMess does NOT protect against:
- ❌ Malicious AI model responses (user responsibility)
- ❌ Exfiltration via AI provider (use local models)
- ❌ Social engineering the AI (GODMODE disables refusals)
- ❌ Forensic analysis of conversation history
If using RedMess for red team operations:
-
Attribution Evasion
# Use VPN/Tor torsocks redmess # Clear bash history export HISTFILE=/dev/null # Use burner API keys hermes config set openai.api_key $BURNER_KEY
-
Conversation Security
- Conversations are stored locally in
~/.hermes/ - Encrypt home directory
- Use ephemeral VMs
- Wipe after operations
- Conversations are stored locally in
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C2 Infrastructure
- Don't hardcode real C2 servers in prompts
- Use placeholders in generated malware
- Manually edit before deployment
-
Legal Protection
- Get written authorization before testing
- Document scope and timeline
- Store authorization letters securely
These are intentional and not vulnerabilities:
-
No Content Filtering
- RedMess will generate malware, exploits, and illegal content
- This is core functionality, not a bug
- Users are responsible for legal compliance
-
Full System Access
- RedMess can execute arbitrary commands
- It can read/write any file
- Run in isolated environments
-
Conversation Logging
- All conversations stored locally
- Includes generated exploits and malware
- Encrypt storage or use ephemeral environments
-
AI Model Access
- Conversations sent to AI provider (Anthropic, OpenAI, etc.)
- Providers may log requests
- Use local models for sensitive operations
-
Docker Isolation (Recommended)
hermes setup terminal # Select Docker backend # Commands run in container, not host
-
User Restrictions
# In Telegram bot config OWNER_IDS = [123456789] # Only you RENTAL_ENABLED = False # No sharing
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API Key Rotation
# Monthly rotation hermes config set anthropic.api_key $NEW_KEY
-
Audit Logging
# Enable detailed logs hermes config set logging.level debug tail -f ~/.hermes/logs/agent.log
If you believe your RedMess instance is compromised:
-
Immediate Actions
- Disconnect from network
- Revoke API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI, etc.)
- Rotate Telegram bot token if applicable
- Stop all running processes
-
Investigation
- Check conversation history:
~/.hermes/conversations/ - Review command history:
~/.hermes/logs/ - Inspect running processes:
ps aux | grep hermes - Check network connections:
netstat -tuln
- Check conversation history:
-
Remediation
- Wipe conversations:
rm -rf ~/.hermes/conversations/* - Reinstall RedMess:
./install.sh - Change all credentials
- Review generated code for backdoors
- Wipe conversations:
-
Report to Us
- Email:
security@redmess.dev - Include incident timeline
- Share IOCs if applicable
- Email:
-
Signed Releases
- All releases GPG-signed
- Verify before installing:
gpg --verify redmess-v1.0.0.tar.gz.sig
-
Dependency Pinning
requirements.txtuses exact versions- No wildcard version ranges
- Regular dependency audits
-
Code Review
- All PRs reviewed before merge
- No force-pushes to main
- Commit signing required
-
No Telemetry
- RedMess doesn't phone home
- No usage tracking
- No crash reporting
- Audit the code yourself
# Clone and audit
git clone https://github.com/harezadmm/RedMess.git
cd RedMess
# Check for suspicious network calls
grep -r "requests.post" .
grep -r "urllib" .
grep -r "socket" .
# Review dependencies
cat requirements.txt
pip install pipdeptree
pipdeptree
# Run in isolated environment
docker build -t redmess .
docker run --rm --network none redmessRedMess uses cryptography for:
-
API Key Storage
- Keys encrypted at rest
- OS keyring integration (when available)
- Fallback: XOR obfuscation (not secure, use keyring)
-
Telegram Bot Tokens
- Stored in config file (plaintext)
- User responsible for file permissions
- Recommend:
chmod 600 ~/.hermes/config.yaml
-
Conversation Encryption (Optional)
# Enable encryption hermes config set encryption.enabled true hermes config set encryption.key $(openssl rand -hex 32)
RedMess processes:
- Conversation history (locally stored)
- User IDs (Telegram, Discord)
- API keys (encrypted)
Your rights:
- Access:
cat ~/.hermes/conversations/* - Deletion:
rm -rf ~/.hermes/ - Portability: Copy
~/.hermes/directory
No data sent to maintainers unless you report a bug.
Same as GDPR. We don't collect data centrally.
RedMess may contain:
- Strong cryptography (export-controlled)
- Offensive security tools (export-controlled)
Users are responsible for compliance with:
- US Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
- International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
- Local export control laws
Do not use RedMess in embargoed countries without proper licenses.
- Security Issues: security@redmess.dev
- General Questions: GitHub Discussions
- Urgent Matters: Telegram
@harezadmm
PGP Key for security@redmess.dev:
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
[Key would go here in real implementation]
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Last updated: 2026-09-04
Security is a shared responsibility. Report issues responsibly.