DeviceIntelligence 2.0.1

Changed

• attestation.key verdict: a non-Verified boot is now CRITICAL (was HIGH). deriveIntegrityVerdict no longer treats SelfSigned (yellow) as a genuine OS — only a Google-Verified (green) boot qualifies for MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY. SelfSigned (yellow), Unverified (orange), and Failed (red) all mean the boot chain was modified (custom AVB key / unlocked / failed verification), so the tee_integrity_verdict finding is now emitted at CRITICAL severity for all three. A yellow/relocked-with-own-key boot (custom kernel / KernelSU / custom ROM) no longer reaches MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY and no longer downgrades to HIGH.

Added

• Hardware-attested "OS modified" proof on tee_integrity_verdict. When the boot state is non-Verified, the finding's message now states why the OS is considered modified, and details gain two fields: verified_boot_key_sha256 (the attested boot-signing key hash — Google's on stock, a custom value on a re-signed boot) and os_modified_proof (a human-readable, hardware-attested explanation). These come from the secure element's RootOfTrust and cannot be forged on-device.

Wire-format impact

schema_version stays at 2 — the new details keys are additive and the severity field already existed. Backends that branch on tee_integrity_verdict.severity will now see critical where they previously saw high for non-Verified boots; treat that as a stronger signal, not a new shape.