bsv_third_entry drives the chain_c CLIs to publish a receipt's Bitcoin SV Third Entry and to run the AgentTea identity lifecycle. It builds the environment those CLIs read; it does not itself hold keys or talk to the network.

Every on-chain action is DRY-RUN by default. A real broadcast that spends BSV requires both:

1. an explicit confirm=True / --confirm at this layer, and
2. the chain_c binary's own CONFIRM_MAINNET_BROADCAST=yes gate — which this layer sets only when (1) is given.

Never weaken or auto-set the second factor. In resumable mode, a --confirm request with no deployed identity fails closed (it does not silently broadcast).

receiptHash / modelHash / ricardianHash are validated as 32-byte (64-hex) values before they are handed to the chain. A truncated or malformed hash raises rather than being anchored as a permanent, unverifiable commitment. Direct AgentTea actions require both --action-hash and --provenance-hash; all-zero provenance is rejected. Receipt publication requires a nonzero modelHash, and an explicit provenanceHash must match it—there is no receipt-hash fallback.

This package holds no secrets. Key files ({wif,address} JSON) live under $BONSAI_NOTARY_HOME/chain/ (default ~/.local/trinote/chain/) and are read by the chain_c binaries, never by this code. Do not commit key files, WIFs, or mnemonics; do not copy or ship $BONSAI_NOTARY_HOME.

Report privately anything that could cause an unintended broadcast, a weakened interlock, or key exposure — via GitHub Security Advisories ("Report a vulnerability" on this repository's Security tab, or the repo-relative security/advisories/new). Do not open a public issue for an unfixed vulnerability, and never include real key material in a report.