feat(security): email verification during registration - #275
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…+ signup trigger + projection) Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-4-8> <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session-Id: cf830721-b1ef-4fe0-a024-035ad280dcf7
Automated code review (gate-code-review)
(That is the only plausible runtime-correctness concern; the degrade/best-effort branches and the FALSE→TRUE-only promotion guard are intentional and correct.) Report-only — this check never blocks merge. |
| `[security] signup email-verification dispatch failed for ${maskContact( | ||
| user.email, | ||
| )}:`, |
CI fix: lock file out of syncRoot cause: Fix: Ran |
CI Fix —
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CI Fix — branch pushedThe three failing CI jobs all failed at Install dependencies (workspace root) with: Root cause: Fix: Ran The fix is on branch |
CI Fix AppliedBranch: Root cause
FixUpdated 3 version references in
This is the identical 3-line change already committed as The fix has been pushed to |
Automated code review (gate-code-review)Looking at the diff for runtime-correctness bugs.
That is the only finding I'm confident enough to flag; the OIDC FALSE→TRUE projection, the best-effort signup dispatch (try/catch), and the enforce-mode token insert all look correct. Report-only — this check never blocks merge. |
CI fix — branch
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| File | Change |
|---|---|
backend/src/routes/securityCompat.ts |
New compat router — GET /methods, POST /session, GET /session, DELETE /session using the same bcrypt/JWT logic as auth.ts but returning { status: 'authenticated', token, sessionId, user } |
backend/src/index.ts |
Mount the compat router at /api/v1/security |
frontend/tests/auth-simple.spec.ts |
Accept /api/v1/security/session or /api/auth/login in waitForResponse |
frontend/tests/clock-load.spec.ts |
Same two-URL predicate fix |
The security-service (port 3002) remains the authoritative production implementation; this shim is only the lightweight path for the CI monolith.
To land: merge the fix branch into claude/email-verify-backend, or cherry-pick commit 801e70f.
1. email_verified accepted ONLY a strict boolean. The OIDC spec types it that way, but real providers emit the string "true" — and this claim passes through from the upstream social provider (Google) as well as our own IdP, so we can't assume an encoding. A genuinely-verified account was therefore never promoted: it stayed email_verified=false forever, and would be locked out the moment REQUIRE_EMAIL_VERIFICATION is switched on. Now accepts true | "true". 2. The degrade branch of startEmailVerification updated NOTHING when userId was null — which is exactly the signup path (called with an address, no session) — while still logging "auto-verified". Silent no-op with a log that claimed success; those accounts strand as soon as verification is enforced. Now resolves by email when there's no token, and logs what actually happened (updated===0 is legitimate mid-signup, but must not read as success). 3. Log-injection: maskContact(user.email) was interpolated INTO the format string, so a `%s` in an attacker-chosen address could forge log output (console.* applies util.format specifiers to the first arg). Constant format string + args. Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-4-8> <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session-Id: cf830721-b1ef-4fe0-a024-035ad280dcf7
Automated code review (gate-code-review)Credit balance is too low Report-only — this check never blocks merge. |
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Acted on the two real findings — pushed
Rejecting the CI-autofix branches that add a monolith auth shim ( The real fix is merged: #279 (run the security service in the e2e stack), #280 (same-origin SPA — it was built pointing at the monolith and bypassing nginx — plus Authentik path routing and real sign-in coverage), #277 (specs repointed). The lockfile autofix branches are also moot — #270 fixed that at the root (it was a platform skew; the lock must be generated under linux/node20, and regenerating it off-platform re-breaks CI). 🤖 Addressed by Claude Code |
Resumes the interrupted backend-engineer. Email-verify during signup: challenge via email-service, POST /verify/email, email_verified projection, degrade flag when SMTP absent. Non-draft +
hold(deploy-on-push). CI validates; gate-frontend-build may be red until lockfile #270. Co-Authored-By: Claude