v0.11.1

Security release. Upgrading is recommended for anyone running the MCP server.

Security

• Pipeline names are validated to prevent path traversal (GHSA-596g-p98x-c7hw) — _load_pipeline (reachable from a model through the MCP pipeline tool with action="run") and pipeline_create (CLI) interpolated a caller-supplied name straight into a filesystem path (pipelines_dir / f"{name}.yaml") with no sanitization, so a name containing .. or an absolute path escaped the pipelines directory. On the read side, a crafted pipeline_name reached via prompt injection could load and execute any .yaml file on disk as a pipeline — bounded to the whitelisted actions, which include notebook_delete, so the reachable outcome was destructive action against the user's notebooks. Pipeline names are now validated as identifiers (letters, digits, dot, dash, underscore; no path separators) at both entry points. Reported privately by @Naor-Peretz.