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Commit when work lands, and have security_review enqueue HIGH/MEDIUM findings as #dev-ready QUEUE tasks so unattended loops can drain them. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Add tests identified in the QA gap report without touching production code. Cover run-tree prefix indentation and bounded self-recursive workflow expansion in progress.test.ts, add a new use command test suite, extend the compiler txtar fixtures with parse and validate error cases, and register the docker lifecycle and toolchain e2e scripts in the aggregate runner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract cohesive modules and dedup boilerplate flagged by the simplifier report while preserving behavior. Split the ServeHandler declarations and pure HTTP helpers out of handler.ts into new serve/types.ts and serve/http-util.ts. Collapse repeated meta-field parsing and error handling in run.ts, dedup config/triple-quoted/prompt emission in emit.ts, factor inline-script and triple-quoted literal builders in workflow-brace.ts, share image/copy/mount logic in docker.ts, and pull apart config/backend/watchdog concerns in kernel/prompt.ts. No test or e2e changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the missing tests identified in the QA gap report without touching production code. Register the docker live-step-output and agent credentials pre-flight e2e scripts in the runner, and fix the credentials pre-flight test to drop --unsafe (unsafe mode skips the credential pre-flight, suppressing the very warning/error the section asserts). Extend display/progress unit tests to cover model-token failure labels, multi-site self-recursion tree bounding, and channel route nodes, and add a compiler parse-error fixture for module.* keys rejected in workflow-level config. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Apply behavior-preserving simplifications from the simplifier report: extract shared string-unescape helpers (unescapeDoubleQuotedInner, unescapeConfigInner) in the parser and a killProcessTreeEscalating helper in the runtime kernel, then dedupe the call sites across parse, format, transpile, and runtime modules. No test or e2e changes; the public behavior of each affected path is unchanged.
Add missing tests identified in the QA gap report. Cover the jaiph init guard for an existing non-directory path, and add a skipped test documenting the uncaught-ENOENT bug for a nonexistent path. Extend the compiler txtar fixtures with parse-error cases for match-arm and const triple-quote trailing content and a const missing its equals sign, plus a validate-error case rejecting nested inline captures in log. No production code changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace 10 byte-identical single-quote error string literals across 7 parse modules with a shared core.ts constant, removing a 10-way drift hazard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deduplicate repeated error-message extraction across CLI entrypoints and telemetry into a single errText helper in src/errors.ts. Extract the duplicated runner meta-file parsing and return_value.txt reading from run.ts and exec/call.ts into a new shared src/cli/shared/run-meta.ts module (readMetaFields, readReturnValue). Behavior is preserved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add #dev-ready QUEUE.md tasks for the HIGH and MEDIUM findings from the latest .jaiph/tmp/security_review_*.md report. Each task captures the context (finding id, severity, confidence), the concrete problem with code locations, a remediation direction, and acceptance criteria that fail when the security contract is violated. Covers the shell-injection sink, host-only serve token leaking across the sandbox boundary, the tamper-resistant audit journal, and library install integrity, among others.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Free-form workflow body lines run via `sh -c` after Jaiph substitutes
`${var}` references, and the runtime used to splice in the raw value.
A caller-controlled value such as `name = "$(id)"` or
`name = "; rm -rf ~ #"` could therefore inject a command, and `jaiph
mcp` / `jaiph serve` bind request arguments to workflow parameters
positionally, so an untrusted caller reached this sink directly
(finding H-1).
The runtime now passes every value interpolated into a shell
fallthrough line through `shellQuote` (the single canonical
`printf %q`-style escaper, now exported from prompt.ts) before it
reaches `sh -c`. This covers parameters, `const` values, prompt and
other captures, `for` loop iterators, channel payloads, and inline
`${run …}` / `${ensure …}` capture results; a value like `$(id)` is
echoed literally and never evaluated. Non-shell string positions
(`const` / `return` / `send` / `say` / `prompt`) keep the raw value.
The compile-time `W_PROMPT_IN_SHELL` diagnostic still fires to steer
prompt captures toward the safer argv path.
Adds a unit test covering each value provenance and an e2e test that
drives the `jaiph serve` positional param path with `$(id)` and a
`touch` marker, asserting neither is shell-evaluated. Docs and
changelog updated; dequeues the task from QUEUE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The environment-forwarding allowlist forwarded every JAIPH_* variable into the Docker container and the agent subprocess, carving out only JAIPH_DOCKER_*, the inplace flags, and JAIPH_RUN_WORKFLOW. That leaked the whole host-only JAIPH_SERVE_* family across the sandbox boundary, including JAIPH_SERVE_TOKEN — the single-operator bearer secret that authorizes the entire `jaiph serve` HTTP API — even though the in-container runtime never reads them. A malicious or injected workflow could read the token, exfiltrate it over the default-on network, and authenticate back to the server as the operator (finding H-2). Add a JAIPH_SERVE_ carve-out alongside the existing JAIPH_DOCKER_ one in a shared ENV_ALLOW_EXCLUDE_PREFIXES list, so isEnvAllowed rejects every JAIPH_SERVE_* key on both boundaries — the Docker forwarding loop and the scrubPromptEnv prompt-backend scrub. Runtime-consumed control keys such as JAIPH_DEBUG and JAIPH_WORKSPACE still cross the boundary. Adds Docker and env-allowlist tests, updates the env-vars, sandboxing, and serve docs, and dequeues the task from QUEUE.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Finding H-3 (ASI-06): each run_summary.jsonl line chained a prev_hash that
was an unkeyed SHA-256 over a public genesis, and no production path ever
called verifyRunSummaryChain. Because the journal lives under the workflow's
own cwd, the audited workflow could delete, truncate, or fully recompute an
internally-valid chain and every reader accepted it.
The chain is now keyed: prev_hash is chainHmac(key, previousLine) under a
fresh per-run 256-bit secret (generateChainKey) that lives only in the
trusted kernel process env (JAIPH_CHAIN_KEY / CHAIN_KEY_ENV). scrubTrustedKeys
strips the key and the JAIPH_RUN_SUMMARY_FILE path from every script scope, and
scrubPromptEnv drops the key at the agent boundary, so no workflow subprocess
can forge or relink the chain. The host generates and forwards the key and, once
the run is terminal, persists it beside the journal as a 0600 .chain-key file.
verifyRunJournal(runDir) loads that key and hard-fails when verified && !ok at
every read/export boundary: run listing marks the run failed with
TAMPERED_RESULT_TEXT, GET /v1/runs/{id}/events returns 409 E_TAMPERED, and the
OTLP and Sentry exporters warn and skip rather than post a tampered timeline.
An unkeyed/legacy run cannot be verified and is never blocked, a missing or
truncated journal is a verification failure, and a chain recomputed without the
key fails at the first line. Docs and CHANGELOG updated; task removed from
QUEUE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hub calls implement_from_task; CLI default routes through implement_from_queue. Drop the role CLI arg and auto-classify instead. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Fail closed on unsigned or tampered remote registry indexes, disallow http library URLs, and enforce optional pinned commit + minisign checks. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Complete the integrity-verification work for `jaiph install` and the library registry (finding H-4) with its user-facing documentation and end-to-end coverage. Document the registry scheme allowlist, detached `registry.minisig` signature verification, pinned-commit and per-library detached-signature post-clone checks, and the maintainer registry-signing step across the CLI, libraries, contributing, and env-vars docs; add the CHANGELOG entries; drop the completed task from QUEUE.md; and add an e2e case asserting a remote `http://` install is rejected before any clone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An entry file is repo- or model-supplied and untrusted, but its
`config { runtime { … } }` values were used verbatim to build the Docker
sandbox. A file-declared `runtime.docker_network = "host"` won over the
`default` and ran the container in the host network namespace — reaching
loopback-only services and binding host ports while still appearing
sandboxed; `container:*` / `ns:*` joined another namespace, and a
file-declared `runtime.docker_image` pointed the sandbox at an arbitrary
image.
`resolveDockerConfig` now treats both keys as host-controlled whenever
Docker is the active sandbox. A file-declared image with no operator
`JAIPH_DOCKER_IMAGE` fails with `E_DOCKER_IMAGE_HOST_ONLY`, and
`imageExplicit` is set only by the env var. A file-declared network fails
with `E_DOCKER_NETWORK_HOST_ONLY` unless it is host-safe (`default`,
`none`, or a plain named bridge network), as checked by the new
`isHostSafeInFileNetwork`. The operator's `JAIPH_DOCKER_NETWORK` /
`JAIPH_DOCKER_IMAGE` stay trusted and are used verbatim. When Docker is
off (host / unsafe mode) both keys are inert. Adds unit coverage in
`src/runtime/docker.test.ts` and an e2e case
(`e2e/tests/153_docker_network_host_control.sh`), plus docs updates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An entry file's config { trusted_envs = "..." } was resolved from the
operator's host environment and forwarded verbatim into the Docker
sandbox, bypassing the allowlist meant to keep host secrets out. An
untrusted or model-edited entry .jh could name arbitrary non-JAIPH_
secrets (AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN) and pull them across the
sandbox boundary the file is meant to be contained by (finding M-7).
Under Docker the in-file declaration is no longer consent on its own:
planTrustedEnvs now honours it only when the operator sets the opt-in
JAIPH_TRUSTED_ENVS=1|true, otherwise it ignores the declaration (leaving
forwarded env empty) and warns so the operator can opt in deliberately.
JAIPH_TRUSTED_ENVS is reserved so the file cannot name it. Host modes,
which have no allowlist to bypass, keep honouring the declaration. Docs
now state that authoring the entry file is a trust boundary equal to
--env.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The image jaiph-presence check ran the workflow-selected image with none of the run's sandbox hardening and under a login shell, so profile scripts baked into an attacker-influenced image (via an untrusted runtime.docker_image) executed at higher privilege than the real run. The new buildImageProbeArgs applies the same hardening as a real run (--cap-drop ALL, --security-opt no-new-privileges, a pinned non-root --user, --network none) and runs a non-login sh -c, so command -v jaiph resolves only PATH and nothing image-controlled is sourced or executed. Adds unit tests and an e2e case proving a /etc/profile.d script in the probed image is never sourced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
createOidcAuthenticator set the principal subject to the token sub or a shared "unknown" constant, and per-principal isolation keys entirely on principal.subject (lookupRun/listRuns and the idempotency composite key). Any two callers whose verified tokens omit sub (common for OAuth2 client-credentials / machine tokens) both authenticated as "unknown" and shared one run-visibility bucket and idempotency namespace, so client B could enumerate and cancel client A's runs and collide on A's Idempotency-Key (finding M-9). Identity now comes from the new exported principalSubject(payload), which returns the token sub when non-empty, else a non-empty client_id, else null; the authenticator rejects a verified token that yields null with 401, so no principal is ever assigned the shared "unknown" constant for isolation. Adds unit coverage for principalSubject and integration coverage asserting two sub-less tokens get distinct identities, client B cannot read/list/cancel client A's run, and a token with neither claim is 401. Docs and CHANGELOG updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Project-local `<workspace>/.jaiph/hooks.json` was loaded and merged with the global `~/.jaiph/hooks.json` unconditionally, and its commands ran in the host CLI process via `spawn(resolveShell(), ["-c", cmd], …)` — before and outside any Docker sandbox. Cloning a shared repo and running any workflow (`jaiph run`, `jaiph serve`, `jaiph mcp`) executed that repo's arbitrary host commands on `workflow_start` with no trust prompt (M-10). `loadMergedHooks` now takes a `trustProjectHooks` argument, and the callers pass the new `isProjectHooksTrusted(process.env)`, true only for `JAIPH_TRUST_PROJECT_HOOKS=1|true`. Absent the opt-in, a present-and- non-empty project file is ignored (never loaded) with a one-line stderr notice; the global file is unaffected and still runs. The opt-in is read from the host env only and added to `RESERVED_ENV_KEYS`, so a `.jh` file cannot name it via `--env` / `trusted_envs` and cannot trust itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Harden download verification so a compromised release channel or toolchain CDN cannot slip unverified bytes past the installer or the runtime image (finding M-11). The binary installer now requires a valid minisign signature on a normal host: a missing minisign aborts unless CI is set or the operator opts into JAIPH_ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1, and an empty JAIPH_MINISIGN_PUBLIC_KEY fails closed instead of silently skipping. The jaiph run/init/use bootstraps stop piping curl into bash and instead fetch docs/install with its published install.sha256, compare them, and run the script only on a match. Every remote toolchain fetch in runtime/Dockerfile routes through the new runtime/fetch-verify.sh, which requires a non-empty pinned SHA-256 and runs sha256sum -c, so an empty or mismatched checksum fails the build. Covered by use.test.ts, release-workflow.test.ts, and e2e tests 06/07/09. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
redactCredentials fired only for env keys ending in one of four suffixes
(_API_KEY / _TOKEN / _SECRET / _API_TOKEN), silently missing common
secret names such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, STRIPE_SECRET_KEY,
DB_PASSWORD, PASSPHRASE, and SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, and it replaced only the
exact literal value above an 8-character floor, so base64/hex/URL-encoded
copies and short secrets slipped through.
isCredentialKey now flags any key whose name (case-insensitive) contains
SECRET, PASSWORD, PASSPHRASE, TOKEN, PRIVATE_KEY, ACCESS_KEY, API_KEY, or
CREDENTIAL, or ends in _PAT / _DSN; the value floor drops to 4; and each
matched value plus its base64, base64url, hex, and URL-encoded forms are
replaced with [REDACTED] (longest form first). The shared helper feeds
the journal, OTLP, Sentry, GET /v1/runs/{id}/events, and a failed call's
result_text, so every surface tightens at once. Literal-substring
replacement is documented as an explicit non-guarantee. Adds
redact.test.ts and a /events STRIPE_SECRET_KEY assertion in
server.test.ts. (Finding M-5, ASI-06, MEDIUM, confidence 0.85.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Embed the pinned swagger-ui-dist JS/CSS into the jaiph binary via the existing embed-assets pipeline and serve them from same-origin paths under /docs instead of loading from cdn.jsdelivr.net. Air-gapped and CSP-hardened deployments now render a working Swagger UI that loads /openapi.json and can Authorize + try-it-out with no browser internet access. JAIPH_SERVE_EXPOSE_DOCS gating and persistAuthorization behaviour are preserved, and docs plus CLI help note that /docs is now self-contained. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
emitLog appended the durable LOG/LOGWARN/LOGERR payload to
run_summary.jsonl without redactCredentials, unlike emitStep (which
redacts a step's out_content/err_content) and emitPromptEvent (which
redacts the prompt preview). A workflow that did log("...${SOME_TOKEN}...")
persisted the raw credential into the journal, so every surface that
reads the journal back (GET /v1/runs/{id}/events, the OTLP export, and
the Sentry export) served it verbatim -- the same value that would be
[REDACTED] inside a step's captured output slipped through when it went
through log. emitLog now runs redactCredentials(message, this.env) on
the durable message before writing the line, so the persisted journal
shares one redaction boundary across step output, prompt previews, and
log messages. The live __JAIPH_EVENT__ progress line on the runner's
stderr still carries the message as authored, matching how a step's live
event streams its output before the durable copy is redacted.
Adds a test asserting log/logwarn/logerr credential values persist as
[REDACTED] in run_summary.jsonl, and documents the durable-only boundary
in the Secret redaction section of the architecture docs.
Security review, ASI-06, LOW, confidence 0.75, finding L-1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Host and --unsafe runs previously had no automatic stop beyond manual Ctrl-C: the wall-clock timeout existed only for Docker mode and the per-prompt watchdog covered individual backend calls only. Add a parent-enforced overall run timeout for host mode in run.ts and for serve/mcp workflow calls in callWorkflow, escalating through killProcessTree, plus an optional max-step circuit breaker in the runtime that halts a runaway workflow when the iteration cap is hit. Docker-mode timeout behaviour is unchanged. Adds tests for the host timeout, the shared callWorkflow timeout, the max-step breaker, and a Docker timeout regression, with supporting config/env/docs updates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pass jwtVerify an explicit algorithms allowlist (RS/PS/ES families plus EdDSA) instead of relying on jose's implicit defaults, as defense-in-depth for finding L-3. Symmetric algorithms (HS*), alg:none, and ES256K are deliberately excluded, so a future JWKS or key-type change can never make an RS/HS confusion or alg:none forgery reachable. The allowlist and the verify-options builder are exported and covered by unit and integration tests asserting the options include algorithms, a disallowed alg is rejected, and the OIDC happy path still authenticates.
Extend docs-structure CI guards so agents can decide relevance from the page lead and oversized docs fail unless explicitly allowlisted. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Require public-entry imports, the layer DAG, arch:check/lint, and pin the contract with an integration test. Clear the completed QUEUE tasks. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Align log with logwarn (yellow) and logerr (red) so info messages are distinct on a color terminal. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Capture the mcp/serve stderr logging design (no winston) plus the existing agent-analyzability track so work is sequenced with testable acceptance criteria. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Break the three baselined import cycles and clear them from the depcruise baseline. Quarantine Docker-named e2e under JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER for the overnight ensure_ci_passes loop so Docker Desktop load flakes stop trapping the recover agent; full Docker e2e remains required on GitHub Actions. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Treat commands/ as the CLI composition root so command→slice edges are not baselined peer violations. Widen JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER to cover daemon scripts without "docker" in the basename (e.g. 148_standalone_image). Put flaky Docker Desktop e2e fix at the top of QUEUE with mandatory multi-run confirmation. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Stop agents from deleting queue tasks themselves — rule 4 and engineer safety now say only queue.remove_completed_task may. Retone the Docker Desktop task so done means drop JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER. Add named-container wait/cleanup and logged-run helpers with regression guards. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The Docker-daemon e2e helpers/scripts are already hardened (named
jaiph-run container waits with Created counting, e2e::docker_cleanup
EXIT removal of leftover containers, e2e::run_logged stderr surfacing;
guards in src/runtime/docker.test.ts). Remove the temporary quarantine
so the overnight engineer loop runs the full suite like GitHub Actions.
- .jaiph/ensure_ci_passes.jh: stop exporting JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER=1;
update the recover-agent guidance to "fix the harness, not docker.ts
probe timeouts".
- docs/contributing.md: describe the hardening and reframe
JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER as an opt-in local escape hatch, not an
overnight default.
- docker.test.ts: add a regression guard that fails if
ensure_ci_passes.jh re-exports JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER.
The JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER mechanism and E2E_DOCKER_DAEMON_SCRIPTS list
remain in e2e/test_all.sh for ad-hoc no-Docker local runs.
Evidence — 3/3 consecutive green on a quiet Docker Desktop, driver
looping the Docker e2e set 3x (0 leftover jaiph-run-* containers
between iterations):
for iter in 1 2 3; run e2e/tests/{72_docker_run_artifacts,
74b_docker_signal_cleanup,74c_docker_prepull,
74d_docker_snapshot_isolation,75_docker_live_step_output,
148_standalone_image}.sh
=> ITERATION 1/2/3: ALL GREEN (6/6 each) — EVIDENCE RESULT: 3/3 GREEN
Also: npm run build, npm test (2834 pass / 0 fail), npm run arch:check,
npm run lint all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Docker-daemon e2e hardening is complete, so remove the finished "Make Docker Desktop e2e reliable and drop the engineer skip" entry from QUEUE.md. Rewrite the Docker-daemon section of docs/contributing.md to describe the reliability changes in e2e/lib/common.sh (named jaiph-run-* container waits via e2e::wait_for_jaiph_run_container using docker ps -a so Created counts as appeared, EXIT-trap force cleanup via e2e::docker_cleanup, and success runs through e2e::run_logged so daemon flakes surface their own stderr) and clarify that JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER is now only an opt-in local escape hatch that nothing sets by default — both GitHub Actions and the overnight engineer loop run the full suite. Evidence for the completed hardening: looped 72, 74b-74d, 75, and 148_standalone_image on a quiet Docker Desktop 3 consecutive times, all green; npm run build and npm test pass.
An agent dropped JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER after a subset loop of 72/74/148; overnight then hung for hours on kind load in 150_k8s_deploy and melted Docker Desktop. Restore the quarantine, invert the unit guard so the export cannot be removed quietly, restore the QUEUE task with mandatory full test:e2e ×3 (including kind), and put Clear peer CLI back on the queue. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Presence-probe failures from Docker Desktop wedges were mapped to E_DOCKER_NO_JAIPH; distinguish daemon flakes (retry → E_DOCKER_PROBE_FAILED) from a clean missing-jaiph exit. 74d treated stale jaiph-run-* as “started” and mutated the host before the new snapshot — clear leftovers and wait via the shared helper. Heartbeat + wall timeout for kind; ensure_ci_passes heartbeats so idle-kill cannot murder a long silent test:ci. Evidence: Docker subset (72/74b-d/74f/75/148) 3× green; 74d 5× green with decoy jaiph-run leftover; 150_k8s_deploy green with 600s bounds. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Evidence: npm run test:e2e three consecutive times on Docker Desktop — 114/114 scripts passed each run (0 fail / 0 skip), including 150_k8s_deploy. Remove JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER from ensure_ci_passes, flip the unit guard, update contributing, and clear the QUEUE task. Keep the ensure_ci heartbeat so idle-kill cannot murder a live suite. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
…baseline Eliminate no-cross-cli-slice-imports by relocating the shared MCP protocol engine and workflow-call executor out of peer private trees so serve/mcp/ generation compose downward through src/cli/shared. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Wording "re-export JAIPH_E2E_SKIP_DOCKER" matched the unit-test regex that bans exporting the skip flag. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Dequeue the "Clear peer CLI slice baseline edges" task from QUEUE.md and update the architecture docs to reflect that the MCP and workflow-call concerns now live under src/cli/shared. The per-call cancel and JAIPH_MODULE_GRAPH_FILE hand-off references now point at the shared workflow-call executor (src/cli/shared/workflow-call.ts) instead of the removed src/cli/mcp/call.ts, and the analyzability note states the mcp and exec slice directories no longer exist rather than being empty. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a second public runtime entry, src/runtime/testing.ts, that re-exports the small named set of test seams cross-package *.test.ts files need (_dockerExec, _dockerSpawn, _inplacePrompt, CHAIN_GENESIS, chainHmac, RuntimeEventEmitter) so these stay off the production index.ts. Allowlist it beside src/runtime/index.ts in the no-deep-imports-into-runtime rule and retarget every baselined test import to the seam entry, so no test reaches a raw src/runtime/** path. Clear the two upward test layer edges by moving each test to its correct layer: parse-error-snapshot.test.ts moves parse -> transpile (needs loadModuleGraph) and module-graph.test.ts moves transpile -> runtime (needs buildRuntimeGraph). The baseline now carries zero no-deep-imports-into-runtime, layer1-parse-format-no-upward, and layer2-transpile-no-upward entries, and none fire under --no-ignore-known. No runtime behavior changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Runtime and other outside callers could reach compile through two doors: src/transpiler.ts and the allowlisted src/transpile/module-graph.ts. This weakened the "one contract per package" model and forced deep-import rules to special-case the module-graph path. Re-export the full module-graph API (loadModuleGraph, readModuleGraph, writeModuleGraph, moduleGraphFromAsts, serializeModuleGraph, deserializeModuleGraph, ModuleGraph types) from src/transpiler.ts and retarget every outside import — including runtime/kernel/graph.ts — to it. Drop the module-graph.ts pathNot exceptions from no-deep-imports-into- transpile and layer3-runtime-only-transpile-public-graph so runtime may import only src/transpiler.ts from the transpile package. Update the ADR table and allowlisted-exception prose in docs/agent-analyzability.md to state a single transpile public entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Agent analyzability caps (docs/agent-analyzability.md) hold each production file under src/ to <=8 runtime imports and <=400 non-blank, non-comment lines, but sixteen of the hottest files were grandfathered with per-file overrides in eslint.config.mjs that disabled the cap they broke, so the invariant did not apply where agents pay the most context cost. Split twelve of the sixteen into sibling modules in the same directory (per the factory code_philosophy: prefer siblings, not deeper trees) so each now meets both caps under the global rules, and delete its override: cli/commands/mcp, cli/commands/serve, cli/shared/generation, cli/index, cli/shared/workflow-call, parser, runtime/index, transpile/validate, transpile/validate-step, format/emit, runtime/docker, and runtime/kernel/prompt. Public entries stay curated with no export * barrel. Four overrides remain, each rewritten with a fresh justification because each needs a larger multi-file decomposition that is out of scope here: cli/commands/run, cli/serve/handler, parse/workflow-brace, and runtime/kernel/node-workflow-runtime. The global caps were not raised. Behaviour preserved: lint, build, and the full test suite pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ADR still carried rollout-era "queued in QUEUE.md" / "still planned" wording even though the deep-import gates (parse/transpile/runtime/format), CLI slice isolation, and docs guards have all landed with an empty dependency-cruiser known-violations baseline. Rewrite the Enforcement table, Landed, Scripts, and Status sections so they describe what CI now enforces: every layer sits behind a public-entry rule, the import-graph baseline is empty, the only grandfathered items left are the four oversized files with per-file ESLint overrides, and arch:graph is documented as an optional Graphviz-only dev command rather than a promised gate. Add a docs-structure parity test that fails if the ADR calls deep-import enforcement "queued" while the matching rules already exist in .dependency-cruiser.cjs, and drop the completed task header from QUEUE.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
jaiph mcp and jaiph serve now write an operator log to stderr so an
operator can see which workflow started, under which sandbox posture,
and where its run directory is, without reading .jaiph/runs. Each tool
call or run emits a start line ("Running <workflow> (<sandbox>)
run_id=…") and an end line with terminal status, exit, elapsed_ms, and
rundir when known; serve also carries principal and correlation, and
its duplicate invoke line is dropped so the start is logged once.
A small shared helper (src/cli/shared/server-log.ts) wraps the existing
stderr sink with a label, level colors, and grep-friendly key=value
tails, reusing the run color and indent helpers now shared from
src/cli/shared/log-format.ts. It adds no dependency — no winston, pino,
or bunyan. Colors apply only on a TTY sink with NO_COLOR unset. The log
is stderr only and never touches the protocol channel: MCP stdout stays
JSON-RPC and HTTP bodies stay API payloads.
Two env knobs tune verbosity: JAIPH_SERVER_LOG=debug prints debug lines,
and JAIPH_SERVER_LOG_WORKFLOW=1 mirrors workflow log/logwarn/logerr
events, colored by level with run_id and the run tree's indent.
Mirroring is off by default and mirrored lines go through the same
credential redaction as the durable run journal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Treat secret isolation as a first-class problem and design commitment alongside sandboxing and structured AI steps. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Bump CLI, plugins, installers, and docs pins to 0.13.0; stamp Unreleased into the 0.13.0 CHANGELOG. Document that container/k8s standalone deploys skip E_UNSAFE_NO_CONSENT so factory VPS servers keep working without --unsafe on the command line. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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