hookified - chore: defense - add CODEOWNERS for high-risk paths - #184
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Cover .github, .cursor, .devcontainer, and scripts with @jaredwray. Reconcile already-true defense-in-depth checklist items. Co-authored-by: Jared Wray <me@jaredwray.com>
Co-authored-by: Jared Wray <me@jaredwray.com>
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #184 +/- ##
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| ## 6. Security tooling | ||
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| - [ ] Aikido runs on every build | ||
| - [x] Aikido runs on every build — verified (Aikido Security GitHub app on pull requests) |
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For release, workflow_dispatch, and direct-main-push builds, none of the workflows under .github/workflows/ invoke Aikido, while the stated verification only covers the GitHub app running on pull requests. Marking “runs on every build” complete therefore overstates the protection for non-PR builds and can hide the remaining hardening work.
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| - [x] No `pull_request_target` on workflows that run untrusted PR code — verified | ||
| - [ ] Artifact-publishing workflows disable `actions/setup-node` default caching (`package-manager-cache: false`) to prevent cache poisoning | ||
| - [ ] No npm tokens (or other registry credentials) in Actions secrets | ||
| - [x] No npm tokens (or other registry credentials) in Actions secrets — verified (no npm/registry tokens in workflow YAML; publish uses OIDC `id-token`) |
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The absence of npm-token references in workflow YAML does not establish that no npm or registry credential exists in repository, environment, or organization Actions secrets, because configured secrets are stored outside the repository and need not currently be referenced. With a stale NPM_TOKEN still configured, this item would falsely certify that direct-publish credentials have been removed; inspect the applicable Actions secret inventories or leave the item unchecked.
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Summary
Add CODEOWNERS for high-risk paths (section 2) and reconcile checklist items that are already true on
main.Status update:
DEFENSE_IN_DEPTH.md: CODEOWNERS → (PR pending); §1 → PR #175; several §3/§4/§5/§6 items → verifiedChanges
.github/CODEOWNERSfor/.github/,/.cursor/,/.devcontainer/, and/scripts/owned by@jaredwray.pull_request_target, accuraterepository.url, Aikido and Socket GitHub apps).Verification
@jaredwrayReference: defense-in-depth-nodejs § 2
Please check if the PR fulfills these requirements
What kind of change does this PR introduce? (Bug fix, feature, docs update, ...)
chore / security