fix(M4/L5/L8): oracle robustness - #18
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Groups the audit's oracle-robustness findings: - M4: a prolonged Chainlink outage freezes the risky-leg mark, so the normal CPPI trigger goes blind to a real decline. OracleHub gains prolongedStale() (feed stale beyond a configurable window since the last good snapshot); the vault gains a permissionless deRiskUnderProlongedStaleness() that fully de-risks into the safe leg at the degraded bound. Over-conservative but floor-safe; a later rebalance re-risks once the feed recovers. - L5: settleEpoch now requires oracle health, so value is never crystallized at a stale/degraded price. - L8: OracleHub takes an optional USDC/USD feed; when USDC depegs beyond a tolerance (or its feed is stale), healthy() flips false so deposits and settlement pause until the peg returns. address(0) disables the check (par assumed). Addresses the ETH/USD-as-ETH/USDC conflation at the settlement/gating layer. IOracleHealth extended with prolongedStale(); constructor unchanged (USDC feed and windows are owner setters). 7 regression tests; 127 -> 134.
This was referenced Jul 20, 2026
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Category PR grouping the audit's oracle-robustness findings. Branched off main, targets main.
M4 — prolonged-staleness circuit breaker
A prolonged Chainlink outage freezes the risky-leg mark, so the normal CPPI trigger (which reads that mark) is blind to a real decline and never fires.
OracleHub.prolongedStale()reports when the feed has been stale beyond a configurable window since the last good snapshot;CPPIVault.deRiskUnderProlongedStaleness()is then permissionless and fully de-risks into the safe leg at the degraded bound (H6). Over-conservative but floor-safe; a later rebalance re-risks once the feed recovers. Reverts to zero risky then no-ops, so it isn't spammable.L5 — gate settlement on health
settleEpochnow calls_requireOracleHealthy(), so an epoch's NAV is never crystallized at a stale or depegged price. (Claims read the frozenepochNavPerShare, so they stay open per the audit.)L8 — USDC/USD conflation
OracleHubtakes an optional USDC/USD feed viasetUsdcFeed. When USDC depegs beyondmaxUsdcDepegBps(or its feed is stale),healthy()flips false so deposits and settlement pause until the peg returns.address(0)disables the check (par assumed). This closes the ETH/USD-used-as-ETH/USDC gap at the settlement/gating layer without threading a conversion through every swap bound.Tests
7 regressions: prolonged-stale full de-risk (permissionless), not-allowed-when-not-prolonged, settleEpoch blocked when unhealthy, USDC depeg / stale-feed / within-tolerance / no-feed, and the prolonged-stale view timing. Suite 127 -> 134. No fork surface changed (ExecutionModule/PT adapter untouched).