# **CodeBook for State Capture Database**

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\*\*(All measures have been converted to interval from Ordinal for pure VDEM variables)\*\*

\*\*Variables in the database are placed in parentheses ()\*\*

Total # of Variables in Database = 136

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        - 2.2.4.1.2. 1: Seldom.
        - 2.2.4.1.3. 2: About half of the time.
        - 2.2.4.1.4. 3: Usually.
        - 2.2.4.1.5. 4: Always.
    - 2.2.5. Government Attacks on Judiciary (v2jupoatck)
      - 2.2.5.1. How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?
        - 2.2.5.1.1. 0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.
        - 2.2.5.1.2. 1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.
        - 2.2.5.1.3. 2: Attacks occurred more than once.

- 2.2.5.1.4. 3: There were attacks, but they were rare.
- 2.2.5.1.5. 4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity

# 2.2.6. Judicial Purges (v2jupurge)

- 2.2.6.1. Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.
  - 2.2.6.1.1. 0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.
  - 2.2.6.1.2. 1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.
  - 2.2.6.1.3. 2: There were limited arbitrary removals.
  - 2.2.6.1.4. 3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.
  - 2.2.6.1.5. 4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

# 2.2.7. Rigorous & Impartial Public Administration (v2clrspct)

- 2.2.7.1. Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?
  - 2.2.7.1.1. 0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.
  - 2.2.7.1.2. 1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.
  - 2.2.7.1.3. 2: The law is modestly respected by public officials.Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.
  - 2.2.7.1.4. 3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.
  - 2.2.7.1.5. 4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

# 3. Corruption/State Capture Indicators

# 3.1. VDEM 2021 Database

# 3.1.1. Legislature Corrupt Activities

- 3.1.1.1. Question To what extent do legislators abuse their position for financial gain? (v2lgcrrpt) Converted to interval
  - 3.1.1.1.1. 0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.
  - 3.1.1.1.2. 1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
  - 3.1.1.1.3. 2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.

- 3.1.1.1.4. 3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not
- 3.1.1.2. 4: Never, or hardly ever.
- 3.1.2. **Executive Bribery & Corrupt Exchanges** Question How routine do executive branch members succumb to corruption including bribes, graft, etc? **(v2exbribe)** converted to interval
  - 3.1.2.1.1. 0: It is routine and expected
  - 3.1.2.1.2. 1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.
  - 3.1.2.1.3. 2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary
  - 3.1.2.1.4. 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.
  - 3.1.2.1.5. 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.
- 3.1.3. **Executive Embezzlement & Theft** Question How often do executive branch agents embezzle/steal public funds/goods for their own private/familiar gain? **(v2exembez)** ordinal to interval
  - 3.1.3.1.1. 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property
  - 3.1.3.1.2. 1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property
  - 3.1.3.1.3. 2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property
  - 3.1.3.1.4. 3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property
  - 3.1.3.1.5. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property
- 3.1.4. **Public Sector Corrupt Exchanges** Question How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? **(v2excrptps)** converted to interval
  - 3.1.4.1.1. 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time
  - 3.1.4.1.2. 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees
  - 3.1.4.1.3.2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times
  - 3.1.4.1.4. 3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time

- 3.1.4.1.5. 4: No. Never, or hardly ever.
- 3.1.5. Clientelism Index (v2xnp\_client)
- 3.1.6. **Public Sector Theft** Question How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? **(v2exthftps)** converted to itnerval
  - 3.1.6.1.1. 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property
  - 3.1.6.1.2. 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property
  - 3.1.6.1.3. 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property
  - 3.1.6.1.4. 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property
  - 3.1.6.1.5. 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property
- 3.1.7. Judicial Corruption Decision Question How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision? (v2jucorrdc)
  - 3.1.7.1.1.1. 0: Always.
  - 3.1.7.1.1.2. 1: Usually.
  - 3.1.7.1.1.3. 2: About half of the time.
  - 3.1.7.1.1.4. 3: Not usually.
  - 3.1.7.1.1.5. 4: Never.
- 3.1.8. **Media Corrupt (v2mecorrpt)** 
  - 3.1.8.1. Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?
    - 3.1.8.1.1.1. 0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.
    - 3.1.8.1.1.2. 1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.
    - 3.1.8.1.1.3. 2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.
    - 3.1.8.1.1.4. 3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange

for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

3.1.8.1.1.5. 4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

# 3.1.9. Regime Corruption (v2xnp\_regcorr)

- 3.1.9.1. To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?
- 3.1.10. Political Corruption Index (v2x\_corr)
  - 3.1.10.1. How pervasive is political corruption? Low to high 0-1
- 3.1.11. Executive Corruption Index (v2x\_execorr) Low to high 0-1
  - 3.1.11.1. Question: How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?
- 3.1.12. Public Sector Corruption Index (v2x\_pubcorr)
  - 3.1.12.1. Low to high 0-1
- 3.1.13. CPI Corruption Score (e\_ti\_cpi)
  - 3.1.13.1. 2012-2021

# 4. Media Indicators

# 4.1. VDEM 2021 Database

- 4.1.1. **Government Censorship Effort** Question Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? **(v2mecenefm)** converted to interval
  - 4.1.1.1.1 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
  - 4.1.1.1.2. 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
  - 4.1.1.3. 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
  - 4.1.1.4. 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
  - 4.1.1.5. 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished

# 4.1.2. Government Dissemination of False Domestic Information (v2smgovdom)

4.1.2.1. Question: How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

- 4.1.2.1.1.1. 0 = Extremely Often
- 4.1.2.1.1.2. 1 = Often
- 4.1.2.1.1.3. 2 = About half the time
- 4.1.2.1.1.4. 3 = Rarely
- 4.1.2.1.1.5. 4 = Never

# 5. Civil Society Indicators

- 5.1. VDEM 2021 Database
  - 5.1.1. Civil Society Participation Index (v2x\_cspart)
  - 5.1.2. Freedom of Religion (v2clrelig)
    - 5.1.2.1. Is there freedom of religion?
      - 5.1.2.1.1.1. 0 = Hardly if any
      - 5.1.2.1.1.2. 1 = weak
      - 5.1.2.1.1.3. 2 = somewhat
      - 5.1.2.1.1.4. 3 = mostly respected
      - 5.1.2.1.1.5. 4 = fully respected by public authorities

# 5.1.3. Civil Society Organization Repression (v2csreprss)

- 5.1.3.1. Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?
  - 5.1.3.1.1.1. 0 = severe
  - 5.1.3.1.1.2. 1 = substantially
  - 5.1.3.1.1.3. 2 = moderately
  - 5.1.3.1.1.4. 3 = weakly
  - 5.1.3.1.1.5. 4 = not at all no restrictions

# 5.1.4. CSO Anti-System movements (v2csantimv)

- 5.1.4.1. Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?
  - 5.1.4.1.1.1. 0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.
  - 5.1.4.1.1.2. 1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.
  - 5.1.4.1.1.3. 2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.
  - 5.1.4.1.1.4. 3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the
  - 5.1.4.1.1.5. 4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime

# 5.1.5. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (v2caassemb)

5.1.5.1. To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly?

- 5.1.5.1.1.1. 0 = never
- 5.1.5.1.1.2. 1 = rarely
- 5.1.5.1.1.3. 2 = sometimes
- 5.1.5.1.1.4. 3 = mostly
- 5.1.5.1.1.5. 4 = almost always

# 5.1.6. Mass Mobilization (v2cagenmob)

- 5.1.6.1. In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization been?
  - 5.1.6.1.1.1. 0: There have been virtually no events.
  - 5.1.6.1.1.2. 1: There have been several small-scale events.
  - 5.1.6.1.1.3. 2: There have been many small-scale events.
  - 5.1.6.1.1.4. 3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.
  - 5.1.6.1.1.5. 4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

# 5.1.7. Engagement in independent trade unions (v2catrauni)

- 5.1.7.1. What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions?
  - 5.1.7.1.1.1. 0: Virtually no one.
  - 5.1.7.1.1.2. 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%).
  - 5.1.7.1.1.3. 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
  - 5.1.7.1.1.4. 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
  - 5.1.7.1.1.5. 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

# 5.1.8. Civil Liberties Index (v2x civlib)

- 5.1.8.1. To what extent is civil liberty respected?
- 5.1.9. Political Civil Liberties Index (v2x clpol)
  - 5.1.9.1. To what extent are political liberties respected?

# 5.1.10. Private Civil Liberties Index (v2x\_clpriv)

5.1.10.1. Question: To what extent are private liberties respected? Clarification: Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

# 6. Demographic & Societal Indicators

#### 6.1. World Bank Data

- 6.1.1. Rural Population (WB\_RuralPopulation)
- 6.1.2. Forest Area % of Land Area (WB\_ForestArea\_Percent\_of\_LandArea)

- 6.1.3. Agricultural Land % of Land Area
  - (WB\_AgricultrualLand\_Percent\_of\_LandArea)
- 6.1.4. Rural Population % of Total Population
  - (WB\_Rural\_Population\_Percent\_of\_Total\_Pop)
- 6.1.5. Total Population (WB\_Total\_Population)
- 6.1.6. Urban Population % of Total Population
  - (WB Urban Population Percent of Total Pop)
- 6.2. World Bank Data Societal Indicators
  - 6.2.1. Literacy Rate Adult Total % (WB\_Literacy\_Rate\_Adult\_Total\_Percent)
- 6.3. VDEM 2021 Database Societal Indicators
  - 6.3.1. Educational Equality (v2peedueq)
    - 6.3.1.1. To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?
      - 6.3.1.1.1. 0: Extreme.
      - 6.3.1.1.1.2. 1: Unequal.
      - 6.3.1.1.3. 2: Somewhat equal.
      - 6.3.1.1.4. 3: Relatively equal
      - 6.3.1.1.1.5. 4: Equal.
  - 6.3.2. **Health Equality (v2pehealth)** 
    - 6.3.2.1. To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?
      - 6.3.2.1.1.1. 0 = Extreme
      - 6.3.2.1.1.2. 1 = Unequal
      - 6.3.2.1.1.3. 2 = Somewhat equal
      - 6.3.2.1.1.4. 3 = Relatively equal
      - 6.3.2.1.1.5. 4 = equal
  - 6.3.3. Primary School Enrollment % (v2peprisch)
  - 6.3.4. Secondary School Enrollment % (v2pesecsch)
  - 6.3.5. Tertiary School Enrollment % (v2petersch)
  - 6.3.6. Education 15+ (e peaveduc)
    - 6.3.6.1. What is the avg years education citizens 15 and older?
- 7. Foreign Aid Indicators
  - 7.1. World Bank Data
    - 7.1.1. Net Official Development Assistance Received % of GNI (WB Net ODA Received Percent of GNI)
    - 7.1.2. Net ODA Received Per Capita USD
      - (WB Net ODA Received Per Capita USDollars)
    - 7.1.3. Net ODA Received USD (WB\_Net\_ODA\_Received\_USD)

#### 8. Trade Indicators

- 8.1. World Bank Data
  - 8.1.1. Net FDI Inflows % GDP (**WB\_Net\_FDI\_Inflows\_Percent\_of\_GDP**)
  - 8.1.2. Net FDI Inflows USD (WB Net FDI Inflows USD)

#### 9. Economic Indicators

- 9.1. World Bank Data on Key Economic Indicators
  - 9.1.1. GDP Growth Annual % (WB\_GDP\_Growth\_Annual\_Percentage)
  - 9.1.2. GDPPC Growth Annual % (WB\_GDPPC\_Growth\_Annual\_Percentage)
  - 9.1.3. Inflation, Consumer Prices Annual %

    (WB\_Inflation\_Consumer\_Prices\_Annual\_Percent)
  - 9.1.4. Total Reserves, USD (WB Total Reserves USD)
  - 9.1.5. GDP [USD] (WB\_GDP\_USD)
  - 9.1.6. GDPPC [USD] (WB\_GDPPC\_USD)
  - 9.1.7. Inflation, GDP Deflator Annual % (WB\_Inflation\_GDP\_Deflator\_Annual\_Percent)
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  - 9.2.1. Labor Force Total (millions) (WB\_Labor\_Force\_Total)
- 9.3. World Bank Data on Natural Resources
  - 9.3.1. Total Natural Resource Rents % GDP (WB\_Total\_Nat\_Resource\_Rents\_Percent\_of\_GDP)
  - 9.3.2. Oil Rents % GDP (WB\_Oil\_Rents\_Percent\_of\_GDP)
- 9.4. World Bank Data on Inequality
  - 9.4.1. Gini index (WB\_Gini\_Index)
  - 9.4.2. Income Share Held By Highest 10%
    (WB\_Income\_Share\_Held\_By\_Highest\_10\_Percent)
  - 9.4.3. % Informal Economy (WB\_Informal\_Economy)

# 9.5. VDEM 2021 Database on Inequality

- 9.5.1. Power Distributed By Socioeconomic Position (v2pepwrses)
  - 9.5.1.1. 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
  - 9.5.1.2. 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power.
     People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.
  - 9.5.1.3. 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power.People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.
  - 9.5.1.4. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.
  - 9.5.1.5. 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.
- 9.5.2. Exclusion By Socio-Economic Group (v2xpe\_exlecon)

- 9.5.2.1. Question: Index of (political) exclusion by socio-economic group
- 9.5.2.2. Clarification: Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g.less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better. Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1)

# 9.6. World Inequality Database (Piketty)

9.6.1. Top 1 % Share Income Inequality

(WID\_Top\_1\_Percent\_Share\_Income\_Inequality)

9.6.2. Top 10 % Share Income Inequality

(WID\_Top\_10\_Percent\_Share\_Income\_Inequality)

9.6.3. Bottom 50% Share Income Inequality

(WID\_Bottom\_50\_Percent\_Share\_Income\_Inequality)

9.6.4. Top 1 % Share Wealth Inequality

(WID\_Top\_1\_Percent\_Share\_Wealth\_Inequality)

9.6.5. Top 10% Share Wealth Inequality

(WID\_Top\_10\_Percent\_Share\_Wealth\_Inequality)

9.6.6. Bottom 50% Share Wealth Inequality

9.6.6.1. (WID\_Bottom\_50\_Percent\_Share\_Wealth\_Inequality)

#### 9.7. World Bank Data on innovation

9.7.1. Total # Patent Applications Residents

(WB\_Patent\_Applications\_Residents)

# 9.8. VDEM Database 2021

- 9.8.1. State ownership of economy (v2clstown)
  - 9.8.1.1. Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?
    - 9.8.1.1.1. 0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.
    - 9.8.1.1.2. 1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.
    - 9.8.1.1.3. 2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.

- 9.8.1.1.4. 3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.
- 9.8.1.1.5. 4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

#### 10. Violence Indicators

#### 10.1. World Bank Data

10.1.1. Intentional Homicides Per 100,000 People

(WB\_Intentional\_Homicides\_Per\_100000\_People)

## 10.2. VDEM 2021 Database

- 10.2.1. Freedom From Political Killings (v2clkil) converted to interval
  - 10.2.1.1. Is there freedom from political killings?
    - 10.2.1.1.1. 0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
    - 10.2.1.1.2. 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.
    - 10.2.1.1.3. 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
    - 10.2.1.1.4. 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases
    - 10.2.1.1.5. Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

# 10.2.2. Freedom From Torture (v2cltort)

#### 10.2.2.1. Is there freedom from torture?

- 10.2.2.1.1. 0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.
- 10.2.2.1.2. 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.
- 10.2.2.1.3. 2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.
- 10.2.2.1.4. 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.
- 10.2.2.1.5. 4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

# 10.2.3. Political Violence (v2caviol)

- 10.2.3.1. How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?
  - 10.2.3.1.1. 0 = not at all
  - 10.2.3.1.2. 1 = rare
  - 10.2.3.1.3. 2 occasionally
  - 10.2.3.1.4. 3 = frequently
  - 10.2.3.1.5. 4 often
- 10.2.4. Physical Violence Index (v2x\_clphy)
  - 10.2.4.1. Question: To what extent is physical integrity respected?
  - 10.2.4.2. Clarification: Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections
- 10.2.5. Civil War (e\_civil\_war)
  - 10.2.5.1. Question: Was there a civil war?
  - 10.2.5.2. Clarification: Civil war at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 battle deaths for each country-year.
  - 10.2.5.3. Responses:
    - 10.2.5.3.1. 0: No
    - 10.2.5.3.2. 1: Yes
- 10.2.6. Coup de tat **(e\_pt\_coup)** 
  - 10.2.6.1. Responses:
  - 10.2.6.2. 0: No coup attempt occurred
  - 10.2.6.3. 1: Unssuccessful coup attempt occurred
  - 10.2.6.4. 2: Successful coup attempt occurred

#### 11. Political Indicators

- 11.1. IADB Database on Political Institutions 2020
  - 11.1.1. How many years has the chief executive been in office? (IADB\_DPI2020\_YRSOFFC)
  - 11.1.2. Party of the chief executive has been how long in office (IADB DPI2020 PRTYIN)
  - 11.1.3. Average age of parties (IADB\_DPI\_2020\_PARTYAGE)
- 11.2. VDEM 2021 Database
  - 11.2.1. Judicial Constraints on the Executive (v2x\_jucon)
  - 11.2.2. Legislative Constraints on the Executive (v2xlg\_legcon)
  - 11.2.3. Political Party cohesion (v2pscohesv)
  - 11.2.4. Among the major parties, what is their most common linkage to constituents? (v2psprlnks)

- 11.2.4.1.1. 0 Clientelistic
- 11.2.4.1.2. 1 Mixed Clientelistic and Local Collective
- 11.2.4.1.3. 2 Local Collective
- 11.2.4.1.4. 3 Mixed Local Collective/programmatic-policy oriented
- 11.2.4.1.5. 4 Policy/Programmatic
- 11.2.5. Presidentialism index (v2xnp\_pres)
- 11.2.6. Party Institutionalization Index (v2xps party)
- 11.2.7. Accountability Index (v2x\_accountability)
- 11.2.8. Political Polarization (v2cacamps)
  - 11.2.8.1. Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?
    - 11.2.8.1.1. 0 = Not at all
    - 11.2.8.1.2. 1 = Mainly Not
    - 11.2.8.1.3. 2 = Somewhat
    - 11.2.8.1.4. 3 = Yes, to noticeable extent
    - 11.2.8.1.5. 4 = Yes, to a large extent
- 11.2.9. Vertical Accountability Index (v2x\_veracc)
- 11.2.10. Horizontal Accountability index (v2x\_horacc)
- 11.2.11. Polarization of Society (v2smpolsoc)
  - 11.2.11.1. Question: How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?
    - 11.2.11.1.1. 0 = Serious polarization
    - 11.2.11.1.2. 1 = Moderate Polarization
    - 11.2.11.1.3. 2 = Medium Polarization
    - 11.2.11.1.4. 3 = Limited Polarization
    - 11.2.11.1.5. 4 = No Polarization
- 11.2.12. Populism **(PopDV)** 
  - 11.2.12.1. 1 = Populism Governing a given country
  - 11.2.12.2. 0 = otherwise
- 11.2.13. Total Years of Populism in Power (YearsPOP)
  - 11.2.13.1. Numeric

# 12. Democracy Indicators

# 12.1. VDEM 2021 Database

- 12.1.1. Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy)
- 12.1.2. Liberal Democracy Index (v2x\_libdem)
- 12.1.3. Participatory Democracy Index (v2x\_partipdem)
- 12.1.4. Deliberative Democracy Index (v2x\_delibdem)
- 12.1.5. Egalitarian Democracy Index (v2x\_egaldem)
- 12.1.6. **Neopatrimonial Index** Question To what extent is rule based on personal authority? **(v2x\_neopat)**
- 12.1.7. Democratic Breakdowns (e democracy breakdowns)
  - 12.1.7.1. How many previous democratic breakdowns occurred?
- 12.1.8. Coups (e\_coups)

- 12.1.8.1. Number of successful coups attempts each year
- 12.1.9. POLITY Combined Score (e\_p\_polity)

12.1.9.1. - 10 to 10

12.1.10. Institutionalized Autocracy (e\_autoc)

12.1.10.1. 0-1

12.1.11. Institutionalized Democracy ((e\_democ)

12.1.11.1. 0-1

- 12.1.12. Political Competition (e\_polcomp)
  - 12.1.12.1. 1-10 (least to greatest political competition where 10 = greatest competition
- 12.1.13. Polity Revised Combined Score (e\_polity2)

12.1.13.1. 0-1

# 13. Heritage Foundation Indicators

- 13.1. Indicators range on topics from governance to economic matters
  - 13.1.1. Economic Freedom (Heritage\_Found\_Economic\_Freedom)
  - 13.1.2. Property Rights (Heritage Found Property Rights)
  - 13.1.3. Government Integrity (Heritage\_Found\_Government\_Integrity)
  - 13.1.4. Judicial Effectiveness (Heritage\_Found\_Judicial\_Effectiveness)
  - 13.1.5. Tax Burden (Heritage\_Found\_Tax\_Burden)
  - 13.1.6. Government Spending (Heritage\_Found\_Govt\_Spending)
  - 13.1.7. Fiscal Health (Heritage\_Found\_Fiscal\_Health)
  - 13.1.8. Business Freedom (Heritage\_Found\_Business\_Freedom)
  - 13.1.9. Labor Freedom (Heritage\_Found\_Labor\_Freedom)
  - 13.1.10. Monetary Freedom (Heritage Found Monetary Freedom)
  - 13.1.11. Trade Freedom (Heritage\_Found\_Trade\_Freedom)
  - 13.1.12. Investment Freedom (Heritage Found Investment Freedom)
  - 13.1.13. Financial Freedom (Heritage\_Found\_Financial\_Freedom)

#### 14. Freedom House Indicators

- 14.1. Civil Liberties (e\_fh\_cl)
  - 14.1.1. Responses:Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).
  - 14.1.2. Source(s): Freedom House (2021). Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.
- 14.2. Political Rights (e\_fh\_pr)
  - 14.2.1. Responses: Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).
  - 14.2.2. Source(s): Freedom House (2021).

14.2.3. Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

# 14.3. Rule of Law (e\_fh\_rol)

- 14.3.1. Responses: Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).
- 14.3.2. Source(s): Freedom House (2021). Taken from Teorell et al (2018).
- 14.3.3. Notes: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

# 14.4. Status (e\_fh\_status)

- 14.4.1. 1 = Free
- 14.4.2. 2 = Partly Free
- 14.4.3. 3 = Not Free