


Inteligencia Artificial Ofensiva

¿Cómo podemos estar preparados?

Miguel Hernández
José Ignacio Escribano





Miguel Hernández

Security Content Engineer at  sysdig
@MiguelHzBz    @mastodon.social




José Ignacio Escribano

Cybersecurity and Machine Learning Researcher
 /in/josé-ignacio-escribano-pablos

Anteriormente en AI + Seguridad...

2017



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTzwTTVfZs>

2019



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ist4Za3C2DY&ab_channel=CCN

2021



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsDLt5gBnmY&ab_channel=CCN


2022



<https://youtu.be/SzW6E6d8KOs?t=27358>

Disclaimer

Todo lo que se muestra en esta charla es con fines **educativos**.



Nuestras opiniones personales **no** están relacionadas con nuestros actuales centros de trabajo.

Agenda

O1

¿Qué es IA
ofensiva?

Motivaciones, límites...

O2

Abuso

Adversarial Machine Learning

O3

Uso

Mejorando lo existente

O4

¿Cómo estar
preparados?

Recomendaciones
y recursos útiles

O1

¿Qué es la IA
Ofensiva?



IA ofensiva

La IA ofensiva es el uso de inteligencia artificial con un propósito malicioso que incluye:

- Ataque a sistemas de inteligencia artificial (o Adversarial machine learning)
- Ataques “clásicos” mejorados con inteligencia artificial (persona building, malware defense evasión, y demás que veremos en esta presentación).

“The use or abuse of AI to accomplish a malicious task”

Motivación del adversario

Automatización

Escalado automático de tareas complejas (spear phishing attacks).

Velocidad

Mayor velocidad en alcanzar las metas del adversario.

Éxito

Aumento en la probabilidad de éxito.

Nuevas amenazas

Propaganda

Posibilidad de realizar ataques personalizados al alcance de cualquiera. Por ejemplo, IA generativa, etc.

Malware inteligente

Si el malware es capaz de hacer movimientos laterales/discovery, reducirá la comunicación con C2 y será más difícil detectarlo.

Robo de propiedad intelectual

La IA permite el robo de la propiedad intelectual (Adversarial Machine Learning).

Taxonomía



Abuso

Explotar las vulnerabilidades de los modelos de Inteligencia Artificial.



Uso

Mejorar las técnicas ofensivas actuales con el uso de la Inteligencia Artificial.


02 Abuso

Adversarial Machine Learning



Adversarial Machine Learning

Rama del machine learning que estudia los **ataques** que puede sufrir un **modelo en la presencia de un adversario malicioso** y cómo **protegerse** de ellos.



Adversarial Machine Learning

Taxonomía




Extracción

Robo de modelos



Inversión

Filtrado de datos



Envenenamiento


Creación de puertas traseras




Evasión

Engaño a los modelos

Extracción (o robo de modelo)



Extracción (o robo de modelo)



Extracción (o robo de modelo)

Limitaciones

El ataque no es sencillo en entornos reales.

Peticiones limitadas por el modelo.

En ocasiones, es tan complicado como entrenar desde cero.

Defensas


Redondeo de las salidas.

Privacidad diferencial.

Medidas específicas.



Inversión



Inversión



Membership Inference Attack (MIA)

Determinar si una **muestra** fue empleada como parte del entrenamiento.



Property Inference Attack (PIA)

Extracción de **propiedades estadísticas** que no fueron codificadas durante la **fase de entrenamiento**.



Reconstrucción

Recreación de una o más **muestras del conjunto de entrenamiento** y/o sus **etiquetas**.

Inversión



<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2810103.2813677>

Training Set



*Caption: Living in the light
with Ann Graham Lotz*

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13188>

Generated Image



*Prompt:
Ann Graham Lotz*

Inversión

Defensas


Criptografía avanzada como privacidad diferencial, criptografía homomórfica y computación multiparte segura.

Técnicas de regularización como Dropout.


Compresión de modelos.



Envenenamiento



Envenenamiento




<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2810103.2813677>

Envenenamiento



Envenenamiento



<https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2810103.2813677>

Envenenamiento

Defensas

Protección del dato, que incluye evitar la modificación, la denegación y la falsificación de los datos y, la detección de los datos envenenados, junto con el uso del saneamiento de datos.

Protección de los algoritmos, que intenta emplear métodos robustos de entrenamiento.

Defensas específicas.


IBM Research AI

Fool the AI!

Hackers can use backdoors to poison training data and cause an AI model to misclassify images. Learn how IBM researchers can tell when data has been poisoned, then guess what backdoors have been hidden in these datasets.

Can you guess the backdoor?


PLAY




<https://fooltheai.mybluemix.net>



Evasión




Evasión



<https://www.nassiben.com/phantoms>

Evasión



Classifier: Word-LSTM

Original Text Prediction: Sci/Tech (Confidence = 47.80%)

Adversarial Text Prediction: Business (Confidence = 52.52%)

Original Text: *Tyrannosaurus rex achieved its massive size due to an enormous growth spurt **during** its adolescent years.*

Adversarial Text: *Tyrannosaurus rex achieved its massive size due to an enormous growth spurt **durnig** its adolescent years.*

Classifier: Text-CNN

Original Text Prediction: Company (Confidence = 98.16%)

Adversarial Text Prediction: Artist (Confidence = 20.27%)


Original Text: *Yates is a gardening company **in** New Zealand and Australia.*

Adversarial Text: *Yates is a gardening company **i** New Zealand and Australia.*

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09156>

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.00760>

Evasión



<https://adversarialdeepfakes.github.io>

Evasión

Defensas

Entrenamiento adversario, que consiste en emplear ejemplos adversarios durante el entrenamiento para que el modelo aprenda características de los ejemplos adversarios, haciendo más robusto el modelo ante este tipo de ataque.

Transformaciones sobre las entradas.

Enmascarado/regularización del gradiente. No muy efectiva.

Defensas débiles.



Herramientas open source

| Nombre | Tipo | Algoritmos | Tipos de ataques | Ataque/Defensa | Frameworks soportados |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|------------------|----------------|--|
| <u>Cleverhans</u> | Imagen | Deep Learning | Evasión | Ataque | Tensorflow, Keras, JAX |
| <u>Foolbox</u> | Imagen | Deep Learning | Evasión | Ataque | Tensorflow, PyTorch, JAX |
| <u>ART</u> | Cualquiera | Deep Learning, SVM, LR, etc. | Todos | Ambos | Tensorflow, Keras, Pytorch, Scikit Learn |
| <u>TextAttack</u> | Texto | Deep Learning | Evasión | Ataque | Keras, HuggingFace |
| <u>Advertorch</u> | Imagen | Deep Learning | Evasión | Ambos | ---- |
| <u>AdvBox</u> | Imagen | Deep Learning | Evasión | Ambos | PyTorch, Tensorflow, MxNet |
| <u>DeepRobust</u> | Imagen, grafos | Deep Learning | Evasión | Ambos | PyTorch |
| <u>Counterfit</u> | Cualquiera | Cualquiera | Evasión | Ataque | ---- |
| <u>Adversarial Audio Examples</u> | Audio | DeepSpeech | Evasión | Ataque | ---- |


Principales herramientas



Adversarial
Robustness
Toolbox



Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART)



<https://github.com/Trusted-AI/adversarial-robustness-toolbox>

03

Uso ofensivo

Mejorando lo existente




Algunas aplicaciones



IA Potenciando
Pentesting



IA Potenciando
Malware




IA Potenciando
OSINT



IA Generativa

IA Potenciando Pentesting




```

[+] Deep Exploit v0.0.1-beta
[+] Author : Isao Takasu (@bbrr_bbq)
[+] Website : https://github.com/13o-bbr-bbq/machine_learning_security/
[+]
[+ Execute Nmap against 192.168.184.132
[+] Nmap already scanned
[+] Get exploit tree from nmap result 192.168.184.132.xml.
[+] Loaded target tree from : /root/machine_learning_security/DeepExploit/data/target_info_192.168.184.132.json
[+] Get exploit list.
[+] Loaded exploit list from : /root/machine_learning_security/DeepExploit/data/exploit_list.csv
[+] Get exploit tree.
[+] Loaded exploit tree from : /root/machine_learning_security/DeepExploit/data/exploit_tree.json
[+] Get payload list from : /root/machine_learning_security/DeepExploit/data/payload_list.csv
[+] Get exploit tree.
[+] Loaded exploit tree from : /root/machine_learning_security/DeepExploit/data/exploit_tree.json
[+] Restore learned data.
[+] Executing start: local_thread1
[+] Execute exploitation.

```

https://github.com/13o-bbr-bbq/machine_learning_security/tree/master/DeepExploit

AutoPentest-DRL: Automated Penetration Testing Using Deep Reinforcement Learning



<https://github.com/crond-iaist/AutoPentest-DRL>

DeepGenerator


Fully automatically generate injection codes for web application assessment using Genetic Algorithm and Generative Adversarial Networks.

Following injection codes were generated by DeepGenerator.

```

<script>\alw0005rt();</script><tr><th/>
<iframe><onload>alert();</onload></iframe><command>
<video><source onerror>javascript:alert();</kind>
<svg><canvas><select><onload>confirm();</select>
<object><src>x<onload>alert();</src></object></svg></video>
<script type="text/javascript">

```



https://github.com/13o-bbr-bbq/machine_learning_security/tree/master/Generator

IA Potenciando Pentesting



brannondorsey/ PassGAN


A Deep Learning Approach for Password Guessing
(<https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.00440>)

1 Contributor 7 Issues 834 Stars 182 Forks



<https://github.com;brannondorsey/PassGAN>

Password guessing



Deep Confusables

Improving Unicode Encoding Attacks with Deep Learning

Miguel Hernández (@MiguelHzBz)
José Ignacio Escribano (@jipep)
Dr. Alfonso Muñoz (@mindcrypt)

May 2019




Deep Confusables: Improving Unicode Encoding Attacks With Deep Learning
- Alfonso Muñoz, Miguel H. Boza and José I. Escribano

<https://github.com/bbvanexttechnologies/deep-confusables-cli>

Phishing campaigns

IA Potenciando Malware

AI-aided attacks



[1] S. Palka et al., "Fuzzing Email Filters with Generative Grammars and N-Gram Analysis", Usenix WOOT 2015

[2] A. Singh and V. Thaware, "Wire Me through Machine Learning", Black Hat USA 2017

[3] J. Jung et al., "AVPASS: Automatically Bypassing Android Malware Detection System", Black Hat USA 2017


[4] H. Anderson, "Bot vs. Bot: Evading Machine Learning Malware Detection", Black Hat USA 2017

[5] DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC), 2016

[6] D. Petro and B. Morris, "Weaponizing Machine Learning: Humanity was Overrated Anyway", DEF CON 2017

IA Potenciando Malware

AI-aided attacks



AI-embedded attack


AI capability *embedded* inside malware itself



DeepLocker

IA OSINT

Target selection



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArnxiQDbt-0>

Mining OSINT

zerofox-oss/
SNAP_R

A machine learning based social media pen-testing tool

1 Contributor 1 Issue 132 Stars 38 Forks

https://github.com/zerofox-oss/SNAP_R


IA Blue Team

 MLSEC

ADVERSARIAL LEARNING VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY MALWARE ANALYSIS DATA ANALYSIS

MACHINE LEARNING FOR COMPUTER SECURITY

Open-source software and datasets developed by the research group of Konrad Rieck



MALWARE ANALYSIS

Drebin — Dataset of Malicious Android Applications

The Drebin dataset consists of roughly 5.000 malicious Android applications that have been collected as part of the Mobile Sandbox project between 2011 and 2012. The dataset can be used to experiment with Android malware and compare different detection approaches.

[Data](#) [Paper](#)

VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY

Adageo — Structural Analysis :

Adageo is a collection of Python n graphs from Android APKs or DD modules provide classes for detecting malicious structure

[Code](#) [Paper](#)

Joern — A Robust Tool for Static Code Analysis

Joern is a platform for robust analysis of C/C++ code. It generates code property graphs, a novel graph representation of code that exposes the code's syntax, control-flow, data-flow and type information. Code property graphs are stored in a graph database. This allows code to be mined using search queries formulated in the graph traversal language Gremlin. Joern forms the basis for assisted vulnerability discovery using machine learning techniques.

[Code](#) [Paper](#)

Malheur — Automatic Analysis

Malheur is a tool for the automatic analysis of malware and the detection of malware with similar behavior analysis

[Code](#) [Data](#) [Paper](#)

Pulsar — Protocol Learning, Simulation and Stateful Fuzzing

Pulsar is a network fuzzer with automatic protocol learning and simulation capabilities. The tool allows to model a protocol through machine learning techniques, such as clustering and hidden Markov models. These models can be used to simulate communication between Pulsar and a real client or server thanks to semantically correct messages which, in combination with a series of fuzzing primitives, allow to test the implementation of an unknown protocol for errors in deeper states of its protocol state machine.


[Code](#) [Paper](#)

Vulnerability discovery / detection



<https://sysdig.com/blog/how-train-crypto-miner-detection-model/>

MITRE ATT&CK



MITRE ATT&CK


dattasiddhartha/
DeepObfusCode



DeepObfusCode: Source Code Obfuscation
Through Sequence-to-Sequence Networks

1 Contributor 0 Issues 3 Stars 1 Fork

Malware Obfuscation



MITRE ATT&CK

dattasiddhartha/
DeepObfusCode



DeepObfusCode: Source Code Obfuscation
Through Sequence-to-Sequence Networks

1 Contributor 0 Issues

Malware

facebookresearch/
AutoCAT




AutoCAT: Reinforcement Learning for Automated
Exploration of Cache-Timing Attacks

1 Contributor 0 Issues 19 Stars 1 Fork

Vulnerability Discovery

At
Att
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Phish
Point of e
Rec



MITRE ATT&CK


dattasiddhartha/
DeepObfusCode



DeepObfusCode: Source Code Obfuscation
Through Sequence-to-Sequence Networks

1 Contributor 0 Issues

Malware



facebookresearch/
AutoCAT

AutoCAT: Reinforcement Learning for Automated
Exploration of Cache-Timing Attacks

1 Contributor 0 Issues 19 Stars 1 Fork

Vulnerability Discov

pralab/
secml_malware

Create adversarial attacks against machine learning
Windows malware detectors

2 Contributors 7 Issues 146 Stars 29 Forks



Evading AVs

<https://arxiv.org/abs>

MITR

dattasiddhartha/ **DeepObfusCode**

DeepObfusCode: Source Code Obfuscation
Through Sequence-to-Sequence Netw

1 Contributor 0 Issues
Malware

facebookresearch/ **AutoCAT**

AutoCAT: Reinforcement Learning for Automated
Exploration of Cache-Timing Attacks

1 Contributor 0 Issues 19 Stars 1 Fork


Vulnerability Discov

BishopFox/ **eyeballer**

Convolutional neural network for analyzing pentest
screenshots

6 Contributors 6 Issues 757 Stars 110 Forks

Vulnerability Detection



pralab/ **secml_malware**

Create adversarial attacks against machine learning
Windows malware detectors

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Evading AVs



<https://arxiv.org/abs>

MITR

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1 Contributor 0 Issues
Malware

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Vulnerability Discov

<https://arxiv.org/abs>

BishopFox/
eyeballer

Convolutional neural network for analyzing pentest
screenshots

6 Contributors 6 Issues 757 Stars 110 Forks

Vulnerability Detection

Generative Models for Spear Phishing Posts on Social
Media

r0reagan/**DeepDGA**

Implementation of «DeepDGA: Adversarially-
Tuned Domain Generation and Detection»
arXiv:1610.01969



1 Contributor 0 Issues 19 Stars 15 Forks

Spear Phishing

pralab/secml_malware




Create adversarial attacks against machine learning
Windows malware detectors


2 Contributors 7 Issues 146 Stars 29 Forks

Evading AVs


MITRE ATT&CK



IA Generativa



Texto



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzctZgha1yw>

Experiments with Making Convincing AI-Generated Fake News

September 30, 2019 • 10 min read • AI, Text Generation

```

maxwoolf@elio:~/ -> cd /Users/maxwoolf/Downloads/google-cloud-sdk/gcloud/beta/compute--project=g/runner-py12761/checkpoint_exists (from tensorflow.python.training.checkpoint_management) is deprecated and will be removed in a future version.
Instruction: for updating:
Use standard file APIs to check for files with this prefix.
maxwoolf@elio:~/ -> cd /Users/maxwoolf/Downloads/google-cloud-sdk/gcloud/beta/compute--project=g/runner-py12761/get_checkpoint_mtime (from tensorflow.python.training.checkpoint_management) is deprecated and will be removed in a future version.
Instruction: for updating:
Use standard file utilities to get mtimes.
2019-09-29 18:38:09.804277: W tensorflow/compiler/xla/mark_for_compilation_pass.cc:141] (Compiler XLA) JIT compilation failed for cluster because envvar TF_XLA_FLAGS=--tf_xla_cpu_global_jit was not set. If you want XLA:CPU, either set that envvar, or use experimental_jit_scope to enable XLA:CPU. To confirm that XLA is active, pass --vmodule=xla_compilation_caches=(as a proper command-line flag, not via TF_XLA_FLAGS) or set the envvar XLA_FLAGS=xla_no_profile.
Load 1000000 words (246531 unique) from vocabulary file.
Read 69845327 words (246531 unique) from vocabulary file.
Loading codes from codes ...
Read 208000 codes from the codes file.
ENTER PROMPT: Links https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-likes-fortnite/2019/09/24/
  
```

When OpenAI announced GPT-2, a robust text-generating AI model, they explicitly only released smaller, less robust versions of the model out of fear that the large model could be used to generate fake news. However, since OpenAI described most of the technical decisions needed to create the model in the corresponding

<https://minimaxir.com/2019/09/ctrl-fake-news/>

Texto

02-21-23

A science fiction magazine closed submissions after being bombarded with stories written by ChatGPT

In a case of life (or something) imitating art, an award-winning publisher of science fiction says it's being overrun with AI-generated work.




Figure 2: Lan... [Source photo: Getty Images]



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzctZgha1yw>

xperiments with Making
convincing AI-Generated
ake News

January 30, 2019 · 10 min read · ■ AI, Text Generation

```
maxwell@maxwell-OptiPlex-5070:~/Desktop$ python -m tensorflow_cloud.gcloud --project over_py12761 -- checkpoint_exists (from tensorflow.python.training.checkpoint_management)
is deprecated and will be removed in a future version.
: function for updating:
standard_file APIs to check for files with this prefix.
UNIMPLEMENTED: (from tensorflow/python/local_python/_jittable_packages/tensorflow/python/training/_jittable.py:1066) get_checkpoint_metadata (from tensorflow.python.training.checkpoint_manager) is deprecated and will be removed in a future version.
: function for updating:
standard file utilities to get ntimes.
DEPRECATION WARNING: Using TensorFlow's compiler API is no longer recommended for a cluster because envvar TF_XLA_FLAGS=--tf_xla_global_jit was not set. If you want XLA@CPU, either set that envvar, or use experiment_jit_scope to enable XLA@CPU. To confirm that XLA is active, pass --vmodule=xla_codegen=cached (as a proper command-line flag, not via TF_XLA_FLAGS) or set the envvar XLA_FLAGS=xla_no_profile.
: function for calculating vocab ...
: 690645327 words (246531 unique) from vocabulary file.
: ing codes from codes ...
: 2808000 codes from the codes file.
: ER PRIORITY: Links https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-likes-fortnite/2019/04/11/
```

OpenAI announced GPT-2, a robust text-generating AI model, they explicitly released smaller, less robust versions of the model out of fear that the large model could be used to generate fake news. However, since OpenAI described some of the technical decisions needed to create the model in the corresponding

<https://minimaxir.com/2019/09/ctrl-fake-news/>

Texto

¿Generación de reglas de seguridad con ChatGPT?

 sysdig

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ChatGPT as your Falco Consultant

BY MIGUEL HERNÁNDEZ - FEBRUARY 24, 2023

SHARE:   



Can OpenAI ChatGPT become a contributor for an open source project like Falco? Is this the end of GitHub Copilot?

<https://sysdig.com/blog/chatgpt-falco-contributor>

How to bypass this Falco rule to run a shell

```
- macro: container
  condition: container.id == host

- macro: spawned_process
  condition: evt.type == execve and evt.dir<=

- rule: run_shell_in_container
  desc: a shell was spawned by a non-shell program in a container. Container entrypoints are excluded.
  condition: container and proc.name == bash and spawned_process and proc.name exists and not proc.name in (bash, docker)
  output: "Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.parent cmdline=%proc.cmdline)"
  priority: WARNING
```

To bypass this Falco rule, you would need to modify the condition in the rule to exclude the specific circumstances under which you want to run a shell in a container. For example, you could add an additional condition to the rule that checks for a specific user or process name, and exclude those cases from the rule.

For example, the modified rule could look like this:

```
- rule: run_shell_in_container
  desc: a shell was spawned by a non-shell program in a container. Container entrypoints and specific users/processes are excluded.
  condition: container and proc.name == bash and spawned_process and proc.name exists and not proc.name in (bash, docker) and not proc.name in (specific_user, specific_process)
  output: "Shell spawned in a container other than entrypoint (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name shell=%proc.name parent=%proc.parent cmdline=%proc.cmdline)"
  priority: WARNING
```

In this example, the rule will still trigger if a shell is spawned in a container, but it will not trigger if the shell is spawned by a specific user or process. You can modify the conditions in the rule to exclude any specific circumstances under which you want to run a shell in a container.



Texto

ChatGPT como auditor de seguridad (Code Review)

The screenshot shows a white web page with a red header bar containing the nccgroup logo. Below the header, there's a navigation menu with links: Privacy, Careers, Disclosure Policy, Technical Advisories, Public Reports, and 2021 Research Report. A red 'Contact Us' button is also present. The main content area has a title 'Security Code Review With ChatGPT' in large black font. Below the title, there's a bio for the author: chrisanley, Machine Learning, Offensive Security & Artificial Intelligence, February 9, 2023, and a note indicating it's a 19-minute read. A large block of text follows, starting with 'TL;DR: Don't use ChatGPT for security code review. It's not meant to be used that way, it doesn't really work (although you might be fooled into thinking it does), and there are some other major problems that make it impractical. Also, both the CEO of OpenAI and ChatGPT itself say that you shouldn't.'

<https://research.nccgroup.com/2023/02/09/security-code-review-with-chatgpt/>

ChatGPT creando malware

It's All About Phrasing

ChatGPT attempts to avoid providing malicious code. In the below image, you can see the reply I got when I asked the software to provide a Go keylogger:




Figure 1: ChatGPT's refusal to provide a keylogger

However, when I rephrased my request and described what the program should do, without using the word 'keylogger', my request was fulfilled.




Figure 2: Successfully getting a Go keylogger

<https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/chatgpt-and-malware-making-your-malicious-wishes-come-true>

Audio


Amey-Thakur/DEEPFAKE-AUDIO



An audio deepfake is when a “cloned” voice that is potentially indistinguishable from the real person’s is used to produce...

2 Contributors 0 Issues 20 Stars 7 Forks

<https://github.com/Amey-Thakur/DEEPFAKE-AUDIO>



<https://github.com/CorentinJ/Real-Time-Voice-Cloning>

Deepfake voice

Speechify is the #1 AI Voice Over Generator. Create human quality voice over recordings in real time. Narrate text, videos, explainers – anything you have – in any style.



Try for free

<https://speechify.com/>

dessa-oss/fake-voice-detection



Using temporal convolution to detect Audio Deepfakes

1 Contributor 11 Issues 224 Stars 69 Forks

<https://github.com/dessa-oss/fake-voice-detection>

BenAAndrew/Voice-Cloning-App



A Python/Pytorch app for easily synthesising human voices

10 Contributors 26 Issues 922 Stars 160 Forks

<https://github.com/BenAAndrew/Voice-Cloning-App>

Your Complete Generative Voice AI Toolkit




Text-to-Speech Speech-to-Speech Neural Audio Editing Language Dubbing

Resemble's AI voice generator lets you create human-like voice overs in seconds.

Clone your voice for free Try Demo

<https://www.resemble.ai/>

Audio



Biometric spoofing

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

PRO CYBER NEWS

Fraudsters Used AI to Mimic CEO's Voice in Unusual Cybercrime Case

Scams using artificial intelligence are a new challenge for companies

[https://www.wsj.com/articles/fraudsters-use-ai-to-mimic-ceos-voice-in-u
nusual-cybercrime-case-11567157402](https://www.wsj.com/articles/fraudsters-use-ai-to-mimic-ceos-voice-in-unusual-cybercrime-case-11567157402)

Fake It Until You Make It: Using Deep Fakes to Bypass Voice Biometrics

September 1, 2022 | Alex Poorman

TECHNICAL BLOG | ADVERSARY SIMULATION

<https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/adversary-simulation/using-deep-fakes-to-bypass-voice-biometrics/>

Au



CEO's Case
for companies

nic-ceos-voice-in-u
2

It: Using
s Voice

lation/using-deep-

Imagen



DeepDream




BigSleep



DALL-E



Midjourney



DALL-E 2



PARTI



StyleGAN



StyleGAN2



StyleGAN3



Stable Diffusion

Imagen



Imagen



Propaganda



Nina Lamparski
@ninaism

The hand strikes again : these photos allegedly shot at a French protest rally yesterday look almost real - if it weren't for the officer's six-fingered glove #disinformation #AI
[Traducir Tweet](#)



11:52 a. m. · 8 feb. 2023 · 14,3 M Reproducciones



Anthony
@WebCrooner

Bonjour Twitter,
(Cette image a été générée par l'IA.)
Ne vous inquiétez pas si vous avez vu cette photo sur Internet.
1. Sur mon tweet d'hier la preuve de faux était évidente avez-vous déjà vu un CRS réconforter un manifestant en France ?
[Traducir Tweet](#)



Imagen




Vídeo




DeepFaceLab



Faceit



dot




FaceSwap

Vídeo



FaceForensics++



FakeVideoForensics



Vídeo

Deepfakes: un gran poder conlleva una gran responsabilidad

Idioma: es

Los deepfakes han maravillado y aterrorizado a la sociedad a partes iguales. ¿Estamos ante una innovadora herramienta creativa que abrirá nuevos horizontes artísticos? O, más bien, ¿es esta tecnología una amenaza para la confianza pública? Toda herramienta tiene sus luces y sus sombras, y los deepfakes ya han demostrado su capacidad tanto para 'resucitar' actores en la gran pantalla, como para socavar los cimientos de la democracia. ¿Estamos realmente preparados para las implicaciones de esta tecnología? En esta charla trataremos de dar respuesta a estas preguntas viendo qué son los deepfakes y cómo se pueden generar con proyectos open source como DeepFaceLab o FaceSwap. Para finalizar, veremos casos de uso actuales y cómo podemos protegernos de las amenazas de esta tecnología.

Ángela Barriga Rodríguez



Vídeo



Propaganda



Deepfake Porn and the Twitch Streamer Who Accidentally Brought it to Light

MADISON MCQUEEN 6 MIN READ FEB 10TH, 2023 LEGISLATION, PORNOGRAPHY

Suplantación

04

¿Cómo estar preparados?

Recomendaciones y recursos útiles



Mayores preocupaciones

Industria

1. Impersonation
2. Spear Phishing
3. Phishing Campaigns
4. Persona Building
5. Vulnerability Detection
6. Reverse Engineering
7. H/NIDS Evasion
8. Mining OSINT
9. Password Guessing
10. Attack Customization

Academia

1. Impersonation
2. Biometric Spoofing
3. Target Selection
4. Spear Phishing
5. Mining OSINT
6. Vulnerability Detection
7. Spying
8. Persona Building
9. Phishing Campaigns
10. AI Model Theft

¿Cómo estar preparados?



Conocimientos
y recursos






Herramientas
y frameworks



Personas

Conocimientos y recursos



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



Draft NISTIR 8269

A Taxonomy and Terminology of Adversarial Machine Learning

Elham Tabassi
Kevin J. Burns
Michael Hadimichael
Andres D. Molina-Markham
Julian T. Sexton

This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NISTIR.8269-draft>

Conocimientos y recursos



Conocimientos y recursos

Flawed Machine Learning Security



(AKA Exploring Secure ML)

About this repo

This Repo contains a set of resources relevant to the talk "Secure Machine Learning at Scale with MLSecOps", and provides a set of examples to showcase practical common security flaws throughout the multiple phases of the machine learning lifecycle.

We also present ways to mitigate and avoid these security vulnerabilities, which are grouped under the "[SML Security \(Safe ML Security\)](#)" repo.

Machine Learning Security

Academic Year 2022-2023

The course will start on October 6, 2022. [Teams link](#).

Instructors: Prof. Battista Biggio

Teaching Assistants: Dr. Maura Pintor, Dr. Ambra Demontis

External Seminars: Dr. Luca Demetrio, Prof. Fabio Roli

MSc in Computer Engineering, Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence (Univ. Cagliari)

National PhD Program in Artificial Intelligence

PhD Program in Electronic and Computer Engineering (Univ. Cagliari)

GitHub repository for course material: <https://github.com/unica-mlsec/mlsec>

Awesome AI Security



A curated list of AI security resources inspired by [awesome-adversarial-machine-learning](#) & [awesome-ml-for-cybersecurity](#).

Conocimientos y recursos



ACM Conference on
Computer and
Communications
Security



ELSEVIER

Conocimientos y recursos

NeurIPS ML Safety Workshop

December 9th, 2022. Virtual.

See also: [the NeurIPS ML Safety Social](#)



15th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security

November 11, 2022 – Hybrid Event (Los Angeles, U.S.A.
+ online)

co-located with the 29th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security

A curated list of AI Security & Privacy events

<https://github.com/ZhengyuZhao/AI-Security-and-Privacy-Events>

Conocimientos y recursos

Machine Learning Security Evasion Competition

Welcome

Welcome to the **Machine Learning Security Evasion Competition**, sponsored by Adversa AI, CUJO AI, Robust Intelligence, and Microsoft.

Please find the official results of the MLSEC 2021 at <https://cujo.com/announcing-the-winners-of-the-2021-machine-learning-security-evasion-competition/>.

Join our Slack channel!

Winners

The 2022 MLSEC competition is over, congratulations to the winners:

Phishing track

1. Biagio Montaruli
2. Tobia Righi

Face recognition track

1. Alex Meinke
2. Zhe Zhao

More information about the competition and the top solutions are published on our [blog](#).

ML APPLICATIONS | COMPUTER VISION

Deepfake Detection Challenge Results: An open initiative to advance AI

June 12, 2020

Deepfake Detection Competitions

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hide

1 Deepfakes: Harmful Potential & Detection Competitions

2 Deepfake Detection: Competitions, Goals & Results

2.1 FaceForensics++

2.2 DFDC

2.3 Deeper Forensics Challenge 2020

2.4 DFGC 2021

2.5 OpenMFC

2.6 ForgeryNet

3 FAQ

3.1 Are There Any Deepfake Detection Experiments or Competitions?

3.2 What is DFDC?

3.3 What are the Main Deepfake Detection Competitions?


3.4 Is Deepfake Detection Successful with Neural Networks?

4 References


Herramientas y frameworks

| Reconnaissance & | Resource Development & | Initial Access & | ML Model Access | Execution & | Persistence & | Defense Evasion & | Discovery & | Collection & | ML Attack Staging | Exfiltration & | Impact & |
|--|--|----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 5 techniques | 7 techniques | 3 techniques | 4 techniques | 1 technique | 2 techniques | 1 technique | 3 techniques | 3 techniques | 4 techniques | 2 techniques | 7 techniques |
| Search for Victim's Publicly Available Research Materials | Acquire Public ML Artifacts | ML Supply Chain Compromise | ML Model Inference API Access | User Execution & | Poison Training Data | Evade ML Model | Discover ML Model Ontology | ML Artifact Collection | Create Proxy ML Model | Exfiltration via ML Inference API | Evade ML Model |
| Search for Publicly Available Adversarial Vulnerability Analysis | Obtain Capabilities & | Valid Accounts & | ML-Enabled Product or Service | | Backdoor ML Model | | Discover ML Model Family | Data from Information Repositories & | Backdoor ML Model | Exfiltration via Cyber Means | Denial of ML Service |
| Search Victim-Owned Websites | Develop Adversarial ML Attack Capabilities | Evade ML Model | Physical Environment Access | | | | Discover ML Artifacts | Data from Local System & | Verify Attack | Craft Adversarial Data | Spamming ML System with Chaff Data |
| Search Application Repositories | Acquire Infrastructure | | Full ML Model Access | | | | | | | | Erode ML Model Integrity |
| Active Scanning & | | | | | | | | | | | Cost Harvesting |
| | | | | | | | | | | | ML Intellectual Property Theft |
| | | | | | | | | | | | System Misuse for External Effect |


Herramientas y frameworks



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Herramientas y frameworks



Adversarial
Robustness
Toolbox



Personas

WIRED BACKCHANNEL BUSINESS CULTURE GEAR IDEAS SCIENCE SECURITY

TOM SIMONITE BUSINESS 07.27.2020 07:00 AM

Facebook's 'Red Team' Hacks Its Own AI Programs

Attackers increasingly try to confuse and bypass machine-learning systems. So the companies that deploy them are getting creative.

<https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-red-team-hacks-ai-programs>

Creating an AI Red Team to Protect Critical Infrastructure

<https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/impact-story/creating-ai-red-team-protect-critical-infrastructure>

How Microsoft and Google use AI red teams to “stress test” their systems

<https://www.emergingechnology.com/stories/2022/06/14/how-microsoft-and-google-use-ai-red-teams-to-stress-test-their-system>

Personas clave



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[@goodfellow ian](#)



[Patrick McDaniel](#)



[Aleksander Madry](#)



[Martín Abadi](#)

¿Cómo estar preparados?

Offensive AI Compilation




Here you will find a curated list of useful resources that cover Offensive AI.

[View on GitHub](#)



<https://jep.github.io/offensive-ai-compilation/>

¡Gracias por vuestra
atención!



Miguel Hernández

@MiguelHzBz    @mastodon.social



José Ignacio Escribano

 /in/josé-ignacio-escribano-pablos

Inteligencia Artificial Ofensiva

¿Cómo podemos estar preparados?

