# Wireless Systems Security

EE/NiS/TM-584-A/WS

Bruce McNair bmcnair@stevens.edu


# Week 5: Still More Security Topics

# Some Important Topics in Information System Security

- Minimum privilege/minimum functionality
- Compartmentalization/Containment
  - Separation of Responsibility
  - Dual Controls
- Security Perimeters
- Trustworthiness/Design Correctness
- Single-points-of-failure/Choke-points
- Covert Channels
- Inference
- Implicit vs. Apparent Security

# Minimum privilege/Minimum functionality

Network Management System




- Applications running on NMS have ultimate control over operation of data network
  - 1. What capabilities do users really need to have to perform their job?

Do users need to be able to monitor traffic on the network? Including (potentially) sensitive user traffic?

## Minimum privilege/Minimum functionality


Network Management System



- Applications running on NMS have ultimate control over operation of data network
  - What capabilities do users really need to have to perform their job?
     Do users need to be able to monitor traffic on the network?
     Including (potentially) sensitive user traffic?
  - 2. What features does system really need to enable it to operate?
    Does NMS application code get compiled on NMS or is it downloaded?

## Compartmentalization/Containment


#### Firewall




- Potential compromise of Network 2 should not be allowed to compromise Network 1
- Partitioning of traffic, namespace, services
- Entities on Network 1 may not even be visible to users on Network 2

# Compartmentalization/Containment

Virtual Private Network



# Separation of Responsibility




# **Security Perimeters**

High security area

#### low security area

- Cost of protection scales with size of secure area
- Defining a small security perimeter containing critical assets allows focus on security priorities


## **Security Perimeters**




- Migrating unnecessary functions out of secure perimeter reduces need for inspection/assurance
- Reduces risk of compromise

#### Trustworthiness/Design Correctness


855 × 77.1 = 65536 216








Node 3 is a single-point-of-failure (or attack) and a choke-point

# Survivable Signalling Network (SS7)









Consider a DB with record locking:

TS: Open1, Open2

C: Open1(blocked), Open2(blocked),

Open3(succeed)

Until(Open1) {}

Close3, Close1

TS: While(!Open3){}

Close1, Close2, Close3

// TS just sent a "0"

TS: Open2, Open3

C: Open1(succeed)


Until(Open2){}

Close1, Close2

TS: While(!Open1){}

Close1, Close2, Close3


//TS just sent a "1"



This is an obvious covert channel, with wide bandwidth (on the order of the open/close speed of a data record)

Arbitrary covert channels can be exploited with P(detection) related to utilized bandwidth.

# **Covert Channels - Timing Channel**



Synchronized access to lower level data is used by TS user to convey TS data to lower level user

Note: "TS user" might be Trojan Horse operating on behalf of TS user

#### Example 1:

- Stevens has used Social Security Numbers as Student IDs for many years. Grades were posted by SSN. Name/SSN are never displayed together publicly
- AT&T Bell Labs (That name carbon-dates the age of the issue) switched from Payroll Account Numbers (PANs) to SSNs as employee identifiers
- The POST employee directory was searchable by PAN or SSN, but did not display them
- Individual privacy can be compromised by SSN fairly easily
  - How can two relatively secure systems be played against each other?

#### • Example 1:

- Stevens has used Social Security Numbers as Student IDs for many years. Grades were posted by SSN. Name/SSN are never displayed together publicly
- AT&T Bell Labs (That name carbon-dates the age of the issue) switched from Payroll Account Numbers (PANs) to SSNs as employee identifiers
- The POST employee directory was searchable by PAN or SSN, but did not display them
- Individual privacy can be compromised by SSN fairly easily
  - How can two relatively secure systems be played against each other?
    - A large percentage of part-time Stevens EE/CpE & CS graduate students have historically come from AT&T/Bell Labs
    - Obtain the SSNs of Stevens EE/CpE/CS graduate students from posted grades
    - Search the POST data base by SSN to identify individuals.
      - » Individual privacy is compromised by the joint weakness of two systems that are relatively secure separately

- Example 2
  - ref: Dorothy Denning, "The tracker inference issues in database security"
  - Database contains User names, department, ages, salary, etc.
  - Individual records are protected against search by low level users: only trusted users may read separate records
  - Aggregate database statistics may be viewed by lower level users, e.g.,
    - "Show average salary of male employees"
    - "Show number of users earning more than \$100k"

 Database security system prevents lower level user from retrieving data sets or statistics based on small number of records

- Example 2
  - ref: Dorothy Denning, "The tracker inference issues in database security"
  - Database contains User names, department, ages, salary, etc.
  - Individual records are protected against search by low level users: only trusted users may read separate records
  - Aggregate database statistics may be viewed by lower level users, e.g.,
    - "Show average salary of male employees"
    - "Show number of users earning more than \$100k"
  - Database security system prevents lower level user from retrieving data sets or statistics based on small number of records
    - The DB Inference problem:
      - Attacker creates a series of queries that have a small sample size in their intersection
      - Unless DB security system can assess sample sizes for all possible combinations of queries user has ever made, it is subject to an inference attack.
      - Even if it does this, innocent queries can be denied because they MIGHT create inference vulnerability

#### Implicit vs. Apparent Security

- User chosen passwords are notoriously insecure, often subject to dictionary attacks. Machine generated passwords are suggested as an alternative. Which is more secure?
  - Password scheme1:

```
character(k) = \{a-z, 0-9, !@\#\$\%^*()\} (46 symbols)
PW = kkkkkk
sample passwords: a5&98!, tfhe5&, 3thp1,
```

Password scheme2

```
vowel(v) = {aeiou}
consonant(c) = {bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxz}
PW = cvcvcvcvcv
sample passwords: ponihavoka, risehipeta, tojifatese
```

#### Implicit vs. Apparent Security

- User chosen passwords are notoriously insecure, often subject to dictionary attacks. Machine generated passwords are suggested as an alternative. Which is more secure?
  - Password scheme1:

```
character(k) = \{a-z, 0-9, !@#$\%^*()\} (46 symbols)
```

PW = kkkkk

sample passwords: a5&98!, tfhe5&, 3thp1,

Total password space: 9,474,296,896

Password scheme2

 $vowel(v) = \{aeiou\}$ 

consonant(c) = {bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxz}


PW = cvcvcvcvcv

sample passwords: ponihavoka, risehipeta, tojifatese

Total password space: 10,000,000,000


 Apparent complexity of first scheme suggests higher security, but ease of memorization of second makes passwords more secure

# **Combining Concepts**



# **Security Assessment**

The structure:




- The process:
  - Structured brainstorming

# STOP HERE

# READ THE NOTES BEFORE PROCEEDING


- True brainstorming occurs in two phases:
  - Free flowing idea generation without any analysis
  - THEN, analysis to weed out the useful ideas

- True brainstorming occurs in two phases:
  - Free flowing idea generation without any analysis
  - THEN, analysis to weed out the useful ideas




 Ice build up on high tension wires in cold climates needs to be removed to avoid damage due to excess weight/wind load on the wires. How to remove ice?

- True brainstorming occurs in two phases:
  - Free flowing idea generation without any analysis
  - THEN, analysis to weed out the useful ideas



- Ice build up on high tension wires in cold climates needs to be removed to avoid damage due to excess weight/wind load on the wires. How to remove ice?
- Brainstorming led to a suggestion to train polar bears to climb the towers to shake the wires, breaking the ice

- True brainstorming occurs in two phases:
  - Free flowing idea generation without any analysis



- Ice build up on high tension wires in cold climates needs to be removed to avoid damage due to excess weight/wind load on the wires. How to remove ice?
- Brainstorming led to a suggestion to train polar bears to climb the towers to shake the wires, breaking the ice
- While that idea is not a sensible suggestion, it led to the idea of having helicopters fly over the wires to vibrate them, breaking the ice free.


- You are inside of a room 10'x10'x10'
- The walls, floor and ceiling of the room are solid concrete
- Embedded in the center of the floor is a steel pipe that projects 1 foot from the floor
- There is a ping-pong ball at the bottom of the pipe
- The pipe diameter is about 1/16<sup>th</sup> inch larger than the ping-pong ball.

- You are inside of a room 10'x10'x10'
- The walls, floor and ceiling of the room are solid concrete
- Embedded in the center of the floor is a steel pipe that projects 1 foot from the floor
- There is a ping-pong ball at the bottom of the pipe
- The pipe diameter is about 1/16<sup>th</sup> inch larger than the ping-pong ball.
- In 60 seconds, think of as many ways as you can of removing the ball from the pipe without damaging it or the pipe; you should at least consider using objects you are likely to able to find in this classroom, but do not restrict yourself to those objects

- You are inside of a room 10'x10'x10'
- The walls, floor and ceiling of the room are solid concrete
- Embedded in the center of the floor is a steel pipe that projects 1 foot from the floor
- There is a ping-pong ball at the bottom of the pipe
- The pipe diameter is about 1/16<sup>th</sup> inch larger than the ping-pong ball.
- In 60 seconds, think of as many ways as you can of removing the ball from the pipe without damaging it or the pipe; you should at least consider using objects you are likely to able to find in this classroom, but do not restrict yourself to those objects
- Repeat this exercise using group brainstorming start with the suggestions from the previous step


- You are inside of a room 10'x10'x10'
- The walls, floor and ceiling of the room are solid concrete
- Embedded in the center of the floor is a steel pipe that projects 1 foot from the floor
- There is a ping-pong ball at the bottom of the pipe
- The pipe diameter is about 1/16<sup>th</sup> inch larger than the ping-pong ball.
- In 60 seconds, think of as many ways as you can of removing the ball from the pipe without damaging it or the pipe; you should at least consider using objects you are likely to able to find in this classroom, but do not restrict yourself to those objects
- Repeat this exercise using group brainstorming start with the suggestions from the previous step
- Compare the effectiveness of the two techniques (individual vs. group brainstorming) for developing ideas


# Case 1 Terrestrial Microwave RF Telephone Relay System




4 GHz
Analog SSB FDMA
Multichannel Voice traffic
CCS signaling
Washington, DC area


#### **Network Architecture**








- Assets
- Perpetrators
- Threats
- Existing Safeguards
- Potential Vulnerabilities
- Additional Security Controls

















#### **ASSETS**

- Bandwidth
- Connectivity info
- Capacity info
- Calling card data
- Called number info
- Signaling integrity
- Service provider reputation for privacy; integrity; reliability

#### **PERPETRATORS**

- Disgruntled employee
- Foreign govt.
- Terrorist
- Teenage hacker
- Organized crime

#### **THREATS**

- Jam link
- Copy calling card #
- Monitor called #
- Record conversations

#### **EXIST. SAFEGUARDS**

- Unpublished signaling protocol
- SHF operation
- Narrow beamwidth
- Frequency of operation not widely known


#### **VULNERABILITIES**

- Attacker learns protocol
- Attacker learns/finds frequency
- Signaling sent in clear
- Signaling sent on common channel
- Content in clear

#### ADD'L CONTROLS

- Encrypt content
- Encrypt signaling
- Transmit signaling on separate channel
- Change operating frequency regularly

# Case 1 Terrestrial Microwave RF Telephone Relay System



4 GHz
Analog SSB FDMA
Multichannel Voice traffic
CCS signaling
Washington, DC area

## Case 2 – Public Safety Wireless Networks

