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@jmagly jmagly released this 28 Jul 16:53
· 326 commits to main since this release
v2026.7.22
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jmagly Joseph Magly
GPG key ID: 839584D0E25E5126
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Learn about vigilant mode.
626bebf
This commit was signed with the committer’s verified signature.
jmagly Joseph Magly
GPG key ID: 454C68C4A2174CE9
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

AIWG 2026.7.22 - Configurable threat policy and complete capability discovery

Released: 2026-07-28
Channel: stable

AIWG 2026.7.22 makes threat assessment an explicit, inspectable project policy
and closes the gap between shipping a component and being able to discover an
operational driver for it. It also strengthens agentic installation, session
history import, and release-publication integrity.

Highlights

  • Project-owned threat posture - select off, audit, or enforce, start
    from documented built-in profiles, or compose project-local rule packs and
    per-surface overrides without patching framework code.
  • One deterministic forge-content engine - issue text, pull-request
    metadata, diff summaries, review comments, outbound maintainer comments,
    release notes, and handoff artifacts share the same typed evidence and
    decision contract.
  • Calibrated interruption - negative statements, quoted evidence,
    documentation, and explicit out-of-scope warnings are distinguished from
    requested behavior. The issue #1922 secret-storage warning is a passing
    regression while malicious credential and supply-chain variants remain
    detected.
  • Complete discovery coverage - every shipped operational component must
    have an indexed driver or an explicit exemption. The LLM Wiki addon now has
    its missing driver, and CI prevents similar gaps from returning.
  • Agentic setup flow - a versioned setup.aiwg.io/v1 contract can inspect,
    repair, install, deploy, regenerate, index, and verify AIWG across supported
    providers while preserving source-checkout development mode.
  • Stronger release evidence - signed web manifests bind to the signed tag's
    exact commit, and release CI installs its SQLite test dependency without
    weakening dependency-age gates.

Configurable threat assessment

Threat assessment now lives under security.threatAssessment in the resolved
workspace member's AIWG configuration. Existing projects retain the documented
balanced enforcement default. Trusted local projects may deliberately turn off
AIWG's classifier, audit-only projects can collect the same findings without
policy-driven interruption, and high-assurance projects can require stricter
authorization or rejection thresholds.

The engine records policy and profile versions, a stable policy hash, source
provenance, matched rule and statement IDs, quoted evidence, severity,
configured action, and audit-mode wouldAction. Invalid configuration, unknown
rules, cyclic inheritance, unsafe shadowing, and unavailable packs fail closed.
Turning AIWG assessment off does not disable provider, hosting-platform,
repository-authorization, secret-scanning, or approval controls.

The design is informed by the local NIST AI RMF/control-baseline, OWASP agentic,
AgentSpec, deterministic-gate, harness-engineering, trust-calibration, and
indirect-prompt-injection research corpus. The documentation uses those sources
as design input and does not claim standards conformance.

Capability discovery

The shipped-component inventory is now checked against the framework index.
Frameworks, addons, extensions, plugins, and other operational bundles must
resolve through an indexed skill, command, flow, rule, agent, or declared
driver. The check emits a machine-readable coverage report and blocks CI when a
new component has no route.

The LLM Wiki addon is covered by a canonical operational driver with setup,
ingest, query, maintenance, and health guidance. This fixes the prior state
where the bundle shipped but ordinary capability discovery could not lead an
operator to it.

Installation and sessions

The new agentic setup contract gives providers a shared path for installation,
repair, upgrade, deployment, indexing, context regeneration, and engagement
verification. It diagnoses Node/npm and PATH state, preserves source checkouts
unless migration is explicitly approved, and reports evidence instead of
assuming a successful install.

Session history imports now retain origin timelines, lifecycle terminal states,
and relocation evidence across the normalized session contract. Regression
fixtures protect the behavior while keeping provider-owned source histories
unchanged.

Package matrix

All three packages are prepared to publish in CalVer lockstep:

aiwg@2026.7.22
@aiwg/cli@2026.7.22
@aiwg/cockpit@2026.7.22

The signed release tag publishes npm packages with provenance, creates Gitea
release assets and checksums, packages the agent reference corpus, and mirrors
the stable release to GitHub.

Upgrade

Full local-corpus distribution:

npm install --global aiwg@2026.7.22

Lightweight signed-web distribution:

npm install --global @aiwg/cli@2026.7.22

Existing projects remain compatible. The new threat policy is explicit,
versioned, and independently documented; provider and repository authorization
controls remain in force regardless of the selected AIWG assessment mode.

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