LibraryZ is pre-1.0. Only main is supported — security fixes land there and are not backported.

Please don't open a public GitHub issue for anything you believe is a security problem. Use one of:

1. GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" flow on the repo (preferred — gives us a private fix branch and a CVE pipeline).
2. Email the maintainer — the address is in git log (git log -1 --format='%ae').

Please include:

• A clear description of the issue and its impact.
• Steps to reproduce, or a minimal proof-of-concept.
• The commit SHA or release tag you were testing against.
• Whether you've disclosed the issue to anyone else.

• Acknowledgement within 72 hours (often much sooner).
• A first assessment within 7 days — severity, whether we can reproduce, the rough plan and timeline for a fix.
• Coordinated disclosure: we'll work with you on a public disclosure window. Default is 90 days from report, accelerated if exploitation is observed in the wild.
• Credit in the fix's release notes if you'd like it — anonymous is also fine, just tell us.

In scope:

• The Go backend (cmd/libraryz, internal/**, pkg/**).
• The Compose Multiplatform client (frontend/).
• The deployment surface in this repo: Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, deploy/kong/kong.yml.
• Anything in scripts/ (seed scripts, helpers).

Out of scope:

• Third-party services LibraryZ talks to in your deployment (Postgres, MinIO/S3, Redis, Kong). Report those to their respective projects.
• Issues that require an already-compromised machine, a malicious admin, or physical access.
• Findings from automated scanners with no demonstrated impact.

These are documented elsewhere but worth restating so they don't get re-reported:

• JWT_SECRET is required in production. cmd/libraryz refuses to start when JWT_SECRET is unset or equal to the built-in dev value. Tests and go run use a known-weak default on purpose.
• No refresh tokens. JWTs expire and the client re-logs in.
• Moderator promotion is by SQL UPDATE. There is deliberately no admin endpoint yet. The User.IsModerator field is json:"-" so it cannot be set via the signup body.
• Public catalog by default. GET /works, GET /works/{id}, GET /editions/{id}/download require no auth. Self-host with a reverse proxy that enforces auth if you want a private library.
• Downloads stream through the backend — no presigned URLs. This is a deliberate design choice (ARCHITECTURE.md explains why); not a vulnerability.
• Rate limiting is per-IP via Kong (deploy/kong/kong.yml). Per-user limits require Kong consumers + iss/kid claims in the JWT, which isn't wired yet. If your deployment lives behind a NAT, all users share the same bucket — be aware.
• docker compose up exposes MinIO on :9000 / :9001 with default credentials. Change them, or don't expose those ports, in any deployment past your laptop.

Before pointing this at the public internet:

• Set a long random JWT_SECRET (≥32 bytes from /dev/urandom).
• Change Postgres + MinIO default credentials in docker-compose.yml.
• Put the stack behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (Caddy, Nginx, Cloudflare Tunnel — whatever you trust).
• Restrict Kong's exposed port to the proxy, not the open internet.
• Consider disabling public download of editions if your corpus isn't intended to be public.
• Back up the Postgres volume (pgdata) and the storage backend (filesystem dir or S3 bucket) on a schedule that matches your loss tolerance.