v2.0.6

This release adds configurable allow paths to secret protection and fixes several cases where the secret path scanner misread commands, including a detection gap for symlinked credential directories.

Added

• Added a secret_protection.allow_paths policy setting with a matching "Allow paths" list in the policy GUI. Literal file or directory entries are exempt from the secret pattern rules; explicit deny paths and the coding-CLI protections still apply. Entries that cover the home directory or the guard's own configuration are rejected, and glob patterns are not supported. (#77)

Fixed

• Fixed the home credential rules (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ...) so they still block access when the credential directory is a symlink, as commonly created by dotfile and password managers. (#77)
• Fixed false blocks on text that does not name a local file: regex operands such as git grep "process\.env", prose that begins with a sensitive prefix such as .env.example), and remote http(s) URLs. Files that exist on disk with such names, file: URLs, and shell-escaped operands stay blocked. (#77)
• Fixed the explain exemption to cover every documented invocation form, including bunx cc-safety-net explain, npx -y cc-safety-net explain, and bun run <entrypoint> explain. Other runners and packages keep full argument inspection. (#77)
• Fixed the policy GUI so an unsaved draft created before this release restores without breaking the editor. (#77)