feat(api,web): access model v2 P2 - sign once, listen freely#78
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One SIWE-style signature opens a ~24h session; every later key request rides
a bearer token instead of a fresh wallet signature. The token proves identity
only - the on-chain access check still runs per track on every request.
Key service:
- sessionTokens.ts: HMAC-SHA256 tokens over a strict claim shape, key
HKDF-derived from CONTENT_KEY_MASTER_SECRET with a dedicated info label (no
new secret, no shared bytes with content keys), constant-time verify, 24h
TTL, jti revocation (in-memory, process-lifetime - documented boundary).
- signatures.ts: canonical SIGN_IN message + verifySignInRequest (expiry ->
signature -> nonce consumption, same fail-closed order).
- POST /api/auth/session (401 on bad signature, 503 when unconfigured so the
per-request path remains) and idempotent POST /api/auth/logout.
- key-request route accepts {sessionToken, purpose}; the chain check runs
against the token's address, never client input. 13 new tests (37 total).
Web:
- ensureDotifySession: reuse the stored per-address token (refresh margin),
else one sign-in signature; requestContentKey rides the token, retries once
with a fresh sign-in on 401, and falls back to per-request signing when the
backend lacks session support (404/503).
- Wallet disconnect also signs the session out server-side and forgets the
stored token.
Threat model gains the session-auth boundary section; ticket 24 delivery
notes updated. API 37/37 + typecheck; web 90 unit, lint 0 errors, build ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stacked on #77 (P1b). Ticket 24 P2: session-based key delivery - one wallet signature per ~24h instead of one per listen.
Design (as approved in
dotify-v2-access-and-streaming.md)SIGN_INmessage (nonce, expiry, replay-protected - same fail-closed order as key requests: expiry -> signature -> nonce consumption).POST /api/auth/sessionexchanges it for a bearer token.POST /:contentHash/key-requestaccepts{sessionToken, purpose}. The service verifies the token and runs the on-chain access check against the token's address on every request - the token proves identity, never access.ensureDotifySessionreuses the stored per-address token (60s refresh margin); on 401 it re-signs once and retries; backends without session support (404/503) fall back to the per-request signed path unchanged. Wallet disconnect signs out server-side (POST /api/auth/logout, idempotent) and forgets the token.Token design - no new secret, no new dependency
HMAC-SHA256 over a strict claim shape (
address, chainId, jti, iat, exp), key HKDF-derived fromCONTENT_KEY_MASTER_SECRETwith a dedicated info label - token keys and content keys never share bytes, and operators provision nothing new. Constant-time signature comparison; 24h TTL;jtirevocation blocklist.Boundaries (stated in the threat model, same PR)
Verification
tsc --noEmitclean.tsc -b+ build clean.Merge order: #76 -> #77 -> this.