Patcher desktop 0.1.1-alpha.3

alpha.2 made a sandboxed turn the default. This build is what came of taking
that seriously: a review went looking for ways out of the sandbox and found
them — the app key sitting in a terminal's environment, a rename that walked
around a deny, a CLI a turn spawned outside its own boundary — and each one was
measured before and after rather than reasoned about. Beyond that, a sandboxed
turn's network can be held to a list, an ACP agent and Pi run inside the
boundary their mode promises, and a repository's own setup script asks before it
runs.

Still macOS on Apple Silicon, still ad-hoc signed, and still without
auto-update: the first launch needs one explicit approval in System Settings,
and a newer alpha has to be downloaded rather than offered. On Linux the sandbox
is bubblewrap, and a machine that cannot build one refuses the turn instead of
running it unconfined.

What a sandboxed turn no longer reaches

• The files git executes. A clone whose config, hooks or .gitattributes
  name a program no longer runs it inside Patcher's git — for Codex turns as
  well as Claude ones, on Linux as well as macOS, and no longer only where the
  path is spelled the way the rule expected. Renaming .git, editing the file
  and renaming it back walked around every one of those denies; each directory
  on the way to a protected path is now protected as a name.
• A program outside its own sandbox. On macOS a confined shell could ask the
  system to do what it had been refused directly: defaults write put a file in
  ~/Library/Preferences through the preferences daemon, and an application
  bundle written inside the workspace and handed to open ran with the whole of
  the user's home and network — including the network of a turn whose egress was
  confined to a list. Both are refused now, and so is sending an AppleEvent to
  another application. The cost is open itself: a confined terminal can no
  longer hand a URL or a file to an application, so a tool that wanted a browser
  has to print its link instead.
• What runs outside a Linux sandbox, on the sandbox's behalf. The same
  class as the one above, on the other backend. A confined turn shared the
  machine's process table, so it could signal the daemon and anybody else's
  terminal; it now has a process table of its own. A turn whose network is
  confined could reach the sockets of services outside its namespace — a
  session bus is a program run outside the sandbox, with the network the turn
  had just given up — and those are gone from its view now, along with the
  proxy's willingness to dial the machine's own loopback for a client that asks
  it to. And Patcher's own credential files are hidden by the directory rather
  than one by one, so a database's newest rows are not readable through the
  file SQLite writes a moment after the turn starts.
• Other threads. A turn drives its own thread and the ones it spawned. A
  thread it creates can only name the caller's own thread as its parent and the
  caller's own project — a parent is not a filing label, it is a turn dispatched
  on that thread when the child finishes, at that thread's own permission mode.
• A more privileged next turn. A turn cannot ask for more privilege than it
  has, and it can no longer write the app settings it is running under: three
  fields of that object decide what network the next turn gets. Appearance and
  keyboard stay writable, because a documented agent workflow ends in one of
  them.
• A workspace outside the project's sources. Refused when the thread is
  created, and asked for through update_environment_directory instead.
• The app key. Out of a terminal's environment, and out of the ACP bridge —
  which runs outside the sandbox its agent runs inside and used to answer
  fs/readTextFile and fs/writeTextFile for any path at all. The bridge now
  carries the same denied credential files, the same protected repository
  entries, and the same write roots as the profile.
• A key that outlives its turn. A thread has two credentials with two
  lifetimes, so nohup from a turn's shell loses the API when the turn ends.
• The CLI, except as an API. patcher mcp-serve is spawned by Codex rather
  than by a sandboxed shell, and ran whatever argv the model passed — one
  command wrote a file through a positional path with no server involved at all.
  It now runs only the commands whose whole effect is a request to the API, and
  answers the rest by naming the turn's own shell, where the sandbox says which
  paths exist.

Consent

• A repository's own .patcher-env-setup.sh asks before it runs. The answer is
  remembered per project, machine, checkout and file contents, and is revocable
  in Project Settings; allows made before this build are dropped, so the
  question is asked once more.
• A terminal can answer a consent prompt, so a headless host is no longer a
  thread nobody can unblock.
• A plugin cannot answer one — in either direction. Allowing and dismissing are
  a person's, not something a plugin holding threads settles while a turn
  waits.
• An MCP server's tool in a Codex turn asks, instead of being refused.
• A host nobody put on the list raises a prompt naming the host, the provider
  and the port. The attempt that raised it has usually given up by the time it
  is answered — an agent's own HTTP client stops waiting after ten seconds — so
  the answer is what matters: it is remembered, and the next attempt is the one
  that goes through.

Terminals

• An agent's terminal runs inside its turn's boundary, and is refused where
  bubblewrap cannot build a namespace rather than opening unconfined.
• The tab says sandboxed, the panel names what is refused, and
  patcher terminal list has a Sandbox column.
• A terminal you open from a thread view keeps your own credential. It used to
  be handed the turn's, which refused you patcher terminal restart|close|input
  on the terminal you were sitting in and left your own consent prompts
  unanswerable from that shell.
• patcher terminal create --self and list --self, so a turn does not have to
  go find its own thread id before it can open a terminal.

Providers and the network

• Settings → General → "Confine the network of sandboxed turns", with an
  allow-list of hosts. Off by default, and built on macOS and on Linux.
• Settings → Codex → "Take the network from sandboxed turns", off by
  default.
• ACP agents — Cursor, OpenCode, Grok and Hermes — run inside the boundary their
  mode promises, with the state directories and hosts each one needs measured
  rather than guessed, and a registered agent can declare its own. An agent that
  has declared none has nothing to confine it into, and runs unconfined with the
  thread saying so rather than being refused.
• Pi has a mode besides Full Access. Its network is not confined there, and
  Patcher says so rather than implying otherwise: its client ignores the proxy.
• The patcher CLI reaches a Codex turn as a tool, not only over the network.

The daemon

• A loopback API credential of its own.
• A config write survives a reload the running server refuses.
• The offline reload endpoint is pinned, not just its port.

Browser tools

• Nine patcher browser fixes, including a scoped page read, and four more a
  later review found: wait --url matches a pattern with a ? in it, so a
  redirect ending in a query string is waitable at all; --tab takes a URL or
  title substring rather than only something shaped like an id; a scoped read
  has a deadline of its own instead of waiting out the server's; and
  wait --text searches the whole page rather than the first 20 000 characters
  of it.
• A browser action that refuses says which check refused it, instead of
  sometimes reporting a deadline that expired while it was asking.

Fixes and polish

• A turn can fork a thread again. The scope check read fork as a thread id and
  refused every turn that tried; the fork is now held to the same relationship
  as any other thread a turn drives.
• A terminal on Linux no longer prints
  warning: unable to access '.git/info/attributes' twice for every git
  command. That file is one Patcher protects, and on a repository that does not
  have one, what stood in its place was unreadable rather than empty.
• A Linux machine that has just been given permission to build sandboxes no
  longer has to have its daemon restarted before the next terminal will open.

Docs

• Installing on Linux says what it needs: bubblewrap, and the
  unprivileged-user-namespace sysctl Ubuntu 24.04 restricts — where bwrap is
  installed and still answers Permission denied to everything.
• Security
  is corrected where it had drifted, and names what this build still leaves
  open: how long a turn's credential really lives, and two ways around the
  Linux network boundary.

Patcher desktop 0.1.1-alpha.3 — alpha. macOS on Apple Silicon only.

Download the .dmg, open it, and drag Patcher to Applications.

First launch needs one approval

This build is ad-hoc signed. An ad-hoc signature is valid, but it
carries no Apple Developer ID and is not notarized, so macOS will not
open it on your word alone:

1. Open Patcher from Applications. macOS refuses, saying it cannot
   check it for malicious software.
2. Open System Settings → Privacy & Security, scroll to Security,
   and choose Open Anyway for Patcher.
3. Confirm. Later launches ask nothing.

From a terminal instead:

xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /Applications/Patcher.app

Verifying the download

There is no notarization ticket to check, so SHA256SUMS.txt is what
says the bytes are the ones CI produced:

shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS.txt

It says nothing about who built the app. Only Apple's chain does that,
and this build is not in it.

Alpha builds d...

Patcher desktop 0.1.1-alpha.2

Agents now run sandboxed by default, and stepping outside the sandbox is a
choice you make on purpose. Plus a round of browser fixes, tighter plugin
isolation, and a start-up that no longer lands on a white screen.

Still macOS on Apple Silicon, still ad-hoc signed, and still without
auto-update: the first launch needs one explicit approval in System Settings,
and a newer alpha has to be downloaded rather than offered.

Agents are sandboxed by default

A thread runs inside the operating system's own sandbox: the agent writes in its
workspace and nowhere else. macOS ships that sandbox; on Linux Patcher needs
bubblewrap installed.

• A machine that cannot sandbox refuses the turn and names what to install,
  instead of running the turn without one.
• A provider that does not offer the mode you picked now resolves down to
  the sandbox instead of up to Full Access.
• Every machine still set to Full Access is lowered to the sandbox ceiling when
  you update. Raise it again in Settings if that is what you want — the message
  a refused turn shows names the limit and whose it is to change.
• Full Access is no longer the third item in a menu. Choosing it opens a
  dialog that says what it turns off, and waits for you to confirm.

What a sandboxed turn no longer reaches

• Patcher's own secrets. The app key, the machine auth secret, the daemon's
  bearer token, and the database that holds every thread are denied to the turn
  inside the sandbox — and the daemon refuses to serve those same paths through
  its file API, to any caller.
• The app key itself. A turn's processes are handed a key scoped to that one
  thread instead. It answers for that thread, and the routes that would undo a
  sandbox refuse it: writing files anywhere, opening a terminal, raising a
  machine's ceiling, enrolling a machine, installing a provider CLI, and
  approving the turn's own permission prompt.
• A repository's own git config. A clone whose config or .gitattributes
  names a hook, a filter, or an external diff no longer runs it inside Patcher's
  git.

Security names what this does not close yet, Codex reads and
.git inside the writable roots among them.

Plugins

• Each plugin runs in its own process, so one plugin's key and channel never
  meet another's.
• A plugin is held to what it declared it registers, not only to what it calls.
  A page script matching every site needs the sites to say so.
• A plugin cannot reach a browser command it never declared by writing to its
  channel instead of calling the API it was handed.
• A second connection can no longer take the browser role off the window that
  holds it.

The browser

• Cmd-click opens a link as a background tab instead of crashing the shell.
• The address bar keeps a half-typed address, selects the whole address on the
  click that focuses it, and stops offering to switch tabs while you type one.
• A hovered omnibox row no longer decides what Enter does.
• Closing a tab no longer closes the popup it opened.
• The selected tab is a shade you can find.

Start-up

The app no longer opens on a white screen. A Node builtin reaching the app
bundle fails the build instead of warning, and CI opens the packaged app and
fails the build when the start-up errors.

Patcher desktop 0.1.1-alpha.2 — alpha. macOS on Apple Silicon only.

Download the .dmg, open it, and drag Patcher to Applications.

First launch needs one approval

This build is ad-hoc signed. An ad-hoc signature is valid, but it
carries no Apple Developer ID and is not notarized, so macOS will not
open it on your word alone:

1. Open Patcher from Applications. macOS refuses, saying it cannot
   check it for malicious software.
2. Open System Settings → Privacy & Security, scroll to Security,
   and choose Open Anyway for Patcher.
3. Confirm. Later launches ask nothing.

From a terminal instead:

xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /Applications/Patcher.app

Verifying the download

There is no notarization ticket to check, so SHA256SUMS.txt is what
says the bytes are the ones CI produced:

shasum -a 256 -c SHA256SUMS.txt

It says nothing about who built the app. Only Apple's chain does that,
and this build is not in it.

Alpha builds do not auto-update

electron-updater installs only a Developer ID-signed update, so
this build will not replace itself. Check this page for a newer alpha.

Patcher desktop 0.1.1-alpha.1

Patcher desktop 0.1.1-alpha.1 — alpha. macOS on Apple Silicon only.

Download the .dmg, open it, and drag Patcher to Applications.

First launch needs one approval

This build is ad-hoc signed. An ad-hoc signature is valid, but it
carries no Apple Developer ID and is not notarized, so macOS will not
open it on your word alone:

1. Open Patcher from Applications. macOS refuses, saying it cannot
   check it for malicious software.
2. Open System Settings → Privacy & Security, scroll to Security,
   and choose Open Anyway for Patcher.
3. Confirm. Later launches ask nothing.

From a terminal instead:

xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /Applications/Patcher.app

Alpha builds do not auto-update

electron-updater installs only a Developer ID-signed update, so
this build will not replace itself. Check this page for a newer alpha.