openvc is a security library — it verifies Verifiable Credentials, handles signing keys, and resolves DIDs over the network. Vulnerabilities are taken seriously.

Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Report privately:

• Email luisgf@luisgf.es (you may encrypt to the maintainer's published key), or
• Use GitHub Security Advisories ("Report a vulnerability") on the repository.

Include a description, affected version(s), and a reproduction if possible. You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days and coordination on a fix and disclosure timeline.

openvc is pre-1.0; only the latest released 0.x version receives security fixes. Pin a version and watch releases.

Areas most relevant to security, and how the library is designed to fail closed:

• Signature verification. The VC-JWT suite pins an algorithm allow-list (ES256, EdDSA) before any crypto runs — alg: none, RS*, HS* are rejected (alg-confusion defence) — and reconciles the JWT envelope with the embedded credential. The Data Integrity suite verifies over the RDF canonical form.
• SSRF. The EBSI client enforces an https-only host allow-list. The separate did:web fetch (openvc.fetch) is https-only, refuses redirects, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved/multicast addresses, and pins the connection to the validated IP (closing the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU window).
• JSON-LD contexts for Data Integrity are served from a bundled offline allow-list; unlisted contexts fail closed rather than being fetched.
• Private keys sign through the SigningKey protocol, so an HSM/Vault backend can keep key material out of the process.
• Resource bounds. openvc.fetch caps a response at 1 MiB, and status-list decode caps the decompressed bitstring at 16 MiB, failing closed with StatusListError — a gzip/zlib compression bomb in an issuer-controlled encodedList / lst cannot inflate to an OOM. Caveat: status-list and credentialSchema fetches use a caller-injected resolver, so the openvc.fetch SSRF guard applies only if you pass it. Use the blessed defaults in openvc.resolvers (default_status_list_resolver, default_status_list_token_resolver, default_credential_schema_resolver) — they fetch through the guarded https fetch and, for status, verify the fetched list before trusting it. A custom resolver deliberately opts out of that guard.

For the full assets / trust-boundaries / attacker-capabilities picture, see the threat model. The code-cited auditor annex — per-parser attack-surface tables, the fail-closed invariants catalog, the residual-risk register, and the fuzz-coverage / review history — is the external-audit pack.

If you believe any of these controls can be bypassed, that is exactly the kind of report we want.