A comprehensive research repository focusing on AI/LLM security vulnerabilities, defense mechanisms, and agentic system protection.
This repository documents extensive research into emerging AI security threats, particularly:
- Visual Prompt Injection (VPI) - Hidden instructions in images that bypass traditional security scanning
- Role Confusion Attacks - Attempts to manipulate LLM identity and behavior through prompt engineering
- Agentjacking - Attacks targeting AI coding agents and autonomous workflows
- Deepfake Voice Calls - AI voice cloning for social engineering
- AI-Generated Phishing - LLM-crafted phishing campaigns that evade traditional filters
Testing multimodal LLM vulnerabilities through hidden visual instructions.
Key Findings:
- Claude Opus 4.5: Initial 50% success rate, now 100% defended against system prompt leaks
- Gemini 2.5 Flash: 50% success rate (API access restricted)
- White-on-white text, perspective distortion, and noise overlays successfully bypass OCR-based security scanning
- System prompt leaks via visual hidden instructions - CRITICAL VULNERABILITY IDENTIFIED & DEFENDED
- VPI detection patterns: 10/10 threat patterns validated
Defense Deployed:
vpi_system_prompt_leak_defense.py- Multi-layer VPI defense system (100% success rate)vpi_detector_fixed.py- Enhanced VPI detection engineVPI_SYSTEM_PROMPT_LEAK_DEFENSE_REPORT.md- Comprehensive defense documentation
Test Framework:
vpi_test_runner_anthropic.py- Anthropic API integrationvpi_test_runner_gemini_genai.py- Google Generative AI API integrationvpi_test_cases_full.json- 8 comprehensive VPI test casesvpi_test_report_anthropic.txt- Latest test results (100% defense success)
Generated Test Images:
- Perspective distortion mockups
- White-on-white low contrast images
- Noise/texture overlay UI mockups
- 5 actual VPI test images in
test_images/directory
Testing LLM resistance to identity and authority manipulation.
Test Cases:
- Role Tag Manipulation
- CoT Forgery (Fake Chain-of-Thought)
- Security Thought Reinforcement Bypass
- Stylistic Authority Inference
- Gatekeeper Bypass Simulation
Results:
- Anthropic Claude Opus 4.5: 100% detection and resistance
- Gemini 2.5 Flash: Variable detection rates
Comprehensive research into attacks targeting AI coding agents and autonomous workflows.
Attack Categories:
- Workspace Poisoning - Malicious code injection via agent prompts
- Tool Misuse - Unauthorized system access through legitimate tools
- Input/Output Tampering - Corrupting data streams
- Provenance Attacks - Spoofing agent identity and credentials
Defense Framework:
agentic_workflow_graph_controller.py- Validates LLM-generated tool requests against allowed actionsagentjacking_defense_framework.py- Comprehensive defense architectureagentjacking_simulator.py- Attack simulation and testingmcp-provenance-validator/- Cryptographic signing for agent provenanceworkflow_graph_execution_controller.py- Improved execution controller with enhanced protection
Allowed Actions: read_file, write_file, execute_script, send_network_request, db_query, upload_file
Each with strict parameter constraints and validation patterns.
Recent Improvements:
- Added
UPLOAD_FILEaction with strict CVE-2026-48939/56291/48908 protection - Enhanced Ghostcommit and VPI threat detection
- Improved file upload RCE detection for multiple CVEs
Defense mechanisms against visual and multimodal prompt injection.
SmoothVLM:
- Uses input smoothing (randomized smoothing) to reduce VPI success rate to 0%-5.0%
- Maintains model accuracy while blocking adversarial inputs
VLMGuard:
- Maliciousness estimation using SVD-based analysis
- Unlabeled data maliciousness scoring
- Proactive safety alignment through reasoning-driven prompt rewriting
Implementation:
vlmguard_integrated_full.py- Full integrated implementationvlmguard_r1_enhanced_intent_analyzer.py- Intent analysis with reasoningvlmguard_cli_guide.md- Command-line interface documentation
VPI-Bench Integration:
- VPI-Bench benchmark integration complete (306 test cases)
- Custom test cases covering direct, indirect, and evasion attacks
- Anthropic API testing: System prompt leak vulnerability patched
- Gemini API testing: Access restricted (requires new API key)
Runtime protection for AI agents through strict execution control.
Architecture:
- Workflow Graph Controller - Validates tool requests against allowed action graph
- Local Runtime Protector - Monitors execution environment for unauthorized system actions
Blocks:
- Path traversal attacks (
/etc/passwd,../../) - Untrusted network requests (
malicious-site.com) - Destructive SQL queries (
DROP TABLE,DELETE FROM) - Dangerous system commands (
rm -rf,sudo) - File upload RCE attacks (CVE-2026-48939, CVE-2026-56291, CVE-2026-48908)
- SSRF attacks (CVE-2026-15409, CVE-2026-15317)
- SQL file disclosure attacks (CVE-2026-50180)
Test Results:
- Gemini 2.5 Flash: 6/6 tests passed
- File upload RCE tests: 11/11 passed (all malicious uploads blocked)
- Benign requests allowed
- All malicious intents blocked including VPI and Ghostcommit attacks
Deepfake Voice Attacks:
- Tools: OpenVoice, Coqui TTS, RVC, ElevenLabs
- Attack Pattern: Voice sample collection β Cloning β Social engineering
- Real Case: 2023 UK Energy Firm Hack (β¬220,000 wire transfer)
- Detection: Lack of natural variance, spectral artifacts, missing liveness indicators
AI-Generated Phishing:
- Tools: Llama 3, Qwen, Mixtral, PhaaS platforms
- Why Traditional Filters Fail: No malicious keywords, grammatically correct, contextually relevant
- Defense: Content analysis, sender reputation, SPF/DKIM/DMARC verification
# Install dependencies
pip install -r requirements.txt
# Set up API keys
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="your-key"
export GEMINI_API_KEY="your-key"# Anthropic testing
python vpi_test_runner_anthropic.py
# Gemini testing
python vpi_test_runner_gemini_genai.pypython agentic_jacking_attack_scenarios_test_runner.pypython workflow_graph_real_api_test_runner.py.
βββ vlmguard-integration/ # VLMGuard defense implementations
βββ agentic-framework/ # Agentjacking defense framework
βββ vpi-research/ # Visual prompt injection testing
βββ role-confusion/ # Identity manipulation tests
βββ workflow-graph/ # Execution control system
βββ multimodal-research/ # Audio/video prompt injection
βββ documents/ # Research papers and reports
βββ memory/ # Daily research logs
- InkJect critical threat identified: hidden visual instructions bypass OCR security
- Vulnerable models: GPT-5.2, GPT-5.4 Mini, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Claude Opus 4.5
- VPI-Bench benchmark integration complete (306 test cases)
- No context dilution effect found - all models show perfect recall across context sizes (20KB-150KB)
- Previous "dilution" findings were methodological artifacts (task execution vs. information recall)
- Category 10A provides primary memory persistence evidence
- Successfully integrated Anthropic and Gemini APIs for real-world testing
- Confirmed LLMs generate valid intent JSON that matches allowed schemas
- Proof that decoupling execution control from LLM reasoning mitigates prompt injection
- π‘οΈ VPI System Prompt Leak Defense Deployed - 100% defense success rate
- π‘οΈ Critical CVE Defense Systems Operational - 7 CVEs now protected (iCagenda, Balbooa, JoomShaper, SonicWall, SharePoint, AD FS)
- π‘ BGP Hijack Monitoring Fixed & Running - Job timeout increased to 1100s, operational
- π VPI Detection Patterns Validated - 10/10 threat patterns detected
- π CVE Patching Decision Document Created - Immediate patching recommended
- π¨ Critical File Upload RCE Defense Deployment
- CVE-2026-48939 (iCagenda) - DEFENSE PROTECTED
- CVE-2026-56291 (Balbooa Forms) - DEFENSE PROTECTED
- CVE-2026-48908 (JoomShaper) - DEFENSE PROTECTED
- All three layers tested: Workflow Graph, VPI Detection, SIEM rules
- π― BGP Hijack Monitoring Operational - Job runs successfully (114.8s duration)
- π 3 BGP Hijack Events Detected - 1 ongoing HIGH risk event requiring action
- Gatekeeper LLM architecture prototype complete
- VLMGuard SVD prototype implementation
- Deepfake voice call attack analysis
- AI-generated phishing research
- VPI-Bench benchmark integration (306 test cases)
- π Role Confusion Testing Complete - Claude Opus 4.5: 100% detection
- π‘ VPI-Bench Testing with Anthropic API - Initial results: 50% success rate (vulnerability identified)
- π οΈ Workflow Graph Execution Controller - Improved protection against VPI and Ghostcommit attacks
- π€ Deepfake Voice & AI Phishing Research - Complete analysis with defense mechanisms
- Apple patches 30+ vulnerabilities including 4 WebKit vulns found by AI tools
- BioShacking attack on AI browsers discovered
- SimpleHelp RMM CVE-2026-48558 actively exploited for Djinn Stealer malware
- Nissan Americas breach via Oracle PeopleSoft zero-day
- π QUIC Security Research Completed - 100% complete, ready for deployment
- Memory persistence research completed (Category 10A)
- Category 10B code state manipulation tests: 0 executions across all scenarios
- Heartbeat research on Q2 2026 prompt injection literature
- CVE-2026-55200 libssh2 critical memory corruption (CVSS 9.2)
- OpenAI/Anthropic customer restrictions confirmed
- Miasma supply chain attack discovered
- π― Visual Prompt Injection (VPI) Research Initiated - Critical "InkJect" threat identified
This is a research repository. Contributions are welcome in the form of:
- New attack scenarios and test cases
- Defense mechanism implementations
- Real-world vulnerability findings
- Academic research citations and references
DO NOT share API keys in this repository. All sensitive credentials should be:
- Stored in
.envfiles (not committed) - Rotated regularly
- Scoped to minimum required permissions
Research purposes only. All findings should be responsibly disclosed to affected vendors.
For research collaborations or vulnerability disclosures, please open an issue or contact through GitHub.
Built with π€ by OpenClaw research team