BaseHarbor v0.4.5
BaseHarbor v0.4.5
BaseHarbor v0.4.5 adds a shared secure-binding and workload-identity foundation for capability providers.
Why this matters
BaseHarbor already had strong security primitives in the Compose/OpenBao path: application-scoped OpenBao access, a runtime broker, mTLS, protected binding files, required/generated secrets, identity rotation and revocation behavior.
Until now, those pieces existed mainly as implementation-specific runtime behavior. v0.4.5 extracts the stable security semantics into the shared capability/provider domain so later SQL, S3, messaging, vector, AI and MCP providers do not each invent their own credential and trust plumbing.
Added
secure-binding/v1, a provider-neutral binding specification for workload identity, credential references, trust material, authorization metadata, secret references and security lifecycle declarations.- Secure binding metadata on the shared capability
Bindingmodel used below CLI-specific code. - SPIFFE workload identity mapping for the existing Compose/OpenBao runtime identity:
spiffe://baseharbor/apps/<application>/<environment>. - Machine-readable security diagnostics and explicit renewal/rotation/revocation support declarations.
WorkloadBinding.securityinbaseharbor.provider/v1so future external gRPC/Protocol Buffer providers consume the same security model.
Changed
- Managed
secrets/v1bindings now expose their existing identity, trust, authorization and required-secret semantics through provider-neutral references. - Secure binding validation now happens during plan construction, before provider preflight and before any mutation.
- Credential, trust and secret references must be opaque
baseharbor://references; credential-bearing URLs and plaintext values are not valid binding references.
Security
- OpenBao AppRole names, RoleIDs, SecretIDs, policies, KV paths and PKI internals remain provider state.
- Tokens, passwords, private keys and secret values do not enter the secure-binding model, provider diagnostics or portable application intent.
- Application and environment identity remain isolated; different applications/environments receive distinct logical identity and credential references.
- Shared provider infrastructure does not imply shared authorization.
- Least-privilege authorization metadata is explicit and currently maps managed-secret workloads to read-only secret consumption.
Compatibility
- Manifest version remains
1and no new application-facing security fields are required. - Existing OpenBao, runtime-broker, mTLS, required/generated-secret and restore behavior remains authoritative and compatible.
- Compose remains the complete current runtime provider.
- Existing v0.4.4 exposure behavior is unchanged.
Intentionally deferred
- Human login, OIDC, RBAC, MFA, JIT elevation and breakglass remain v0.6 work.
- Full cross-provider zero-downtime credential/certificate rotation remains tracked separately.
- Managed public certificate issuance/renewal remains outside this release.
- A dynamic external provider loader is still not introduced.