rustjunosmcp v0.27.0

Security

• Redact device secrets from tool output. get_junos_config and
  junos_config_diff returned raw device configuration, including Junos
  $9$-style reversibly-encrypted values, PSKs, SNMP communities, and
  RADIUS/TACACS secrets, straight to the calling model (the README also
  wrongly called these values "hashed" — they are symmetrically encrypted
  and recoverable with the device's master key). Redaction is now applied
  at the two tool-specific call sites and, as a last-mile safety net, in a
  single call_tool post-processor covering every tool response, so a
  newly added tool cannot silently skip it. Tool descriptions and the
  README now say output is redacted (MEC-14).

Added

• confirm_commit — new write tool that sends the confirming commit for
  a commit-confirmed window opened by load_and_commit_config,
  rollback_config, or render_and_apply_j2_template, cancelling the
  pending auto-rollback (MEC-45).

Changed

• Behaviour change: commit-confirmed is on by default.
  load_and_commit_config, rollback_config (commit=true),
  render_and_apply_j2_template, and apply_junos_change_set now issue
  commit confirmed <window> unless the caller passes
  confirm_timeout_mins: 0. Previously these committed directly with no
  auto-rollback net unless the caller opted in. The window defaults to the
  new --commit-confirm-default-mins flag (default 10 minutes); a per-call
  confirm_timeout_mins overrides it. The opt-out is recorded in the audit
  event as commit_confirmed=false. The response and change-set status both
  report rollback_deadline_unix (MEC-45).
• --ssh-accept-new-host-keys now gives real TOFU for NETCONF SSH, not
  no-verification-at-all. Previously the flag pinned scp's known_hosts
  entries on first contact (HostKeyVerification::AcceptNew) but set NETCONF
  SSH to HostKeyVerification::AcceptAll — an operator reading the flag name
  had no reason to expect that NETCONF connections were left completely
  unverified. NETCONF now uses AcceptNew too: an unknown host's key is
  pinned on first contact, and a host that later presents a different key
  is refused, on both the scp and NETCONF paths, against the same
  known_hosts file (MEC-44).
  Behaviour change for anyone relying on the old flag for key rotation:
  a device that rotates its host key (reimage, RE swap) will now be refused
  on reconnect instead of being silently re-trusted. Re-run
  scripts/scan-known-hosts.sh, or delete the stale line from
  known_hosts, after a legitimate rotation.
• New --ssh-insecure-accept-any-host-key flag, lab-only, carries the
  old blanket HostKeyVerification::AcceptAll behavior for NETCONF SSH under
  an honestly-named opt-in. Mutually exclusive with
  --ssh-accept-new-host-keys. Logged loudly at startup and recorded as an
  audit event.
• Container images now publish to ghcr.io/mechubsec/rustjunosmcp —
  the repo moved to the mechubsec organization, and images are renamed to
  match. Older tags were copied from the previous name.

Fixed

• --ssh-insecure-accept-any-host-key now also disables host-key
  verification for scp (transfer_file / upgrade_junos), not just
  NETCONF SSH. The MEC-44 landing (above) left scp on AcceptNew (TOFU)
  under this flag, so a device presenting a changed key was still refused
  over scp despite the flag's name promising to accept any key. Both
  transports now share one SshHostKeyMode end-to-end
  (Strict / AcceptNew / AcceptAll), so --ssh-insecure-accept-any-host-key
  means the same thing on both paths.
• srx_flow_sessions fails closed on two more summary-parsing gaps
  (MEC-745): a node reporting no error but also no recognised session-count
  element no longer has its missing count silently papered over by the
  other nodes' totals, and an early warning-severity rpc-error on a node
  can no longer mask a later error-severity one on the same node. Both
  previously risked understating the true session count.

Full changes: v0.26.0...v0.27.0

Backfilled GitHub release for an existing tag (2026-10-07).