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chore(deps): update dependency qs to v6.14.2 [security]#741

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chore(deps): update dependency qs to v6.14.2 [security]#741
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renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability

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@renovate renovate bot commented Jan 1, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
qs 6.14.06.14.2 age confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-15284

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs did not enforce limits for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2), only for indexed notation (a[0]=1). This is a consistency bug; arrayLimit should apply uniformly across all array notations.

Note: The default parameterLimit of 1000 effectively mitigates the DoS scenario originally described. With default options, bracket notation cannot produce arrays larger than parameterLimit regardless of arrayLimit, because each a[]=value consumes one parameter slot. The severity has been reduced accordingly.

Details

The arrayLimit option only checked limits for indexed notation (a[0]=1&a[1]=2) but did not enforce it for bracket notation (a[]=1&a[]=2).

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js:159-162):

if (root === '[]' && options.parseArrays) {
    obj = utils.combine([], leaf);  // No arrayLimit check
}

Working code (lib/parse.js:175):

else if (index <= options.arrayLimit) {  // Limit checked here
    obj = [];
    obj[index] = leaf;
}

The bracket notation handler at line 159 uses utils.combine([], leaf) without validating against options.arrayLimit, while indexed notation at line 175 checks index <= options.arrayLimit before creating arrays.

PoC

const qs = require('qs');
const result = qs.parse('a[]=1&a[]=2&a[]=3&a[]=4&a[]=5&a[]=6', { arrayLimit: 5 });
console.log(result.a.length);  // Output: 6 (should be max 5)

Note on parameterLimit interaction: The original advisory's "DoS demonstration" claimed a length of 10,000, but parameterLimit (default: 1000) caps parsing to 1,000 parameters. With default options, the actual output is 1,000, not 10,000.

Impact

Consistency bug in arrayLimit enforcement. With default parameterLimit, the practical DoS risk is negligible since parameterLimit already caps the total number of parsed parameters (and thus array elements from bracket notation). The risk increases only when parameterLimit is explicitly set to a very high value.

CVE-2026-2391

Summary

The arrayLimit option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when comma: true is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).

Details

When the comma option is set to true (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., ?param=a,b,c becomes ['a', 'b', 'c']). However, the limit check for arrayLimit (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in parseArrayValue, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.

Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):

if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
    return val.split(',');
}

if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
    throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}

return val;

The split(',') returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via utils.combine does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., ?param=,,,,,,,,...), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of arrayLimit, which is enforced correctly for indexed (a[0]=) and bracket (a[]=) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).

PoC

Test 1 - Basic bypass:

npm install qs
const qs = require('qs');

const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25);  // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };

try {
  const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
  console.log(result.a.length);  // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
  console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message);  // Not thrown
}

Configuration:

  • comma: true
  • arrayLimit: 5
  • throwOnLimitExceeded: true

Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error.
Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.

Impact

Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.

Suggested Fix

Move the arrayLimit check before the comma split in parseArrayValue, and enforce it on the resulting array length. Use currentArrayLength (already calculated upstream) for consistency with bracket notation fixes.

Current code (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):

if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
    return val.split(',');
}

if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
    throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}

return val;

Fixed code:

if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
    const splitArray = val.split(',');
    if (splitArray.length > options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength) {  // Check against remaining limit
        if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded) {
            throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
        } else {
            // Optionally convert to object or truncate, per README
            return splitArray.slice(0, options.arrayLimit - currentArrayLength);
        }
    }
    return splitArray;
}

if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
    throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}

return val;

This aligns behavior with indexed and bracket notations, reuses currentArrayLength, and respects throwOnLimitExceeded. Update README to note the consistent enforcement.


Release Notes

ljharb/qs (qs)

v6.14.2

Compare Source

  • [Fix] parse: mark overflow objects for indexed notation exceeding arrayLimit (#​546)
  • [Fix] arrayLimit means max count, not max index, in combine/merge/parseArrayValue
  • [Fix] parse: throw on arrayLimit exceeded with indexed notation when throwOnLimitExceeded is true (#​529)
  • [Fix] parse: enforce arrayLimit on comma-parsed values
  • [Fix] parse: fix error message to reflect arrayLimit as max index; remove extraneous comments (#​545)
  • [Robustness] avoid .push, use void
  • [readme] document that addQueryPrefix does not add ? to empty output (#​418)
  • [readme] clarify parseArrays and arrayLimit documentation (#​543)
  • [readme] replace runkit CI badge with shields.io check-runs badge
  • [meta] fix changelog typo (arrayLengtharrayLimit)
  • [actions] fix rebase workflow permissions

v6.14.1

Compare Source

  • [Fix] ensure arrayLength applies to [] notation as well
  • [Fix] parse: when a custom decoder returns null for a key, ignore that key
  • [Refactor] parse: extract key segment splitting helper
  • [meta] add threat model
  • [actions] add workflow permissions
  • [Tests] stringify: increase coverage
  • [Dev Deps] update eslint, @ljharb/eslint-config, npmignore, es-value-fixtures, for-each, object-inspect

Configuration

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🚦 Automerge: Enabled.

Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.


  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR was generated by Mend Renovate. View the repository job log.

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch from b17e6ed to cb65216 Compare January 19, 2026 17:49
@socket-security
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socket-security bot commented Jan 19, 2026

Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff Package Supply Chain
Security
Vulnerability Quality Maintenance License
Addedlsmod@​1.0.01001007275100
Addedlodash@​4.17.2181998688100
Addedmemoize@​10.0.010010010081100

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@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch from cb65216 to be59942 Compare January 23, 2026 16:59
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch from be59942 to 9b8bcc7 Compare February 12, 2026 11:10
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socket-security bot commented Feb 12, 2026

All alerts resolved. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

This PR previously contained dependency changes with security issues that have been resolved, removed, or ignored.

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@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-qs-vulnerability branch from 9b8bcc7 to ead3037 Compare February 14, 2026 04:32
@renovate renovate bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency qs to v6.14.1 [security] chore(deps): update dependency qs to v6.14.2 [security] Feb 14, 2026
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