Install Time

Install-time execution

A dependency can run code the moment you install it, before you have read a line of it. That is the vector behind event-stream, ua-parser-js and node-ipc, and it is the one place where scanning after the fact is too late.

Three commands cover it, and they protect at three different moments. Being clear about which is which matters more than any of them individually.

	Blocks what	Has the payload run?
npm allowScripts	the script executing	no — the only real gate
postmortem scripts	nothing — it informs the decision	not yet
postmortem hook	the commit of a bad lockfile	yes, on your machine
postmortem watch	nothing — it reacts	yes

npm already withholds the execution

npm 11 stopped running dependency lifecycle scripts by default:

npm warn allow-scripts 1 package has install scripts not yet covered by allowScripts:
npm warn allow-scripts   some-pkg@1.0.0 (postinstall: …)
npm warn allow-scripts Run `npm approve-scripts <pkg>` to review

Approvals are recorded in package.json as "allowScripts": { "pkg": true }.

That closed the execution hole. postmortem does not reimplement it — two sources of truth for "may this run" would be worse than one. What npm leaves open is the decision itself: it tells you that seven packages want to run code, and nothing about whether any of them should.

postmortem scripts

postmortem scripts .

install scripts  .

  3 package(s) execute code at install time — 1 awaiting approval

  ✗ node-ipc@9.2.1       pending   references network/exec primitives
  · esbuild@0.21.5       approved  script read, nothing flagged
  ? unrs-resolver@1.12.2 pending   script not on disk — not checked

  to approve the quiet ones: npm approve-scripts esbuild

Which packages run code comes from the lockfile — npm records hasInstallScript per entry — so the decision list works with nothing installed. What the script does needs the script, which lives in node_modules; without it that column reads not checked, never "looks fine". An unread script is not a clean one.

Approvals rot, and that is the part npm cannot catch

allowScripts records a name. Not a version, not a hash. A package you approved last year publishes a new release with a different script, and the approval carries over silently. So approved packages are still analyzed:

⚠ 1 approved package(s) have a script that looks hostile now — an approval
  records a name, not a version, so it carries across releases

Those approvals also show up in postmortem allowlist alongside the project's other suppressions, because they suppress the same way.

Other ecosystems have no gate at all

Python's setup.py runs arbitrary code with nothing to withhold it; the same goes for gem extensions and composer scripts. Those are reported as runs rather than pending — saying "pending" would imply an approval step that does not exist.

Exit codes

Exit	When
1	A script looks hostile, or --fail-on-pending and something awaits approval.
0	Otherwise. Merely-pending does not fail by default: a fresh project has everything pending, and that is not a finding.

postmortem hook

postmortem hook install     # write .git/hooks/pre-commit
postmortem hook status
postmortem hook uninstall

This does not stop a malicious install script. By the time git runs a pre-commit hook, npm install has finished and anything it was going to execute has executed. What it stops is that bad lockfile reaching the rest of the team.

The generated hook:

• runs only when a manifest or lockfile is staged — every other commit costs nothing, because a hook that adds seconds to every commit gets deleted;
• runs offline by default (scan . --severity high), configurable with --run;
• exits 0 when postmortem is not on PATH, so a colleague without it installed is not blocked.

It never clobbers. An existing hook is somebody's work, so installing over one is refused, and husky / lefthook / pre-commit are named so you add postmortem to their config instead. --force takes the file over. uninstall refuses to delete a hook postmortem did not write.

And it is not a control: git commit --no-verify skips every hook, and hooks live in .git/hooks, which is not cloned. The CI gate is the control.

postmortem watch

postmortem watch . --interval 2

Re-runs a scan whenever a lockfile changes. A feedback loop, not a gate — it reacts after an install has finished. Add a dependency, see within seconds what came with it.

Implemented by polling stat on the project's lockfiles. Pulling in a filesystem-notification crate and its transitive tree so a supply-chain scanner could watch three files would be exactly what this tool flags in other people's projects. Size and mtime are compared, since a rewrite can land inside a filesystem's mtime granularity.

Only the project root is watched, not the tree: a recursive watch would fire on every install that touched node_modules without changing the project at all.