chore(deps): upgrade @hono/node-server to 2.0.12 - #1832
Merged
Conversation
CodeQL alert #64 (`actions/missing-workflow-permissions`, medium) on `.github/workflows/main.yml`: no `permissions` block, so every job inherits the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, which is broader than anything here needs. It matters more than the severity suggests because this is the workflow that publishes to npm under OIDC — an over-permissioned token in a job that mints publish credentials is worth tightening before 2.0.0 ships (#1818). Adds a workflow-level `permissions: contents: read`. The `publish` and `publish-github-container-registry` jobs already declare their own blocks (`id-token: write` and friends) and are unaffected: job-level permissions override the workflow-level default outright rather than merging with it. The comment records that, since it means each publish job must keep listing every scope it needs — including `contents: read` — and a future edit that trims one "because it's inherited" would break the publish. Surfaced by the v2 tree swap (#1817): `main` had never scanned this workflow before. Pre-existing on `v2/main`, not introduced by that merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Txmv2qqv3yeKgRzoqXytzD
Clears GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9 (2 Dependabot alerts): path traversal in `serve-static` on Windows via an encoded backslash, affecting < 2.0.5. The Inspector's prod web server calls the flagged function directly (`clients/web/server/server.ts` mounts `serveStatic` at `/*`). Worth being precise about the actual exposure, since the summary line reads worse than the flaw is: `..` escapes remain blocked, so it only reaches files *inside* the configured root, by slipping past prefix-mounted middleware. Here `root` is the built SPA — everything in it is public by design — and the only prefix middleware (`/api/*`) is a separate route, not a subdirectory of that root. So there was no auth bypass and no arbitrary file read to fix; this is hygiene, not an incident. The 1.x → 2.x majors turn out to be a non-event for this codebase: v2 drops Node 18 (the repo already requires >=22.19.0) and removes the Vercel adapter (unused). `serve`, `serveStatic`, and `ServerType` — the entire import surface here, across the prod server and ~15 integration tests — are unchanged. `npm run validate` passes on all four clients. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Txmv2qqv3yeKgRzoqXytzD
This was referenced Jul 28, 2026
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
1 participant
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Clears GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9 (2 Dependabot alerts, medium).
What the flaw actually is
Path traversal in
serve-staticon Windows via an encoded backslash (%5C), affecting< 2.0.5. The Inspector calls the flagged function directly —clients/web/server/server.ts:95mountsserveStaticat/*in the prod web server.But the exposure here is essentially nil, and the summary line reads worse than the flaw is. Being precise, because "path traversal in the thing we ship" invites an overreaction:
..escapes remain blocked. The advisory only allows reaching files inside the configured root./admin/*) to reach a protected subdirectory.rootisconfig.staticRoot ?? __dirname— the built SPA. Everything in it is public by design.app.use("/api/*", …), a separate route, not a subdirectory of the static root.serveStaticnever serves/api.So there is no auth bypass and no arbitrary file read to fix. This is hygiene — clearing a real alert against a dependency we genuinely use — not an incident, and it did not gate the 2.0.0 release.
Why the major bump is safe
v2.0.0's breaking changes are narrow:
>=22.19.0serve()APIserveStatic,ServerTypeThat is the entire import surface in this repo — the prod server plus ~15 integration tests, all importing only
serve,serveStatic, or theServerTypetype.Verification
npm installclean; 2.0.12 resolvedtsc -bonclients/webpasses — the integration tests typecheck against the new majornpm run validatepasses — all four clients: format, lint, typecheck, build, testsLockfile diff is scoped to this dependency; unrelated
libcchurn from a newer local npm was reverted.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Txmv2qqv3yeKgRzoqXytzD