security: wire path + prompt validation into IPC commands#27
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Wire the existing (but previously uncalled) validators from core::security into the command layer: - sanitize_workflow_path on save/load/delete_workflow, save/load_workflow_with_metadata, and save_workflow_with_sidecar to block path traversal (.., /, \, null bytes) in names that are used to construct on-disk file paths. - validate_prompt on generate_workflow_from_prompt to enforce the length cap and basic injection guards before the prompt reaches the LLM provider. validate_coordinates is intentionally left unwired: its hardcoded 0-10000 bound would reject legitimate coordinates on multi-monitor setups. https://claude.ai/code/session_01CQaxE4mHrAWqLcfHNFpdUR
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Summary
Wires the existing-but-uncalled validators from
core::securityinto the IPC command layer (items 1 & 2 from the next-steps plan). These functions already had the logic written and tested; they were simply never invoked fromcommands.rs.Changes
sanitize_workflow_pathnow runs at the top of every command that turns a user-suppliednameinto an on-disk path:save_workflow,load_workflow,delete_workflow,save_workflow_with_metadata,load_workflow_with_metadata, andsave_workflow_with_sidecar. It blocks..,/,\, and null bytes.save_workflow_with_sidecarwas the most exposed, since it builtformat!("{}.meta.json", name)directly.validate_promptruns ingenerate_workflow_from_promptbefore the prompt reaches the LLM provider (length cap + basic injection guards).Deliberately not done
validate_coordinateswas left unwired. Its hardcoded0–10000bound would reject legitimate coordinates on multi-monitor setups (three horizontal 4K displays span ~11520px), turning a "security win" into a false-positive regression ininspect_element.Compatibility note
sanitize_workflow_pathrestricts names to[a-zA-Z0-9_\- ]. Any pre-existing workflow saved with a name containing punctuation (e.g.Report.v2,Backup (old)) would now fail to load or delete. This is the project's own designed validator, used as-is.Test plan
cargo check/clippy/teston macOS + Windows)../evilreturns a validation error instead of writing outside the data dirhttps://claude.ai/code/session_01CQaxE4mHrAWqLcfHNFpdUR
Generated by Claude Code