v0.45.1

v0.45.1

Security fix. Upgrade from 0.45.0 if you rely on licence verdicts.

Fixed

• A hostile licence URL could mint a permissive verdict. host_matches already
  rejected a domain sitting in someone else's path, but the token scanner
  underneath splits a URL at any character it cannot consume — so one URL became
  two tokens and each half was read as a standalone URL:

  http://creativecommons.org@evil.example.com/licenses/by/4.0/
  https://creativecommons.org:8080@evil.example.com/licenses/by/4.0/
  https://evil.example.com#creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

  Each returned a real CC-BY-4.0 and ALLOW for commercial use. The first two read
  the URL's userinfo as the host; the third matched its fragment. Open Data
  Commons URLs were affected identically.

  This is reachable input rather than a curiosity: licence strings are record
  data, and anyone can upload a record and set that field on Zenodo, HuggingFace
  or OpenML. The compatibility verdict, the access flag and the FAIR score were
  all derivable from attacker-controlled text.

  A token is now rejected when the surrounding URL syntax proves it is not a
  host — followed by "@" (optionally through a port) is userinfo, preceded by
  "@ # ? & =" means it sits inside another URL's userinfo, fragment or query.

• The same scanner was quadratic on attacker-supplied text. Its host-label group
  nested a star inside a plus, so a 12 KB licence field of "by-by-by-…" cost
  about 1.5 seconds of CPU, and the scan runs three times per licence check — a
  page of such records was minutes of wall clock. Every repetition is now bounded
  by DNS's own limits and the scan is length-capped. 12 KB now costs about 12 ms.

Both symptoms came from one regex, and both are fixed in one change.