Row-level write gate consults neither `modifyAllRecords` nor `sys_record_share.access_level` — both declared write-widening mechanisms are inert

[yinlianghui]

Part of objectstack-ai/hotcrm#705

Found during HotCRM's 17.0 GA acceptance sweep on @objectstack/* 17.0.0-rc.2, permission matrix phase. Two write-widening mechanisms, both inert; filed together because they share one root: the row write gate consults neither.

Measured

The effective row write gate is: owner_id == caller AND (member_default's wildcard RLS owner_only_writes: created_by == caller, OR an explicit RLS update-widener). Nothing else widens writes.

1. modifyAllRecords is inert. A manager profile with declared viewAll + modifyAll on its core objects got 403 row-level on every cross-owner write probed (update AND delete, four objects). Reads widen exactly as declared (43/43, 9/9); writes never.

2. Edit-level shares grant read only. All three edit-level sharing rules verified to materialize in sys_record_share (incl. a fixture created after rule evaluation — the hook fires; and clean revocation on unbinding) and to widen reads exactly. But a PATCH by the share target on the shared record → 403 row-level, every time. The write gate does not consult sys_record_share.access_level.

Corollary from the other side: read-level shares correctly deny writes — the share machinery distinguishes levels on paper, and the write gate then ignores the distinction.

Reproduction

# as a manager-profile user with modifyAllRecords on crm_opportunity
PATCH /api/v1/data/crm_opportunity/<other-owner-record> {"next_step":"x"}
→ 403 "[Security] … not permitted to update this 'crm_opportunity' record (row-level security)"
# share row present (object=crm_account, access_level=edit, target=<user>):
PATCH that account as the share target → 403 (same shape)

Impact

A manager cannot correct, reassign, or clean up anything they didn't personally create; every "manager fixes it" workflow is unimplementable. Org-admin is the only identity that can write across owners.

Prior related issues (checked)

• security/explain 与写入路径对同一条记录给出相反答案：VAMA 持有者对无主 private 记录 explain 答 allowed:true，PATCH 回 403 #4647 (closed) — security/explain vs write path contradiction for VAMA holders; the write-path half of that contradiction is what this issue measures systematically
• spec 契约文档漂移:ISharingService.canEdit 未提 modifyAllRecords 旁路(canDelete 提了) #5125 (open, docs) — spec doc drift: ISharingService.canEdit doesn't mention a modifyAllRecords bypass; once the enforcement question here is settled the doc should follow the ruling
• 澄清:viewAllRecords / modifyAllRecords 在 public_read_write 下失效,是否为开源版有意设计? #3005 (closed) — clarified viewAll/modifyAll under public_read_write; the objects here are private/public_read

Evidence: HotCRM acceptance run w4/results.jsonl (M3/M4/M8). Sibling: objectstack-ai/hotcrm#703 (the same member_default wildcard RLS supplies the created_by co-gate).

[hotlong]

Triage (maintainer-directed batch, 2026-08-07): routed domain:identity — the "(row-level security)" denial is packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts:1192's pre-image gate; it must honor modifyAllRecords and sys_record_share.access_level write-wideners. bug + target:v17 retained. Anchored by code read; triage seat may veto.

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[baozhoutao]

认领(identity 车道 PM,session_01JwwiU9bjhwy2SWj13ho8uv,第 14 轮,2026-08-07 12:1xZ)

• 分支:claude/issue-5492-write-gate-wideners;worktree:../objectstack-issue-5492;域:domain:identity
• 文件面:packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts(分诊锚定 :1192 前像门)+ 其测试 + changeset;⛔ 不动 plugin-sharing/sharing-plugin.ts(那是 On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493 的锚点,串行在后)。
• 批次裁定:Row-level write gate consults neither modifyAllRecords nor sys_record_share.access_level — both declared write-widening mechanisms are inert #5492/On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493/member_default's * wildcard object grant (C/R/E) union-merges into every org member — app-side explicit-allow object gates are erased on three axes #5491 同子系统严格串行,本轮只派本单。On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493 待本单落地后按必答项重定价;member_default's * wildcard object grant (C/R/E) union-merges into every org member — app-side explicit-allow object gates are erased on three axes #5491(union 语义/通配符)含产品语义分叉,PM 另行评估路线。
• 前提时效警报:本单测于 17.0.0-rc.2(08-05);fix(security): controlled_by_parent 折入主档的归属与共享授权 —— 声明的收窄真正被兑现 (#5386) #5816(CBP 写对偶 resolveSharingCanEdit)、fix(plugin-security): getReadFilter 补上 controlled_by_parent 主档收窄 —— analytics 读面与 middleware 同一作用域 (#5815) #5838(读门三层合成)、fix(plugin-sharing): hierarchy resolver 按权威字段拿到调用方活动组织 (#5859) #6067(DEPTH 权威字段)均于 08-06 后落地,同一片写门已被重写 —— 派发令要求逐条前提对 origin/main 重测,部分症状可能已被 fix(security): controlled_by_parent 折入主档的归属与共享授权 —— 声明的收窄真正被兑现 (#5386) #5816 修掉。
• 方向(带前提的裁决):按 declared = enforced 恢复不变量 —— 写门对 modifyAllRecords 与 sys_record_share.access_level 的兑现应与读侧(viewAllRecords/read-level share,实测正常)对称;扩权的确切范围(modifyAll 是否含 delete、edit-share 是否仅 update)以 spec/ADR 的声明原文为准,dev 实测取证。若发现任何 ADR 明文否定该对称(如 modifyAll 不得旁路 RLS 的既有裁决),停手 needs_decision,⛔ 不硬做。

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[baozhoutao]

dev 回执 —— needs_decision,不带 PR(identity 车道第 14 轮,session_01JwwiU9bjhwy2SWj13ho8uv,分支 claude/issue-5492-write-gate-wideners,未推;代码零改动)

一、前提对 origin/main(01faeb13a)逐条重测:两个症状全部仍在

引擎级复现:真实 SecurityPlugin 中间件 + 真实 SharingService + 真实 sharing 中间件,同一 in-memory engine;权限集直接取平台真实种子 defaultPermissionSets 里的 member_default;对象是普通租户业务对象(sharingModel: 'private',没有 access.default: 'private' —— 后者才是 ADR-0066 ① 旁路门认的 posture);调用方 positions = ['org_member'],即 better-auth member 的真实映射。

探针	main 实测	同一上下文下 ISharingService 的判定
manager(viewAll+modifyAll)跨 owner UPDATE	403 (row-level security)	canEdit = true
manager 跨 owner DELETE	403 (row-level security)	canDelete = true
edit 级共享目标 UPDATE	403 (row-level security)	canEdit = true
edit 级共享目标 DELETE(另给 delete CRUD 位)	403	canDelete = false(正确)
read 级共享目标 UPDATE	403	—(正确)
读侧对照:manager getReadFilter	undefined(完全放开)	—
读侧对照:edit 目标 getReadFilter	{$or:[{owner_id:me},{id:{$in:[shared]}}]}	—

#5816 的 resolveSharingCanEdit 没有修到这条路:它在 security-plugin.ts 全仓只有一个调用点(:3484,ADR-0055 controlled_by_parent 的 master 判定),普通行的前像写门根本不经过它。premise_still_valid: true,ISSUE 的两条测量逐条成立,报错形状与分诊锚定一致。

二、根因:行级写权限today 是两个互不知情的权威 AND,三种声明过的扩权只活在其中一个里面

1. plugin-security 前像门(security-plugin.ts:1143-1204,报错 :1192):只看 RLS —— Layer 0 租户墙 AND Layer 1 业务 RLS。
2. plugin-sharing 中间件(sharing-plugin.ts:826):canEdit / canDelete —— owner + DEPTH、edit 级 sys_record_share、modifyAllRecords 旁路。

DEPTH、share、modifyAll 三种扩权只存在于 (2);而 (1) 里坐着平台自己种下的所有权地板 owner_only_writes / owner_only_deletes(default-permission-sets.ts:365,372,created_by == current_user.id,适用域 positions: ['org_member'])—— 同一条「所有权」契约的第二份实现,而且是不认任何扩权的那份。凡是持 member_default + org_member 的人(= 每一个普通成员,manager 也是普通成员),写门就永远是 created_by == me,声明什么都盖不过去。

modifyAllRecords 之所以在 (1) 里失效,是 computeLayeredRlsFilter 的 Layer 1 短路仍带着 posture 门(:3086/:3090/:3139):posturePermits = isPrivate || tenancyDisabled || isBetterAuthManaged,普通业务对象不满足。注意同一个平台对「modifyAll 在普通对象上扩不扩写」已经有两个不同答案:ISecurityService.hasWriteBypass(:676)不带 posture 门(所以 sharing 门放行),RLS 门带(所以前像门否决)。

#5493 是同一结构的镜像:那边是 RLS 放行、sharing 门先 FORBIDDEN;这边是 sharing 放行、RLS 门否决。两个门互相否决对方的声明扩权 —— 于是带 sharing rule 的对象上,app 既不能靠自著 RLS update-widener 扩写(#5493 堵死),也不能靠 share/modifyAll 扩写(本单堵死),两条退路同时没有。

三、声明原文(逐动作),这是裁决的输入

• packages/spec/src/security/permission.zod.ts:168-180:viewAllRecords = "Super-user read access. Bypasses Sharing Rules and Ownership checks.";modifyAllRecords = "Super-user write access. Bypasses Sharing Rules and Ownership checks." —— 原文只说旁路 Sharing 与 Ownership,没有说旁路 RLS 策略。而 owner_only_writes 恰恰是一条写成 RLS 的 ownership check,正卡在这两个词之间。
• modifyAllRecords 的动作范围:permission-evaluator.ts:49 MODIFY_ALL_WRITE_KEYS = allowEdit + allowDelete + transfer/restore/purge → 含 delete;SharingService.canDelete 也认它。→ 兑现面应为 update 和 delete。
• edit 级 share 的动作范围:ADR-0111 D3 + spec/contracts/sharing-service.ts:133-171:"update → canEdit(ownership/depth or a write-level share);delete → ownership + write-DEPTH + modifyAllRecords only"。→ 兑现面只有 update,不含 delete(read 级不扩写)。
• ⛔ 反向红线(派发令的停手条件,原文) —— ADR-0066 ①(Accepted,0066-unified-authorization-model.md:50):"viewAllRecords bypasses read-side RLS and modifyAllRecords bypasses write-side RLS for that object — but only when the object's posture permits it (platform-global or private)"。HotCRM 的对象是普通租户业务对象 → 按字面,modifyAll 不得旁路写侧 RLS。
• 另一条相关:ADR-0095 D1 的 "accepted delta (b)" 把 owner_only_writes 从 org OR created_by 收紧成 org AND created_by,是架构师明确接受并写进 BREAKING release note 的收紧;本单任何扩权都会部分回退它。

四、三个选项,代价都是实测的

A. 去掉 Layer 1 短路的 posture 门(Layer 0 豁免不动)。实测:plugin-security 全量 36 files / 774 tests 全绿 —— 没有任何测试钉住 Layer 1 的 posture 门(authz-matrix-gate.test.ts 钉的是 Layer 0 豁免;task 上 platform_admin 的 Layer 1 本来就是空的)。效果:manager 的 update + delete 修好;edit 级共享仍然 403。代价:字面反 ADR-0066 ①;且把「任一集合里的 '*': {modifyAllRecords:true}」提升为可越过 app 自著业务 RLS —— 半径由 resolveObjectPermission 的 union 决定(见下 d)。只解一半症状。

B. 前像门把「平台自己的所有权地板」与「app 自著 RLS」分层合成(推荐方向)。行必须满足 Layer0 AND app 自著 RLS;所有权地板可被按声明的写权威顶替,而该权威直接委托 ISharingService(update → canEdit,delete → canDelete),所以 ADR-0111 D3 的动作边界是继承来的、不是重写的;provenance 判定照抄 ADR-0105 D3 的既有形状(platform-tenant-policies.ts 的 (object,name,using) 身份键,不新增可授权开关)。实测:plugin-security 全量 36 files / 775 tests 全绿,四个探针全部按声明落位 —— manager update/delete 200、edit 共享 update 200、edit 共享 delete 仍 403(由 canDelete 判的,不是 CRUD 位判的)、read 共享 update 仍 403。

⚠️ B 有一个实测的 fail-open,必须先改契约才能落地:canEdit/canDelete 把「我放行」和「我不管这个对象」合并成同一个 true(无 owner_id 列 / public 对象 / 部署里没有 plugin-sharing 都 return true)。实测:在没有 owner_id 列的对象上(作者自定义对象最常见的形状),普通成员跨 creator 的 UPDATE 在 B 下变成 200(main 上是 403),sharing.canEdit = true。也就是说平台的 created_by 地板今天是这类对象唯一的行级写门(#1985 那一类)。要正确实现 B,ISharingService 必须能区分三态(放行 / 不表态 / 拒绝),这要动 packages/spec/src/contracts/sharing-service.ts + plugin-sharing/sharing-service.ts —— 都在本单硬禁改面之外(派发令:⛔ 不动 spec;plugin-sharing 串在 #5493 之后)。在 security 侧自己重算 owner/depth/share/bypass = 第二份实现,违反「一个契约一份实现」,我没有做。

C. 维持现状,把声明改对。承认行级写 = 两个权威的 AND,并在 spec/文档里写明 modifyAllRecords 与 sys_record_share.access_level 会被平台种子的所有权地板 AND 掉,同时给 app 一条受支持的退路。代价:默认种子下「manager 修别人的记录」无解,access_level: 'edit' 对写永远无效 —— 等于把 ADR-0049 / ADR-0078 的 declared ≠ enforced 固化在安全层自身。

五、建议:选 B,但分两步走

先补 ISharingService 的三态写判定(spec 契约 + plugin-sharing 实现,一个 PR),再在 plugin-security 前像门做 provenance 分层合成(第二个 PR = 本单)。三轴:

• 真实业务需求:HotCRM 17.0 GA 188 探针实测,四对象 update/delete 全 403;三条 edit 级 sharing rule 已正确物化、读侧已按级别区分 —— 机器在跑,只有写侧不认。不是投机能力面,是已发布能力的兑现。
• 长期健全:今天同一条「所有权」契约有两份实现,赢的是不认扩权的那份;B 把地板收敛到唯一一个知道扩权的权威,On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493 的镜像症状也才有对偶解。A 只解一半且要反 ADR 字面,C 把缺陷写进声明。
• 让 AI 写的元数据不易出错:B 的三态契约把「不表态」显式化,消灭 true 既表示放行又表示弃权这种最容易被误读的返回值 —— 上面那个 fail-open 就是这个歧义直接变出来的。A / C 都不解决它。

若维护者裁 A 或 C,请一并给 ADR(0066 ① 的修订 / 新 ADR),我按裁决执行,不自行反转。

六、必答项 c/d/e

• (c) 对 On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493 的影响:不会自动消失,也不能先修。On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493 的否决发生在 sharing 门,B 不改 sharing 门;但两者是同一个问题的两半(「行级写权威是两个门的 AND,还是一个合成判定」)。裁「合成判定」→ On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493 的修法是本单的对偶(sharing 门在拒绝前要看 RLS 是否已按声明扩权);裁「AND 不变」→ 两单都是 by-design,要一起改声明。建议 On objects that carry sharing rules, sharing middleware answers FORBIDDEN before RLS update-wideners are consulted — the identical widener works on rule-less objects #5493 等本单裁决后重定价。
• (d) 与 member_default's * wildcard object grant (C/R/E) union-merges into every org member — app-side explicit-allow object gates are erased on three axes #5491 的交互:member_default 的 '*' union 正是让每个 org 成员同时继承所有权地板的原因(同一个种子集)。两点:(1) member_default's * wildcard object grant (C/R/E) union-merges into every org member — app-side explicit-allow object gates are erased on three axes #5491 若只在对象授权轴给 app 退路(显式 deny 胜出),不会自动去掉 RLS 地板 —— 策略是按「集合 + positions 域」收集的,不看对象授权;(2) 反过来,选项 A 的爆炸半径直接受 union 语义支配:superuserBypassSets 走 resolveObjectPermission(先 per-object,再 '*'),任一集合的 '*': {modifyAllRecords:true} 会在所有对象上顶掉地板。选 B 时半径由 canEdit/canDelete 自己界定,与 member_default's * wildcard object grant (C/R/E) union-merges into every org member — app-side explicit-allow object gates are erased on three axes #5491 的 union 无关 —— 这也是 B 比 A 稳的一个理由。
• (e) 在飞分支零相交(机械核对):扫 origin 上 2026-08-04 之后有更新的 17 条 claude/* 分支,对 plugin-security/src、plugin-sharing/src、docs/adr/{0066,0095,0111} 求交 —— 只有 claude/issue-6083-adr0122-phase2-bare-name-flip 命中 permission-evaluator.ts / delegated-admin-gate.ts(ADR-0122 裸名翻转,与写门无关)。本单未产出代码,交集为零。

范围外发现已另立:#6277(vama-write-path-convergence.test.ts 的 DELETE 用例喂的是引擎会拒绝的调用形状,安全侧前像门在那一半从未被执行;finding 标签,未修)。

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