fix(service-automation): 从未 seal 的引擎首次执行 flow 时告警一次 (#4792)

.changeset/embedded-host-unsealed-node-type-vocabulary-warns.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/service-automation': patch
+---
+
+自动化引擎:嵌入式 host 从未调用 `sealNodeTypeVocabulary()` 时,首次执行 flow 会告警一次(#4792)
+
+#4771 把 ADR-0018 的节点类型校验从 `registerFlow` 挪到了 `sealNodeTypeVocabulary()`。`AutomationServicePlugin` 在 `kernel:bootstrapped` 自动 seal,插件路径不受影响;但自己 `new AutomationEngine()` 且从不 seal 的嵌入式 host 就彻底拿不到这项校验,而且完全静默 —— 只有读过 changeset 的人才知道要补一行调用。现在这类 host 在第一次真正执行 flow 时会得到一条 `warn`,说明丢了什么、以及要调用哪个方法。
+
+- 首次执行是最早既安全又必然到达的时点:正在跑 flow 的 host 显然已经装配完毕(否则这次执行本身就会 `NO_EXECUTOR` 失败)。
+- **每个引擎实例一次**,不是每进程一次 —— 一个 host 建了多个引擎(按租户/环境各一个是常见形态)就是在每个上都漏了这次调用。
+- 告警只报「缺了这次调用」这个关于 host 的事实,**不报**未知节点类型的审计结果:未 seal 的引擎其词汇表按契约仍可增长,在那里断言「某类型没有执行器」正是 #4771 删掉的那种会被本次启动反驳的判断。需要审计结果又不想封闭词汇表的 host 用只读的 `getUnknownNodeTypeAudit()`。
+- 也**不会**顺带自动 seal:「谁决定词汇表封闭」只能有一个答案(host)。而且 seal 之后 `registerFlow` 会转为即时校验,自动 seal 会让「先执行、后注册插件执行器」(ADR-0018 允许)的嵌入式 host 开始收到 #4771 那种误报。
+
+走 `AutomationServicePlugin` 的部署与已显式调用过 `sealNodeTypeVocabulary()` 的 host 都不会多打任何日志(两条哨兵测试守着)。

packages/services/service-automation/src/builtin/decision-branch-routing.test.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,15 @@ describe('decision branch routing (#4414)', () => {
                 return { success: true };
             },
         });
+        // This harness IS an embedded host, so it owes the host's half of the
+        // ADR-0018 contract: every executor it will contribute is registered
+        // above, so the vocabulary is closed (#4771). Without it the first
+        // `execute()` below reports the omission (#4792) and the
+        // zero-warning assertions in this file — which are about #4414 routing,
+        // not about node types — would count that line. Declaring the seal is
+        // the honest fix; filtering the warning out of the assertions would have
+        // hidden a real signal in every future test that borrows this harness.
+        engine.sealNodeTypeVocabulary();
     });
 
     /** The guard from `examples/app-crm/src/flows/convert-lead.flow.ts`. */
@@ -353,6 +362,10 @@ describe('objectui-authored decision shape (FlowEdgeInspector.applyBranch)', ()
                 { id: 'e3', source: 'check', target: 'auto', label: 'Standard', isDefault: true },
             ],
         });
+        // Same reason as the harness above: an embedded host closes its own
+        // vocabulary once every executor is in (#4771/#4792), and every node
+        // type this flow uses is registered above, so the seal is silent.
+        engine.sealNodeTypeVocabulary();
     });
 
     it('takes only the guarded branch when it matches', async () => {

packages/services/service-automation/src/engine.ts

@@ -1130,6 +1130,14 @@ export class AutomationEngine implements IAutomationService {
      * started; only then is an unknown type a finding worth warning about.
      */
     private nodeTypeVocabularySealed = false;
+    /**
+     * Whether this engine has already told its host that
+     * {@link sealNodeTypeVocabulary} was never called (#4792). Per **instance**,
+     * not per process: an embedded host that builds several engines (one per
+     * tenant/environment is the common shape) forgot the call on each of them,
+     * and a module-level flag would report only whichever engine ran first.
+     */
+    private nodeTypeSealOmissionWarned = false;
     private triggers = new Map<string, FlowTrigger>();
     /**
      * Flows currently wired to a trigger, keyed by flow name → the trigger
@@ -2379,6 +2387,13 @@ export class AutomationEngine implements IAutomationService {
             return { success: false, error: `Flow '${flowName}' is disabled` };
         }
 
+        // #4792 — a real run is about to start, so if the vocabulary was never
+        // sealed the ADR-0018 §M1 node-type check never ran on this engine at
+        // all. Say so once. Placed after the two guards above so the trigger is
+        // an execution and not a typo'd flow name (which is already loud) or a
+        // flow that cannot run. See the helper for why here and not earlier.
+        this.warnIfNodeTypeVocabularyNeverSealed();
+
         // Re-entrancy loop guard (see `activeRecordFlows`). Break the SAME flow
         // re-firing for the SAME record while a prior execution is still active —
         // a self-trigger cascade whose start condition fails to suppress it would
@@ -3592,6 +3607,68 @@ export class AutomationEngine implements IAutomationService {
         return audit;
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Report — once per engine — that a flow ran on an engine whose node-type
+     * vocabulary was never sealed, so the ADR-0018 §M1 check never ran (#4792).
+     *
+     * #4771 made {@link sealNodeTypeVocabulary} the *only* moment node types are
+     * validated. `AutomationServicePlugin` calls it at `kernel:bootstrapped`, so
+     * every plugin-hosted deployment is covered — but a host that constructs
+     * `new AutomationEngine()` itself has no plugin doing it, and before #4771
+     * those hosts *did* get a verdict at `registerFlow` (an accurate one, since
+     * an embedded host controls its own ordering and typically registers
+     * executors first). For them the fix traded an unreliable warning for no
+     * warning at all, discoverable only by reading a changeset. "Documented" is
+     * not "enforced" (ADR-0049, #4632), so the omission has to say its own name.
+     *
+     * **Why the first `execute()` is the right moment.** It is the earliest point
+     * that is both safe and certain to be reached: the engine cannot know when a
+     * host has finished wiring, but a host that is *running flows* has finished —
+     * this very run resolves its executors from the same registry, and would fail
+     * `NO_EXECUTOR` otherwise. On the plugin path the seal already happened at
+     * `kernel:bootstrapped`, strictly before any `execute()`, so that path can
+     * never reach this line (pinned by test, so the warning cannot become noise).
+     *
+     * **Why it names the missing CALL and not the audit findings.** Running the
+     * unknown-type audit here and warning about what it finds would be the exact
+     * shape AGENTS.md "Startup registry reads" forbids: an unsealed engine is one
+     * whose host has *not* declared the vocabulary closed, so "no executor for
+     * `approval`" is still "not registered YET" — a verdict this process can
+     * contradict a line later, recorded in a log nobody can retract. That is
+     * #4771 rebuilt inside the embedded path. The missing call, by contrast, is a
+     * fact about the host that no later registration can change. A host that
+     * wants the findings without sealing has {@link getUnknownNodeTypeAudit},
+     * which is read-only by design.
+     *
+     * **Why it does not seal here.** Sealing would silently move the authority
+     * over "the vocabulary is closed" from the host to the first execution, and
+     * it would not be harmless: after the seal `registerFlow` validates inline,
+     * so an embedded host that registers a plugin's executors *after* running a
+     * flow — legal, ADR-0018 keeps the vocabulary open — would start getting the
+     * false "will fail at execution time" assertions #4771 exists to delete. The
+     * engine states the omission; the host still decides when the world is
+     * closed.
+     *
+     * Keep this text clear of {@link warnUnknownNodeTypes}'s "no registered
+     * executor or descriptor" phrase: tests and log filters use that substring
+     * to count *per-flow* findings, and a line that merely talks about them must
+     * not be counted as one.
+     */
+    private warnIfNodeTypeVocabularyNeverSealed(): void {
+        if (this.nodeTypeVocabularySealed || this.nodeTypeSealOmissionWarned) return;
+        this.nodeTypeSealOmissionWarned = true;
+        this.logger.warn(
+            `[automation] flow executed on an engine whose node-type vocabulary was never sealed — ` +
+            `sealNodeTypeVocabulary() has not been called, so the ADR-0018 node-type check never ran and this ` +
+            `engine has never reported a flow whose node types nothing has registered; such nodes now fail ` +
+            `mid-run with NO_EXECUTOR instead of being named at startup. ` +
+            `A host that constructs AutomationEngine directly must call engine.sealNodeTypeVocabulary() once every ` +
+            `plugin has contributed its executors (AutomationServicePlugin does this at 'kernel:bootstrapped'); ` +
+            `engine.getUnknownNodeTypeAudit() returns the same finding without closing the vocabulary. ` +
+            `Reported once per engine instance.`,
+        );
+    }
+
     /** One warning per flow, shared by the boot audit and the post-seal path. */
     private warnUnknownNodeTypes(entry: UnknownNodeTypeAuditEntry): void {
         this.logger.warn(

packages/services/service-automation/src/node-type-vocabulary-seal-warning.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 ObjectStack. Licensed under the Apache-2.0 license.
+
+/**
+ * #4792 — an embedded host that never seals the vocabulary must be TOLD, not
+ * left silent.
+ *
+ * #4771 moved the ADR-0018 §M1 node-type check out of `registerFlow` and into
+ * `sealNodeTypeVocabulary()`. `AutomationServicePlugin` calls it at
+ * `kernel:bootstrapped`, so plugin-hosted deployments are covered — but a host
+ * that builds `new AutomationEngine()` itself and never calls seal lost the
+ * check entirely, with no signal. Those hosts control their own ordering, so
+ * the pre-#4771 verdict was *accurate* for them: the fix swapped an unreliable
+ * warning for no warning at all, recoverable only by reading a changeset.
+ *
+ * Two halves, and the second is as load-bearing as the first:
+ *
+ *   1. the omission is now loud, once per engine instance;
+ *   2. the paths that did nothing wrong — the plugin boot, and a host that
+ *      calls seal itself — gain no log line at all, which is the only thing
+ *      keeping this warning from becoming the noise #4771 deleted.
+ *
+ * Reverse-verified while writing: temporarily inverting the guard in
+ * `warnIfNodeTypeVocabularyNeverSealed()` (warn when the vocabulary IS sealed)
+ * turns the two sentinels below red and the embedded-host cases green-for-the-
+ * wrong-reason, so the sentinels really do guard the seal, not just the string.
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { LiteKernel } from '@objectstack/core';
+import type { Plugin, PluginContext } from '@objectstack/core';
+import { AutomationEngine } from './engine.js';
+import { AutomationServicePlugin } from './plugin.js';
+
+/** Substring that identifies the #4792 line, wherever logs are captured. */
+const OMISSION_MARKER = 'node-type vocabulary was never sealed';
+
+/** A flow that needs no plugin-contributed executor: structural nodes only. */
+const trivialFlow = (name: string) => ({
+    name,
+    label: name,
+    type: 'autolaunched',
+    nodes: [
+        { id: 'start', type: 'start', label: 'Start' },
+        { id: 'end', type: 'end', label: 'End' },
+    ],
+    edges: [{ id: 'e1', source: 'start', target: 'end' }],
+});
+
+/** A flow whose only real node type nothing registers (the #4771 subject). */
+const approvalFlow = (name: string) => ({
+    name,
+    label: name,
+    type: 'autolaunched',
+    nodes: [
+        { id: 'start', type: 'start', label: 'Start' },
+        { id: 'signoff', type: 'approval', label: 'Sign-off', config: { approvers: [{ type: 'user', value: 'u1' }] } },
+        { id: 'end', type: 'end', label: 'End' },
+    ],
+    edges: [
+        { id: 'e1', source: 'start', target: 'signoff' },
+        { id: 'e2', source: 'signoff', target: 'end' },
+    ],
+});
+
+function loggerCapturing(lines: string[]) {
+    const l: any = {
+        info: (m: string) => lines.push(`info ${m}`),
+        debug: () => {},
+        error: (m: string) => lines.push(`error ${m}`),
+        warn: (m: string) => lines.push(`warn ${m}`),
+        child: () => l,
+    };
+    return l;
+}
+
+const omissionLines = (lines: string[]) => lines.filter((l) => l.includes(OMISSION_MARKER));
+
+/**
+ * Minimal `objectql` stand-in exposing the one seam the boot flow-pull reads,
+ * mirroring `flow-node-type-audit.test.ts` — this is how a flow gets registered
+ * during `AutomationServicePlugin.start()`, i.e. on the real plugin path.
+ */
+function fakeObjectqlPlugin(flows: unknown[]): Plugin {
+    return {
+        name: 'fake-objectql',
+        version: '1.0.0',
+        async init(ctx: PluginContext) {
+            (ctx as unknown as { registerService(n: string, s: unknown): void }).registerService('objectql', {
+                registry: {
+                    listItems: (type: string) => (type === 'flow' ? flows : []),
+                    getObject: () => undefined,
+                },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+}
+
+const sealedState = (engine: AutomationEngine) =>
+    (engine as unknown as { nodeTypeVocabularySealed: boolean }).nodeTypeVocabularySealed;
+
+describe('#4792 — a never-sealed node-type vocabulary announces itself at the first execution', () => {
+    it('warns on the first execute() of an embedded host that never sealed', async () => {
+        const lines: string[] = [];
+        const engine = new AutomationEngine(loggerCapturing(lines));
+        // The embedded shape: register the executors, register the flows, run —
+        // and never call sealNodeTypeVocabulary(), because no plugin does it here.
+        engine.registerFlow('embedded_flow', trivialFlow('embedded_flow'));
+        expect(omissionLines(lines), 'registration alone must stay quiet').toEqual([]);
+
+        const result = await engine.execute('embedded_flow');
+        expect(result.success).toBe(true);
+
+        const warned = omissionLines(lines);
+        expect(warned).toHaveLength(1);
+        // The line owes both halves AGENTS.md asks a degradation for: what was
+        // lost, and the call that restores it.
+        expect(warned[0]).toMatch(/^warn /);
+        expect(warned[0]).toContain('sealNodeTypeVocabulary()');
+        expect(warned[0]).toContain('NO_EXECUTOR');
+        expect(warned[0]).toContain('kernel:bootstrapped');
+    });
+
+    it('says it ONCE per engine — and every engine instance speaks for itself', async () => {
+        const lines: string[] = [];
+        const engine = new AutomationEngine(loggerCapturing(lines));
+        engine.registerFlow('a', trivialFlow('a'));
+        engine.registerFlow('b', trivialFlow('b'));
+
+        await engine.execute('a');
+        await engine.execute('a');
+        await engine.execute('b');
+        expect(omissionLines(lines), 'one line per engine, not one per run').toHaveLength(1);
+
+        // Dedupe is per instance, not per process/module: a host that builds one
+        // engine per tenant forgot the call on each of them, and a module-level
+        // flag would report only whichever engine happened to run first.
+        const otherLines: string[] = [];
+        const other = new AutomationEngine(loggerCapturing(otherLines));
+        other.registerFlow('a', trivialFlow('a'));
+        await other.execute('a');
+        expect(omissionLines(otherLines)).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('does not fire for an unknown or disabled flow name — the trigger is a real run', async () => {
+        const lines: string[] = [];
+        const engine = new AutomationEngine(loggerCapturing(lines));
+        engine.registerFlow('off', trivialFlow('off'));
+        await engine.toggleFlow('off', false);
+
+        expect((await engine.execute('never_registered')).success).toBe(false);
+        expect((await engine.execute('off')).success).toBe(false);
+        // Both already answer loudly on their own; the omission is reported when
+        // an execution actually starts, which is the moment the issue argues is
+        // both safe and certain to be reached.
+        expect(omissionLines(lines)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('warns but does NOT seal — the host keeps authority over closing the vocabulary', async () => {
+        const lines: string[] = [];
+        const engine = new AutomationEngine(loggerCapturing(lines));
+        engine.registerFlow('embedded_flow', trivialFlow('embedded_flow'));
+        await engine.execute('embedded_flow');
+        expect(omissionLines(lines)).toHaveLength(1);
+
+        // Auto-sealing here would put two answers behind "who decides the
+        // vocabulary is closed", and the second one would not be harmless: after
+        // a seal `registerFlow` validates inline, so a host that registers a
+        // plugin's executors AFTER its first run — legal, ADR-0018 keeps the
+        // vocabulary open — would start getting the false "will fail at
+        // execution time" assertions #4771 exists to delete.
+        expect(sealedState(engine)).toBe(false);
+        engine.registerFlow('later', approvalFlow('later'));
+        expect(lines.filter((l) => l.includes('no registered executor or descriptor'))).toEqual([]);
+
+        // …and the host's own seal still works, and still reports the finding.
+        const audit = engine.sealNodeTypeVocabulary();
+        expect(audit.map((e) => e.flowName)).toEqual(['later']);
+        expect(lines.filter((l) => l.includes('no registered executor or descriptor'))).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+
+    it('SENTINEL — a host that called seal itself gets no extra line', async () => {
+        const lines: string[] = [];
+        const engine = new AutomationEngine(loggerCapturing(lines));
+        engine.registerFlow('embedded_flow', trivialFlow('embedded_flow'));
+        expect(engine.sealNodeTypeVocabulary()).toEqual([]);
+
+        const before = [...lines];
+        expect((await engine.execute('embedded_flow')).success).toBe(true);
+
+        expect(omissionLines(lines)).toEqual([]);
+        // Nothing at warn/error was added by the run at all — the new code is
+        // reachable here (execute ran) and stayed silent because the host did
+        // its part, not because the path was skipped.
+        expect(sealedState(engine)).toBe(true);
+        const added = lines.slice(before.length).filter((l) => l.startsWith('warn ') || l.startsWith('error '));
+        expect(added).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('SENTINEL — the AutomationServicePlugin path is untouched: sealed at boot, no new log', async () => {
+        // `kernel:bootstrapped` fires strictly after every plugin's start() and
+        // every kernel:ready handler, so any execute() is necessarily after the
+        // seal and this warning can never reach the normal deployment.
+        const stdout: string[] = [];
+        const spy = vi.spyOn(process.stdout, 'write').mockImplementation(((chunk: unknown) => {
+            stdout.push(String(chunk));
+            return true;
+        }) as never);
+        const kernel = new LiteKernel();
+        kernel.use(fakeObjectqlPlugin([trivialFlow('plugin_flow')]));
+        kernel.use(new AutomationServicePlugin());
+        try {
+            await kernel.bootstrap();
+            const engine = kernel.getService<AutomationEngine>('automation');
+            expect(sealedState(engine), 'the plugin seals at kernel:bootstrapped').toBe(true);
+
+            const bootLines = stdout.length;
+            expect((await engine.execute('plugin_flow')).success).toBe(true);
+
+            expect(omissionLines(stdout)).toEqual([]);
+            expect(stdout.slice(bootLines).join('')).not.toContain('sealNodeTypeVocabulary');
+        } finally {
+            spy.mockRestore();
+            await kernel.shutdown();
+        }
+    });
+});