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v0.7.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 24 Aug 01:47
· 53 commits to main since this release
v0.7.0

v0.7.0 release evidence

Status: published and promoted. The signed tag, GitHub Release, npm package, provenance, immutable
verified-installer/bootstrap chain and signed v1 alias are publicly retrievable. Immutable and
post-promotion Action consumers passed.

Outcome

Scope, audit, harden, and retest web projects with AI coding agents and reproducible evidence.

v0.7.0 corrects route-control aggregation and extends route-security into a bounded
access-control-chain review. Application controls are listed once; authentication, route
authorization and unclassified route controls are separate; and routes with no observed
route-scoped control form a human-review queue without becoming vulnerability findings.

For supported syntax, the analyzer records identity evidence and a caller-selected object reaching
a Prisma, Drizzle or experimental Supabase operation in the same entry or through one exact local
call. It stops before a second local call. Next.js Server Actions are represented separately from
HTTP routes. Missing visible controls or query constraints do not prove BOLA/IDOR, and every
Supabase chain retains an external RLS-policy dependency.

Evidence sets

  • v0.7.0 access-control review: four fixed public
    commits, 173 HTTP routes, 23 Server Actions and 32 manually reviewed entries. All 12 observed
    ordinary-project chains are partial and zero are completed.
  • v0.7.0 access-control regressions:
    four minimized correctness failures covering application-guard aggregation, chain fingerprinting,
    Next monorepo roots and exact tsconfig alias resolution.
  • v0.6.0 rule-contract conformance: the
    unchanged 25 built-in risk and three evidence-integrity source-rule contracts.
  • Known limitations: exact route, Server Action, identity,
    data-operation, module-resolution, one-hop and external-policy boundaries.

The ordinary-project review is purposive source-only evidence. It is not representative production
precision/recall, whole-program data flow, runtime reachability, exploitability, DAST or proof that
an audited project is secure.

Published verification

The bounded local gate included:

npm run check
/usr/local/bin/python3 /Users/kenn/.codex/skills/.system/skill-creator/scripts/quick_validate.py .
npm pack --dry-run --json
git -c gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile=.github/release-signers verify-tag v0.7.0

One final-tree full local gate, one package inspection and bounded clean-room consumers are enough
unless a channel-specific failure appears.

Public release facts

  • The SSH-signed annotated v0.7.0 tag object
    b0de94c044082d951c12d95950360d4250e12d31 peels to source commit
    bfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a. Final-tree CI run
    32680695072
    and CodeQL run
    32680695073
    passed before tagging.
  • GitHub Release workflow
    32680851023
    published the reproducible source archive, SPDX 2.3 SBOM, manifest and checksums on 2026-08-24.
    Public SHA-256 values are c5fa68b48e3c4a00ccc9c55fbd7a375eb1adddf9e7e8b7398f5e14a93974aa78
    (archive), 3e0c80aee8a093a3d04fa950d6e78a604c81958a4b7f984ab78cbd97276f0bf4
    (SBOM), f707c4cceafc4864917fd47de525c522117b53c9a5724eb6a4e80e57cbbe5e37
    (manifest) and f40a58952a221f677c9bc76b923b0f4ebd3a3dfe34b16bfb8ced885cb46aaa47
    (SHA256SUMS). Fresh downloads passed checksums, manifest validation, archive lifecycle checks and
    GitHub provenance verification for all four assets.
  • npm workflow
    32680989366
    published web-app-security-skill@0.7.0 at 2026-08-24T01:49:15.577Z through GitHub OIDC
    trusted publishing. npm records shasum a46d7ab62f577dfc21998ba3350d74c7d256d86d, integrity
    sha512-GhVvvQIDb2ahF1aiRzKD2ilszykYY8X2b6i3RAlJ0TJu7o6KjhVK09edqlAG8IRRVD/MU3Z5Q5+8m4ZMw6HFpw==
    and SLSA provenance.
    Its 177 files matched the corresponding signed source-archive files byte for byte.
  • A clean-room exact-version npx --yes web-app-security-skill@0.7.0 demo run produced the expected
    suspected HIGH lead, review proposal, fixed security retest and passing functional retest.
  • Public-state commit b3e77a87cc5ee16195c0965012217416ee3a935d passed CI
    32681514684
    and CodeQL
    32681514679.
    Its scripts/install-verified.mjs SHA-256 is
    4e3c6ce6c8c3ec0cfa7972edbc85b93885bae64cb714a87c926e81fc49410422.
  • Verifier-pin commit cb36196fb438fb0ad0e5b5a6a27043bf48ffb018 passed CI
    32681707779
    and CodeQL
    32681707703.
    Its scripts/bootstrap-install.sh SHA-256 is
    544d0ded89ed98467c275c838f033148d944668b0b56842d849ff8ae4abc63d2.
  • A clean-room public bootstrap downloaded that exact script, verified its SHA-256, installed into
    an isolated temporary home and returned Web App Security Skill 0.7.0. It verified source commit
    bfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a, archive, manifest, checksums and SBOM. Optional GitHub
    attestation was explicitly reported as not run because the isolated home had no authenticated
    gh session; checksum and manifest verification still ran.
  • Immutable Action consumer
    32682001909
    passed against full commit bfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a. Its NestJS fixture
    confirmed that the application rate-limit guard is listed once, authentication and authorization
    remain separate, an unprotected state-changing object route is review evidence, and no confirmed
    vulnerability is fabricated.
  • The SSH-signed annotated v1 tag object
    b04630846eeb621fd40397f78b28ad92c4c4e6bc was moved with a guarded lease and peels to
    bfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a. Its signature verifies against
    .github/release-signers with fingerprint
    SHA256:DmZYVL1dLhUmgaJnfZKpZIexgzMv5jk9+YCoBT3zRIg.
  • Post-promotion public @v1 consumer
    32682179514
    passed the passive crawl, authorization-refusal and immutable NestJS route-security v2 checks.

Artifact identity, consumer success and provenance do not prove every detector conclusion correct
or an audited project secure. v1 is intentionally movable; consumers requiring an immutable
workflow must use the full source commit.