v0.7.0
v0.7.0 release evidence
Status: published and promoted. The signed tag, GitHub Release, npm package, provenance, immutable
verified-installer/bootstrap chain and signed v1 alias are publicly retrievable. Immutable and
post-promotion Action consumers passed.
Outcome
Scope, audit, harden, and retest web projects with AI coding agents and reproducible evidence.
v0.7.0 corrects route-control aggregation and extends route-security into a bounded
access-control-chain review. Application controls are listed once; authentication, route
authorization and unclassified route controls are separate; and routes with no observed
route-scoped control form a human-review queue without becoming vulnerability findings.
For supported syntax, the analyzer records identity evidence and a caller-selected object reaching
a Prisma, Drizzle or experimental Supabase operation in the same entry or through one exact local
call. It stops before a second local call. Next.js Server Actions are represented separately from
HTTP routes. Missing visible controls or query constraints do not prove BOLA/IDOR, and every
Supabase chain retains an external RLS-policy dependency.
Evidence sets
v0.7.0 access-control review: four fixed public
commits, 173 HTTP routes, 23 Server Actions and 32 manually reviewed entries. All 12 observed
ordinary-project chains are partial and zero are completed.v0.7.0 access-control regressions:
four minimized correctness failures covering application-guard aggregation, chain fingerprinting,
Next monorepo roots and exact tsconfig alias resolution.v0.6.0 rule-contract conformance: the
unchanged 25 built-in risk and three evidence-integrity source-rule contracts.Known limitations: exact route, Server Action, identity,
data-operation, module-resolution, one-hop and external-policy boundaries.
The ordinary-project review is purposive source-only evidence. It is not representative production
precision/recall, whole-program data flow, runtime reachability, exploitability, DAST or proof that
an audited project is secure.
Published verification
The bounded local gate included:
npm run check
/usr/local/bin/python3 /Users/kenn/.codex/skills/.system/skill-creator/scripts/quick_validate.py .
npm pack --dry-run --json
git -c gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile=.github/release-signers verify-tag v0.7.0One final-tree full local gate, one package inspection and bounded clean-room consumers are enough
unless a channel-specific failure appears.
Public release facts
- The SSH-signed annotated
v0.7.0tag object
b0de94c044082d951c12d95950360d4250e12d31peels to source commit
bfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a. Final-tree CI run
32680695072
and CodeQL run
32680695073
passed before tagging. - GitHub Release workflow
32680851023
published the reproducible source archive, SPDX 2.3 SBOM, manifest and checksums on 2026-08-24.
Public SHA-256 values arec5fa68b48e3c4a00ccc9c55fbd7a375eb1adddf9e7e8b7398f5e14a93974aa78
(archive),3e0c80aee8a093a3d04fa950d6e78a604c81958a4b7f984ab78cbd97276f0bf4
(SBOM),f707c4cceafc4864917fd47de525c522117b53c9a5724eb6a4e80e57cbbe5e37
(manifest) andf40a58952a221f677c9bc76b923b0f4ebd3a3dfe34b16bfb8ced885cb46aaa47
(SHA256SUMS). Fresh downloads passed checksums, manifest validation, archive lifecycle checks and
GitHub provenance verification for all four assets. - npm workflow
32680989366
publishedweb-app-security-skill@0.7.0at2026-08-24T01:49:15.577Zthrough GitHub OIDC
trusted publishing. npm records shasuma46d7ab62f577dfc21998ba3350d74c7d256d86d, integrity
sha512-GhVvvQIDb2ahF1aiRzKD2ilszykYY8X2b6i3RAlJ0TJu7o6KjhVK09edqlAG8IRRVD/MU3Z5Q5+8m4ZMw6HFpw==
and SLSA provenance.
Its 177 files matched the corresponding signed source-archive files byte for byte. - A clean-room exact-version
npx --yes web-app-security-skill@0.7.0 demorun produced the expected
suspected HIGH lead, review proposal, fixed security retest and passing functional retest. - Public-state commit
b3e77a87cc5ee16195c0965012217416ee3a935dpassed CI
32681514684
and CodeQL
32681514679.
Itsscripts/install-verified.mjsSHA-256 is
4e3c6ce6c8c3ec0cfa7972edbc85b93885bae64cb714a87c926e81fc49410422. - Verifier-pin commit
cb36196fb438fb0ad0e5b5a6a27043bf48ffb018passed CI
32681707779
and CodeQL
32681707703.
Itsscripts/bootstrap-install.shSHA-256 is
544d0ded89ed98467c275c838f033148d944668b0b56842d849ff8ae4abc63d2. - A clean-room public bootstrap downloaded that exact script, verified its SHA-256, installed into
an isolated temporary home and returnedWeb App Security Skill 0.7.0. It verified source commit
bfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a, archive, manifest, checksums and SBOM. Optional GitHub
attestation was explicitly reported as not run because the isolated home had no authenticated
ghsession; checksum and manifest verification still ran. - Immutable Action consumer
32682001909
passed against full commitbfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a. Its NestJS fixture
confirmed that the application rate-limit guard is listed once, authentication and authorization
remain separate, an unprotected state-changing object route is review evidence, and no confirmed
vulnerability is fabricated. - The SSH-signed annotated
v1tag object
b04630846eeb621fd40397f78b28ad92c4c4e6bcwas moved with a guarded lease and peels to
bfed608b5d1abe56b6b34b09f0c6ef59f17eab4a. Its signature verifies against
.github/release-signerswith fingerprint
SHA256:DmZYVL1dLhUmgaJnfZKpZIexgzMv5jk9+YCoBT3zRIg. - Post-promotion public
@v1consumer
32682179514
passed the passive crawl, authorization-refusal and immutable NestJS route-security v2 checks.
Artifact identity, consumer success and provenance do not prove every detector conclusion correct
or an audited project secure. v1 is intentionally movable; consumers requiring an immutable
workflow must use the full source commit.